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ABSTRACT
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Doctrine as Data examines the issues and opportunities around machine acquisition
and analysis ol legal doctrine. This work sought to treat doctrine as data, as a clump of
federal appellate case opinion texts, which could be procured and empirically analyzed with
inlormation processing technology. Doctrine is a nimble knowledge structure however,
existing as a clump as well as a logic where parameters and understandings in case law are
constituted. The subject doctrine for this project, compelling interests of the strict scrutiny
balancing test, proved to be a logic where notions of legitimate police power and individual
rights are established. That logic is flexible, politically sensitive, and responsive, going
beyond opinions from a myriad of cases said manifesting doctrine.
Doctrine as Data examines information systems and their practices of indexing and
accessing appellate case opinions to explore whether these systems are significant to
sustaining, or challenging, conceptualizations of doctrine in cases. The examination
consists of defining, identifying, and collecting appellate case opinions exhibiting the
compelling interest doctrine using the preeminent hard bound and computer legal
information systems (i.e. West's digests and reporters and Lexis / Nexis respectively).
The project also introduces a new tool, the InQuery search engine from the University of
Massachusetts' Center for Intelligent Information Retrieval, to analyze that collection for
conceptual coherency attributed to doctrine, i.e. to probe doctrine's presence in, and
reJationship to, case opinions. It appears however that doctnne exists outside of cases, or
rather, is attributed to cases through traditions oflegal practice, commentary, and
scholarship moreso than in the systems created to manage law's hard data.
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CHAPTER I
DOCTRINE, DATA, AND MACHINES
A. Introduction
Doctrine as Data explores information machinesi and praeliees of knowledge
management as they help constitute meaning for legal doctrine. Legal docuinc is a
knowledge structure, a textual signifier for the contested meanings, and contests of
meaning, lor Judicial decision making and case opinions. Those contests, and their
authontativc results, are sustained across diverse practices of law, polities, commentary,
and scholarship. Doctrine however is intimately associated with law's hard data, case
opinions, and by association with the systems and traditions for managing and providing
access to that data. To examine how doctrine is made meaningful through law's
inlormation machines, if it is made meaningful, this project treats case opinions as data
upon which inlormation machines and analytical processes may toil, and where doctrine is
said to take its most common from.
Legal inlormation systems for storing, indexing, and providing access to case
opinions arc primary tools for legal professionals and scholars. Organization and
mcaninglul manipulation arc the key practices helping shape how case opinions arc
encountered and ultimately utilized or interpreted. This project examines several of these
practices and inlormation machines in a constitutive analysis^ of the compelling state
^ A machine, or information system, is not a formal designation, it is a loose signifier,
representing iuiy metliod juid/or mechanism devised to order mid organize access to a collection of daui
objects. Alphabetization of a rokxlex witli index ctirds for individual enaies is a simple example. “An
inlomiation system is an ordering of miy fomi of daUi in a way tliat makes it understandable and retrievable.
Think of every information system as having two pints. The first part is die database of information, tlie
second pint is tlie organizing system. No matter what form of information system one approaclies, these
two principles come into play. The information system model cmi be used to amuige pure data, or to array
objects. It is as complex as an enormous on-line database, or as simple as one's wallet” (Berring, 1994:
50).
2john Brigham (Brighiun, 1996) outlines constitutive examinations of law and legal phenomena
by paying attention to the scK'ial practices which make tliem meaningful, giving life to the forms luid
interest doctrine in religious free exercise law.3 Doctrine us Data explores wheUicr. and Uie
manner in which, these practices manifest, incorporate, sustain, enhance, or aller doctrine
in an area of conslituUonal law. Or, is doctrine less in the bodies of opinions (,.e. as a
clump), in the words of the text, and more in the shared understandings (i.e. as a
parameter) of those texts by commentators and judges operating with the formal authorities
ot West digests and reporters or Lexis/Nexis?
This exploration of doctrine and case opinions through legal information systems is
part ol a constructed story. That story originally was designed to use the InQueryTseaich
engine to examine the conceptual content^ of a collection of cases delimited by die
compelling interest doctrine in free exercise law. That doctrine represents a tension, or
more accurately is the site lor a tension to be legally manifested, between conceptions of
legitimate state action and notions of individual freedom; it is the site where a boundary is
drawn and re-drawn through the vagaries of case law, statutes, statutory interpretation and
implementation, administrative rules and decision making, and ultimately in appellate
courts. At such boundaries, legitimacy seems critical to the state’s role, and coherency
attributed to the relationship between state and individual (i.e. line drawing), is nomiatively
positive. In the American version ol the common law tradition, especially witliin federal
appellate courts, coherency is the lileblood of the relationship suggested between doctrine.
concepts in law. Brigham suggests tliat texts can also be examined in tliis nnmner, tliat is, law’s texts can
be explored Uirough tlie practices which make tliem meaningful.
- Compelling interests is a standard said residing in individual rights law. It represents one
element in a balancing lunchon which weighs an individual’s rights against tlie loosely defined interests of
tlie state. In tree exercise law, tlie doctrinal signifier compelling interests (and its many synonyms) is
commonly held to define tlie standards of practice for evaluating cases where a state law or policy, or
conceivably inactivity, was claimed to deny an individual of his/her rights to exercise tlieir religious
beliefs.
^ InQuery search engine is an probabilistic inference information retrieval tool developed by tlie
Center of Intelligent Information Retrieval at tlie University of Massachusetts. InQuery is tlie backbone of
tlie InfoSeek WWW search engine, tlie THOMAS Library of Congress legislative database
Concepts for tlie purpose of InQuery, and Information Retrieval generally, are considered to be
lexically contained in noun-phrases (i.e. single nouns or strings of nouns <uid connectors). InQuery allows
for tlie examination of occurrence frequencies and associations between noun phrases across a text
collection.
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prcccden,. and
.siarc decisis, as i, Hows ihrough ihc ease disposidon process. Coherency is
part or many views and ideologies about law, about t.rder, about rule of law; doctrine ttnd
precedent are often measured against coherency. It is quite likely however that coherency,
as with notions of rationality in Judicial rea,soning and product, is as much the result of
rhetoric and tradition (i.e. of the u,se of powerful language persuasively in particular
contexts), as it is universally valid metrics.
Originally, the goal was to explore, using contemporary inlormation machines,
whether doctrines presence, as a clump ol data objccLs, coiTclated to any coherency in the
text or those cases, i.e. did judges reason and cralt opinions in such a way as to imply a
pattern of treatment, or at least consistent methods of case disposition, with the compelling
interest doctrine in religious IVccdom? Doctrine however is a knowledge structure ol' some
abstraction, a product ol' practices and relationships itscll', a knowledge structure which is
dillicult to SLisUiin^ in lormal information machines without the guiding hand of knowledge
cxperts.7 Thus, Doctrine as Data took a rencxivc approach, to examine information
systems as they shape understandings of doctrine and cases, while simultaneously using
those machines to identity and explore compelling interest doctrine in a collection of cases.
^ SusUiin licre in tlic sense of its identity or rneiuiing being elear, known, and relatively statie and
resisUint to rapid change.
Knowledge expert is a kxise categorization or signilier for a class or sub-group of individuals
Ironi domains ol social activity who organize, provide access to, luul structure information relevant to their
institutional pursuits. In law knowledge experts are not simply tliose who pos.sess tlie greatest collection
or recollection ol data (i.e. facts and rules luid prrKes.ses) but are constituted by opinion crafters, .select
commenhitors from judicial, political, .social, and .scholarly ranks.
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^ Streams of Thoiniht - Back||rnnnH
1. Asthma, Shakespeare, and Compelling Interests
A collcclion or doctor's notes on asthma and a dispute over whether Shakespeare
was the author ol recently uncovered works are not typical places in which to ground
sociolcgal investigations, but this project is dilTcrent. A large public health database and a
textual analysis system to map the occurrences of phrases and words in the works of
Shakespeare provided the spark of inspiration for this project. Each system showed how
mlormation not initially evident while looking at individual data objects, or even a sequence
ol objects, may be uncovered or constructed by investigating relationships and patterns
within and between data objects in a large collection of related texts.
The Center for Intelligent Information Retrieval (CIIR) at the University of
Massachusetts developed a national database of doctors' notes regarding asthma and
breathing related dilliculties using the InQuery search engine (Aronow, et al., 1995: 309-
313). The database was designed to assist health maintenance providers develop coverage
policies lor asthma and breathing problems amongst members in addition to providing a
large collection ol inlormation lor both actuarial and medical research purposes. InQuery
databases support natural language processing of users' queries and return all documents
that either contain supplied search terms or contain terms or phrases which highly co-occur
with supplied search terms.^
As part ol the testing ol this system, and also to define the coverage space of
symptoms related to asthma, doctors were asked to query the database with search terms
and phrases they thought indicated the representation of an asthma attack, and thus would
return appropriate doctors' notes. Doctors came up with terms like, "shortness of breath,"
"dilliculty breathing after exercise," "cold weather," "wheezing," to supply to the search
^ Natural huiguagc queries tae simply information requests eomposed of everyday huiguage instead
ol structured query kuiguages grounded in tilings like Bcxileiui logic.
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engine in hopes of returning doctor's notes which indicated an asthma attack. InQuery
autoniahcally expanded the doctor's queiy by adding to the supplied search terms ilio.se
terms or phrases which occurred with the supplied terms relatively oltcn (i.e. high co-
occurrence). 'What the doctors did not know, and what InQuery was able to expo.se, was
that the phrase "night coughs” also appeared to highly coirelatc with doctimeiiLs indicating
asthma attacks. That is, "night coughs" had a high co-tKcurrcnce with .some ol the d,K-t„r
supplied search terms, therefore InQuery returned documents with night coughs in them, a
large number ol them could be described as asthma exacerbation or attack reports according
to the reviewing doctors.
InQuery took a knowledge representation and request from the users and derived
more inlormation by exploring the textual environment around the supplied search terms in
the document collection, by assessing relationships that exist across the corpus, and using
those relationships to support the information retrieval task. InQuery uncovered
inlormation, a textual correlation between the occurrence of "night coughs" and other
indicators of asthma attack. Information becomes knowledge however when it is
incorporated in the systems of understanding about asthma and its symptoms, when it
becomes an assessment ot the data which either makes sense or leads to sensible
improvements in understanding and treatment.
In another realm of inquiry and investigation the patterns of words across a related
corpus was significant in arguing authorship. During the late 1980's there was a dispute
over authenticity of some works thought to be written by Shakespeare (Kolata, 1986:3). A
new document, or rather, a newly uncovered document, was considered to be
Shakespeare's, but there was doubt and debate in the scholarly community. A software
system was employed which derived statistical representations of the patterns of word use
in Shakespeare's works, or at least those largely assumed to be his. Researchers compared
those patterns with the contested document to make an assessment as to whether it was
likely or not Shakespeare had written it.
5
These clTons showed Ihal il was possible lo derive inlormation, and perhaps
knowledge, not oiheiwise possessed hy the so-called knowledge experis, hy using
inlormation systems that idcntily textual characleristics and relationships across a large
collection of related text documents (e.g. doctor's notes or Shakespearean works).
Doctrine as Data first asked whether this sort of approach could be applied in siKiolegal
sludy, specifically, could a collection of case law, related doctrinally, be explored lor
textual relationships, patterns, and maybe even coherency using InOuery',' Could more be
learned about the structuring power of doctrine by looking at a doctrinal collection ca.scs
with InQucry? In this project compelling interest doctrine was to he analogous with
asthma, and the .search then becomes for free exercise law's own night coughs, and making
a,s,scssmenLs or interpretations of them for a different realm of information cxpcni.se.
The compelling interest balancing test in free cxcrci.se ca.scs at the federal circuit of
appeals and .Supreme Court has been the .site of political controversy and activity in the
l9X0's and I99(l's. In this form compelling intorcsl doctrine is a logic, .setting parameters
of understanding and associating meaning to hard objccLs like cases and law. As such it
provides Icrtilc ground lor the politics ol boundary setting between legitimate state power
and individual rights.
The standard for deciding free exercise appeals, cases where an individual claims a
state policy or law either directly or indirectly interferes with their right to freely exercise
their religious beliefs thus contravening the First Amendment, is the strict scrutiny test. As
part ol that test the Supreme Court had established the compelling interest standard in the
1960's in this area of constitutional law ( Sherhert v. Verner. 374 US. 398, (1963)). The
test asked, amongst other things, whether the policy at issue served a compelling state
interest, and therefore superseded the religious free exercise claim. That standard had come
under some attack in the 1980's as federal and slate prisoners used it to file numerous
claims against prison administrations, criticism tended to focus most on the difficulty in
6
assessing wiial was compelling, and even wheUier the courts ought to be
which seemed to be a policy or logtslativc determtnation.
making ihal
The Court changed doctrinal course in 1990 with the Smith
. 1 10 S.Ct. 1595,
(1990) decision and iushee Seaha’s majority opinion regarding religious Iree exereisl and
prohibition or peyote use. Justice Scalia criticized the prolTered existing strict scrutiny
standard and spccilically the compelling interest doctrine supporting it while at the same
time rc-articulatmg judicial treatment for at least free exercise cases. Rather Uian subjecting
the challenged law or policy to strict scrutiny and attempt to identify and balance relative
interests, appellate judges should only determine whether the challenged law or policy is
discriminatory, lacially or one would suppose, disparatcly impacts upon an identifiable
group. Weighing interests and identifying them as compelling is the realm of policy
making bodies like a legislature writes Justice Scalia. And thus by default, if the legislature
conducts policy making with all considerations of due process, then whether the interest is
compelling or not, does not seem to rise to the level of a constitutional question.
In the wake of Mith Congress moved to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA - 42 U.S.C. 2()()()bb to 2(X)()bb-4 (Supp. V 1994)) to re-install the compelling
interest doctrine s balancing standard in appellate court review of free exercise cases. The
RFRA has subsequently been overturned by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v.
Elorcs, 1 17 S.Ct. 2157, (1997) as an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial power by the
legislative branch. This political and judicial jockeying brought tlie doctrine considerable
attention, and has shown it to be a robust and ubiquitous knowledge structure, showing up
in balancing acts throughout constitutional decision making. Compelling interest doctrine's
role as a logic or site where a particular lorm ol political action or tension takes place is
lurther solidified when its ubiquity in constitutional rights law is exposed. Questions arise
as to when interests are compelling, generally and in specific contexts like religious free
exercise? How an interest became compelling? And, what sort of balancing test
procedures
7
exist tor assessing the relative merits of
exercise interest?
a state interest or conversely of an individual's free
Compelling stale interests have never been fully defined, or outlined as a semi-
lornial institutional practice of appellate courts. Neither had an area of law, like religious
tree exercise, been empirically investigated with information machines which pay parliculai-
attention to word occurrence and co-occurrence patterns. A federal circuit court judge had
the insight to probe this area of case law with what was then cutting edge technology,
Lcxis/Nexis. Judge Noonan’ was able to show that in a large number of cases where
violations of religious free exercise were claimed, that the purveyors of official acts
prevailed. »> In a subset of those cases it is rea.sonable to expect that a compelling stale
interest was lound to exist, and was a factor in upholding state policies. There is as of yet
no standard determination for the existence of such interests, this gap has been commented
upon by other appellate judges.” Judge Noonan made a contribution to our knowledge of
tree exercise and compelling interests, and he showed the power and potential for computer
assisted legal research into structures like doctrine.
In E^jgal Emplpyrngnt Opportunity Commis.sion v, Townlev Engineering
.V Maniinu tiirino
CiLa 859 F.2d 610, (1988), di.ssenting Judge Noonan determined tliat in tlie wide area of First Amendment
cases tliat very rarely is a challenge to governmental policy sustained. This seems at (xlds widi tlie words
of die compelling government interest in tlie First Amendment realm, that is, “tliat tlie policy is least
restrictive and tliat it serves a compelling government interest.” Intuitively tliis would appear a high hurdle
to jump, but yet state and federal policies have enjoyed significant success when challenged, i.e. compelling
interests mid least restrictive means are apparently easily secured.
Specifically, Judge Noonan had his law clerk perform a Lexis search to find a batch of cases
where tlie term “free exercise” was within 10 words of unconstit! or relig!.
^
^ III Waters v. Churchill. 1 14 S. Ct. 1878 (1994), a free speech case, die Court declared its
concern over die doctrine. We have never set forth a general test to determine when a procedural safeguard
is required by die First Amendment-just as we have never set fordi a general test to determine what
constitutes a compelling state interest. This opinion cites Justice O'Connor's opinion in, Michael Boos.
J. Michael Waller and Bridget Brooker v. Marion S. Barry, Jr.. Mayor of D.C.. et. al.. 485 U.,S.312,
1988 where she goes dirough die determination of whedier a compelling interest exists in die federal
govenimeiiLs limidng access to foreign embassies for die purpose of polidcal protest; diere is no apparent
model or guideline upon which O'Connor builds her case.
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C. The Robust MoHpI
1. Doctrine as Data for Information Machines
This project was designed to treat legal doctrine as data (i.e. as a clump) for
cmpincal analysis, attempting that however showed doctnne to be a llcxible knowledge
stmcture constructed and deployed in commentaiy, education, case disposition, and
opinion production. Yet, doctrine's relationship to appellate case opinions is foundational
regardless of the particular form doctrine takes. The original goal of the projeci was to
explore the conceptual domain of the compelling state interest doctrine (i.e. as a clump) by
subjecting a collection of case opinions tied together by that doctrine (i.e. the logic or
knowledge structure) to computer analysis in search of coherencyi2 distinct from that
attributed to cases by scholars and praciiiioners.i3 The InQuery search engine pre,sented
the opportunity to identify concepLs and their occurrence and co-occurrence frequencies
across a collection ol related documents.
It was hoped that InQuery could be used to ascertain whether doctrine was
manilested structurally in case opinions, to investigate whether there were patterns in
concept occurrences and associations which correlate to doctrine’s supposedly
determinative role in two groups ol federal appellate free exercise cases, i.e. those where
the state's interests prevailed or were in essence compelling, or those where individual
1 a
The coherency ot doctrine is rigged to a degree. Autlioritative understandings and expert
knowledge of doctrine and cases were used to define and construct tlie corpus (i.e., supreme court and federal
circuit courts of appeal, focused around tlie First Amendment and its protections of religious free exercise,
operational in particular period ( 1963-present)). And, tlie language of a balancing test will be present
tliroughout. But tliat is a wide conceptual net, or rigged coherency, InQuery can identify all concepts, if
tliere are patterns or occurrences of interest beyond tliose used to select tlie collection we may find tliem
witli InQuery.
Clearly tlie definition of tlie data set, or collection of cases, relied on expert knowledge, tuid tlie
application ol tliat knowledge in tlie determination of what should be in tlie collection and what should not.
That knowledge is part and parcel of a community of individuals, situated in and around legal institutions
tuid tlie research tliereof.
1 1
^ Occurrence frequencies are simple counts of plirase / term occurrences in tlie texts; co-(x:currence
frequency signifies tlie spatial relationship between plirases and terms.
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righLs claims trumped stale interests. The project sought to determine whether collected
cases were tied together primarily by expert knowledge brought to boar in legtU information
management, or instead, was there something in the cases themselves which could be
argued suggested a variant of coherency and bound them together beyond some basic
textual common denominators?
The projeet originally sought to augment the study of judicial politics by viewing
doctrine, and the cases mamlesting it, as part of what has been considered a discoursei-‘>
where conceptual contests (Connolly, 1974) and affirmations of law's coherency take
place. Scholars following in the realist tradition take a skeptical or critical view of doctnne,
claiming it is indeterminate, used to rationalize and situate those decisions in traditions of
interpretation (Gordon, 1984; Kennedy, 1979; Kerruesh, 1991; Barkan, 1987).
Coherency or consistency conferring from doctrine is contrived then, hiding the real
reasons case decisions arc made (e.g. behavioral or political or otherwise sociological).
Doctrine however still provides elements of meaning to decisions and case opinions.
Compelling state interest, while it may be superficial rigmarole, still appears to matter to
judges, lawyers, advocates, disputants, and observers of cases by structuring expectations
and relationships and enabling the domains of winners and losers in legal contests between
individual faith and public welfare, Compelling interest doctrine in religious freedom
jurisprudence also seems to matter significantly to Congress, as it is debating, as late as the
Summer ol 1999, and moving forth on another attempt to reinvigorate the compelling
^ ^ Discourse has become a term used so often as to almost lose its shape, tlierefore for a brief
survey in socio-legal use see (White, 1990; Smitli, 1994, Davies, 1996; Smitli, 1995)
A constitutive assertion: Law generally, and legal knowledge structures like dextrine
specifically, take ultimate shape a wide range of social and political contexts. For more discussion See
Brigham, Const, of Interests 1996. which significantly for Uiis project suggests a constitutive approach to
understanding taw’s texts is possible, presenting a way to examine law’s autlioritative data through tlie
practices which provide for understanding tliem.
interesl standardn expressly jettisoned by the Supreme Court m Smith in 1990
.
Compelling interests in the domain of religious Ireedom is still being constituted, and likely
never will be entirely static, it remains a vibrant logic where policy and ca,ses and social
movemenks and individual righus are made meaningful, it is a structure exemplifying the
reflexive relationship between law's authority and its evolving social reality.
2. Law's Words and Phrases in Context
Karl Llewellyn's oft cited Bramble Bush (Llewellyn, 1930) includes a treatise on
the tlexibility of judges within a framework of legalism and disputes; in disputes, subject to
legalism's structuring power, doctrine is most pronounced. Llewellyn, and other realists
(e.g. Frank, 1935; 1949) refer to practices like precedent and stare decisis as doctrine, and
used rules to describe more specific practices in and around case disposition. It is useful
lor the distinction to be llattcned by stipulating that doctrine, such as compelling state
interest, exist m a subset ot a general class of legal rules. These rules may include broad
notions of practice like precedent or specific constructs like the "strict scrutiny balancing
test. Compelling interest's particular class of informal rules are developed incrementally
thiough case disposition, building a precedential momentum, providing either routes of
judicial action or rationalizations for routes of action.
Llewellyn details the act of making sense of the language, and practices behind,
appellate opinions, and assessing the resulting law (Llewellyn, 1930; 25-69). Llewellyn
claimed that in order to grasp a case you must read it knowledgeably (Llewellyn, 1930:
41). To do that you must know the words contextually in addition to an empirically
positive knowledge; understanding is grounded in positive definitions of words, and their
possible roles given a language's grammar and idiosyncrasies, as well as narrower context
The Religious Liberty Protection Act - Summer of 1999 (H.R. 1691)
For a more detailed history of compelling interests in Free Exercise, and Uie subsequent efforts
of Congress to contravene die Smitli decision, see Chapter 3.
specitic relationships. The latter depend on practices of word or phrase use and
assoaanons amongst them that develop over ume, and ihe amnnaUon tutd rcphcation by
subsequent knowledge workers who develop and sustain them, "the life of words ,s in the
using of them, m the wide network of their long associations" (Llewellyn, 19,^0: 41 ).
The study of law and language focuses on the manner in which language su-uclures
particular legal understandings and contexts, how law is interpreted, and ultimately how it
is applied and socially constituted (Brigham, 1978; Conley and O'Barr, 199(1; White. 1990
;
Fish, 1980; Constable. 1998). Brigham's Consiiiulional I
.anr.,»a. an early efforl to
refocus public law analysis on a specific legal language and domain specific concepts,
explored grammars in constitutional discourse. Grammars and asscxhated practices of
word use give life to that language and those concepts hy delimiting when constitutional
Utterances are reasonable and unreasonable, when they "make sense" (Brigham, 1978).
Perhaps part ol that sense making is manifested in relationships between concepts as
constituted m word or phrase, and could be explored with tools that identify concepts (i.e.
phrases) and their occurrences and associations (e.g. InQuery).
Hanna Pitkin also explored the way legal language and words become meaningful
m her writing on Wittgenstein and Justice (Pitkin, 1972). Pitkin, appropriating the work of
Paul Zitf (Zitf, 1960), argued that words become meaningful through their repeated and
expected use in context, in "cases." Rather than being conceptually fixed signifiers for
static meanings, many words are ever evolving, always though dependent upon use,
acceptance, and repetition. Phrase or word, "meaning is determined by the word's
distribution in language, the linguistic environment in which it occurs" (Pitkin, 1972: 11).
Pitkin argued that the meaning depends on the "set of other words that can also normally
occur in its position in those expressions," and "the set of expressions in which it occurs
normally" (Pitkin, 1972: 11).
The InQuery search engine identifies nounphrascsi’ and their
.Kcurrcncc and co-
occurrence frequencies ,n document collections. Scholarship in tnformation retrieval has
shown that nounphrases, espec.ally those occumng most often, ,n a doma.n specif.c»text
collection, often convey significant meaningful content for that collection.^! Informalion in
the form of occumence frequency and co-occurrence association statistics ha,s implications
for knowledge of a coqius of related texts. Often that knowledge is redundant in that it
mimics or signifies a key characteristic for the corpus (e g. in doctors' notes "asthma" is a
highly occurring nounphrase). It is possible though that the knowledge is novel, like that
ol night coughs hcing a strong indicator of asthma, hardly redundant, perhaps even
financially and medically significant. This project hypothesized that occurrence and co-
occurrence frequency statistics for nounphrases across the collection could be utilized to
explore compelling interest doctrine. Specifically, this project sought to probe for the
correlation ot compelling interests doctrine with patterns and distinctions between two
groups ot opinions, i.e. those religious free exercise cases where the state's interest
prevailed and those where such interests were trumped by an individual rights claim.
3. A Robust Machine
At the dawn of the computer era political scientists suggested that electronic data
processing presented new opportunities to study law and the decisions judges make
(Lovenger, 1963). This project adopts that Jurimetric suggestion at a significantly later
date. At its most abstract this project proposed to construct a metaphorical machine
comprised of a number of individual information management systems, each system would
Nounphrases are simply strings of nouns and connectors, typically one word, but often
complex expression.
70 The specificity of tlie domain in tliis project is cases representing Free Exercise of religion and
exhibiting a balancing test signified by compelling interest doctrine.
See Information ReUieval scholarship: (Justeson and Katz, 1995; ting and Croft, 1994; Croft,
et. af, 1991).
be pun of a process of identifying and colIecUng da,a ob|oe,s22wi,h dislinc, a,Cribu,cs23
be analyzed as an aggregate by InQuery. InQuety is the last part of that process, and
perfomrs textual examination of data objects rdenttlted and collected under the compelhng
interest rubric. This model was considered robust because it was designed so that users
could stand well removed from the machine, simply querying ,l to identify and collect cases
meeting a particular characterislic, or characteristics, and then using InQuery look for
textual patterns or coherency in subsets of those cases. For instance, it was designed so
that a researcher could ask InQuery to produce occuitence and co-occun ence frequency
stalislics for all lho.se compelling intere,st cases where Justice Scalia wrote the opinion and
the stale's interest prevailed, in hopes of finding pattems to iho.se opinions or other such
subsets.
The ease eolleetion was originally to be defined in purely textual terms (i.e. using a
prolile24 possessing partieular terms and phrases in defined patterns), and eolleeted from a
lull text database (i.e. Lexis / Nexis or Westlaw) by executing automated, hands-off,
searches derived Irom the profile, and then some cursory human examination of those
cases was planned to tag data objects for later data set subdivision and InQuery
examination. The process of trying to implement the robust model however raised
lundamental questions about the target doctrine, and consequently about doctrine as a
knowledge structure in law, and how systems for managing law's information help
constitute the meaning for doctrine and cases. The attempt at automated, hands off data set
22 DaUi objects are appellate cases for tliese legal intormation systems. The machine meUiphor
corresponds to inlormation management systems like tliat of tlic Lawyers Cooperative, West digests and
reporters, and otlier autlioritative systems of primary source organization and access. Systems like Lexis /
Nexis and Westlaw arc in fact electronic computational machines to which users connect via computer
networks.
Attributes is a semi-specialized term. In information retrieviil an attribute is a characteristic or
meaning associated witli a particular data object or objects. See work (Sartori, 1970) which suggests dial
attributes, fact patterns, or oUier observed characteristics, arc autlioritative in segregating data collections.
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Compelling state interests balancing tests or sUuidards possess several textutU signifiers,
Uierelore cases had to be screened for die presence of diose terms, phrases, and concepts. As explained later
diis was attempted bodi via automated computer searching and screening, as well as interactively widi a
computer and hardbound digest
dehniuon and acqu.siiion problematizod. or at least brought tnto relief, doctrine’s identity, a
notion made meaningful through traditions of legal practice, education, and scholarship
which define things like a doctrinal space and operate accordingly. Docuine is a
chameleon, yet one that takes on different roles depending upon die
.setting and the needs of
relevant actors. At one instant doctrine is con.sidered a clump of ca.ses, or at least delimiting
and defining that clump, describing a panicular area of judicial practice and law. At other
times, while it is apparent that doctrine is a central product and cuirency of those intellectual
and professional traditions, it is more like a logic or a arena where knowledge about an area
ol case law or judicial practice is constructed and contested. This duality challenges
information management sy,stems, doctrine as a clump may be a knowledge representation
that can be articulated in an information management system, cases considered in that
clump could .simply be tagged with an identifier by the infomiation management system
(i.e. held identification and value assignment). But, since doctnne is often more than ju.st
that clump, and is likely not fixed in its meaning in any one context, the current information
management systems in law may or may not be able to ineorporate all knowledge of
doetrme Irom those traditions into indexing structures and practices, and thus may create
tensions between what these systems present and the intellectual world that most system
users inhabit.
D. The Reflexive Model
1. An Evolution - Challenges of the Robust Machine
The robust lormulation was overly ambitious from both a practical (i.e.
technological) and substantive (i.e. subject matter) perspective. Early in the process of
trying to implement the robust model it was apparent that an information representation of
compelling interests within a particular area of constitutional law (i.e. free exercise of
religion) and over a defined domain (i.e. Supreme Court and federal circuit courts of
appeals) challenged both automated collection with full text search tools and our
under.,a„d.ngs o,' doc.rine^ Scholarsh.p which Cesied ,he cmcacy ol l,dl
.nl„n„a,i«n
.cu-,eval system. (Blair and Mai'cn, 1985) suggested that using iuli-tex, tools to ulontity a
collect,on of cases fed together by an abstraction or complex expression such as
compelling interest doctrine could be dilTicult. Ye, because contpelling tnteresus were
considered relattvely constant in tree exerci.se cases between 1963 and the present, and
were an expressed and seemingly tmporlani part of iLs jurisprudence, i, .seemed reasonable
10 attempt automated collection via Lexis / Nexis or Westlaw. Additionally, the robust
model included the goal of stepping away from knowledge experts and audtority as much
as practical (i.c. hands off data set acquisition), to .see just how doctrine inriticnced the ca.se
opinions, led to an attempt a, atitomautd collection via Lexis / Nexis. This proved largely
impossible, as full text .searching for ca,scs rcpre.senting the determinative itse of compelling
interests in tree exerci.se law produced many fal.se positives (i.e. data ohjecis that .satisfied
the .search query but were not "on point"), and also mi.sscd ca.ses which arc known to be
relevant as determined cither from random sampling or scholarship and commentary.
Dillicullies with lull text tools and data .set definition and di.scovcry forced a re-
examination of what was being asked of the machines, and the doctrinal profile created as
an information rcprc.sentation Lexis / Nexis could .search on, as well as the very nature of
the doctrine itscll 1 his dilliculty was only enhanced when held against the oriorl to control
as much as passible for the aulhoritalivc understandings of doctrine. 25 To pursue a lexical
analysis of a collection of doctrinally related case opinions with InQuery required relying
on doctrine being a relatively lixed notion solidly in the minds and practices of law
prolc.ssionals and scholars, and more importantly, as icxltially prc.scnl and significant in
case opinions. Doctrine's presence is indeed fixed, but beyond that there is Ihiidily and
9 S
- ConlToIling lor aulhoriUilivc notions ol compelling inicrcsLs in Free Exercise was a hall hearted
endeavor, die reality was diat a searcher had to consult auUiorily, or be educated/ trained in a context wliere
intellectual auUiorily about constitutional law was clearly present, was a delault. At best what we sought
to do was use audiority to structure the panuneters of our seju-ches (e.g. between certain dates :uid including
cases Irom certain subsUintive <u"eas), alter that we setached blind. That is, once establishing the basic
piamneters ol die daUi set we then looked lor dadi objects within dial had some very basic textual
cluaacteristics.
debate,
.nUetemtinacy and pol.t.cs, doctrine is ,n Ute eases, ot at leas, attnbuted to dtent, bn,
parsing doctrtne out easily, or even identify.ng the cases which manifest it, was a d.meuh
proposition.
Attempting to use Lexis / Nexis for data set definition and acquisition showed that
authority (i.c. from knowledge experts) is essential to doetnne's presence and inlluence in
the meaning of case opinions and areas oflaw. It was impossible to gather the doctnnal
collection without significant reference to knowledge experts who attribute substance and
style to things like doctnne. To know which cases exemplified the determinative u.se of
compelling interests scholarship had to be consulted to assess when and how compelling
interesLs were applied in domain specific decisions. But is that authority around compelling
interests sustained in the ca.ses as data? As objeefs in the various machines of law’s
inlormation? Do the highly indexed and editorialized machines like 'West’s digests and
reporters sustain that authority? Or is that doctrine too inconsequential an abstraction for
Wests editors to notice.' And by association, is the expanding universe of legal
information systems destabilizing to abstractions like doctrine? Do we need authority, or is
It undermined, in an arena where everyone has the tools the make what they will out of the
product of judges?
2. Doctrine and the Practices of Law's Machines
The proposed exploration of doctrine through information machines assumes that
doctrine could be treated as data in the lorm of appellate case opinion texts, and as a logic
through which the meaning of those texts, not to mention judicial practice, is articulated.
Data is acquired or interpreted from a source phenomena, and made meaningful through
practices ol inlormation management and presentation, be they of neurons, parchment, or
electro-magnetic discs. Data becomes inlomiation, becomes meaningful, in the service of
knowledge workers and their practices. Machines of legal information depend upon and
structure attributes of law’s data, this work explores that with respect to compelling interest
dcK-trine. U explores how d.lTcrcm mach.nes are used ,o present, or make available.
»pinion,s lied together by doctrine, or at least die expert knowledge which suggests d.Ktnne
KS at work withm. Machine is used metaphorically here, relemng to the technology,
practices, and knowledge stmetures employed in manipulating data objecLs, making ihem
nteaninglul inlormation. Decisions aboul laws hard data, i.e. how cases are organised and
indexed, are specifications incorporated in machines. Tho.se decisions directly inniicncc
how u.sers expenence ca.se law becau.se the machines provide specilic interfaces between
data and user. Interfaces, and the knowledge representation
.schemes under girding them,
do more than allow unencumbered access to law's hard data, Ihey .shape how it is known
and applied.
Practices develop lor identifying, collecting, and manipulating cases relative to
understandings ol them. Traditional case management tools like West's digests and
reporters were built around editorial practices of data manipulation, subject area
categorization, synopsis creation, and key numbering. Newer tools use different practices,
for instance the adoption of universal indices in full-text Lcxis/Ncxis, and the application of
concept occLin-cncc and co-occurrence frequencies to aid in document retrieval in InOuciy.
This project turns its attention to those practices and their inlTicnce on notions of doctrine
and case opinions.
3. Constitutive Practices and Doctrine
This work ultimately presents a constitutive analysis of doctrine and case opinions.
That analysis is conducted through an examination of information practices which shape
mcaninglul attributes lor legal doctrine and case opinions through organization,
categorization, access, and case opinion retrieval. Such an agenda calls not only for an
investigation ol machines like Lexis / Nexis and InQuery and their relationship to docuinc,
but of cpistcmic or scholarly communities who construct and use doctrinal formulations.
Constitutive socio-lcgal study (Brigham^ 1996; White, 1990) examines how law and its
lomis become meaningful through social practices which give them palpable suhslance (
e.g. see Brigham, 1987). Resulting social contexts, and attendam beliefs, am, tides, and
actions thus constitute law's forms and structures. Law's meaning is not inicrpretively
lixed in the proclamations of judges, legislators, and policy makers, but rather in ever
evolving institutional and social contexK and practices giving shape to Ihose proclamalions
Bngham suggests that constitutional concepts and provisions arc conslituicd, made
meaningful, through social and political interests as they organize and act relaUve to
authoritative understandings of Ihose concepts and provisions (Brigham, 1996). As an
example, to examine constitutional free speech scholars should look beyond the
aulhomalive formulations and commentary of law's knowledge experts, and pay attention
to how free speech is manifested in society, especially in those places where individuals or
groups are altcmplmg contest or reaffirm authoritative understandings of free speech for
speed 1C ends. Brigham indicated that constitutive analyses of law’s texts is also possible
by examining the practices which make those texts meaningful (Brigham, 1996: 5)
Doctrine as Data extends constitutive analysis to doctrine and case opinions, doctrine
attributes meaning to cases, and is itself sustained by practices and traditions of legal
knowledge experts (i.e. Judges, legal scholars and commentators, lawyers). This project
investigates whether legal inlormation systems managing case opinions sustain or alter the
meaning of doctrine, and thus of case opinions said doctrinal.
E. Doctrine as Data
1. Clump and Logic
Cases are still central data objects in the study of law and politics. Attention to
ideological and political variables in judicial voting and decision making have not displaced
attention to case opinions (Segal and Spaeth, 1993). Formalism^^is a powerful notion in
Formalism as an explanatory model, and epistemological framework, is .said to have been
di.splaced by Realism. Fomialist approaches to law and legal scholarship asserted tliat tliere was still
praciice ,f nol in theory, and a,s .scholars strive to understand law and politics the
stgntlicance of opinions and doctnne must he considered, to do .so attentton need be paid to
practices which help make them meaningful to special, /,ed communities and the greater
social contexl.
This project began with the intention of heating doctrine as a clump of data, to
,.solate dtKnrinc and expo.se it to rigorous empirical analysis u.sing computer dataha.ses and
mtormation retrieval
.search engines. At that point doctrine seemed a reasonable object to
study in this way. having spent several years working with legal scholars and cutting
academic teeth on civil liberties, the Supreme Court, and judicial politics. Doctrine is a
largo part ol lho.se traditions, and to make the statement that one was going to study
doctrine via computers seemed plausible if unusual.
The doctrines ol the law are built Irom findable pieces of hard data that traditionallyhave been expressed in the form ol published judicial decisions. The point of the
^
search is to locate the nugget of authority that is out there and use it m constnicting
one s argument. (Berrmg, 1994: 1 1 ) ^
It is evident however that doctrine is never quite as fixed as it might seem, and most
certainly cannot be bundled into case opinions as data without explanation. Simply because
doctrine is part ol everyday law talk, and is one of the first structures we cling to when
organizing cases into indexed collections or merely useful bundles, does not mean it can be
studied like a biological specimen.
As a logic or parameter doctrine is an abstraction for judicial practices and standards
corresponding to categories of case law. For example, doctrine associated with First
Amendment cases underwrites and organizes Court tieatment of clauses within the
Amendment. Establishment clause doctrine might delimit state actions that arc immediately
suspect, and how such suspicion might be manifested in Court product (i.e. decisions and
opinions), and even include a three pronged testing schema for a pseudo-scientific
explanatory and autlioritative power in traditional legal notions such as doctrine juid precedcni; Realist
notions decried such a reliance on structures so inherently interpretive, and proffered instead tliat individual
characteristics and variables ought to be explored for tlieir determinative inlluence on tlie law.
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deierm.nat.on of d.acrete results .n church and state cases^ Free exercise ought also have
associated doctnne, one currently espousing nom.nal neutrality toward policies wh.ch
impact social practices which may be argued are religious in nature, and lower levels of
judicial scrutiny rather than accommodation and highest levels of scmtiny of those same
polices. Compelling interests represent a knowledge structure in free exercise case law,
signifying a standard which descnbes the balancing of interests by courts. The challenge is
to tie doctrine to the written opinions of Supreme Court justices and federal circuit court
judges, to tie logic to clump, so that doctrine might be looked at as data.
2. Doctrine Within the Words and Phrases of Case Opinions
Doctnne is said to reside within case opinions, or be associated with them in some
determinative way (Levinson, 1994; 1039). Therefore, the first place chosen to look for
doctrine is in the texts of optnions.^’ Cases are ordered to fit pre-existing categories or
areas ol law in systems like West's digest and reporter, doctrine may be part of the
knowledge base used to construct those distinctions. There are external forces at work in
.shaping the terrain ol indexed case law. Knowledge experts (e.g. West editors) manage
mtormatton systems through data object editing, categorization, indexing, and use / access.
Each practice is relative to an interpreted or mediated view of the data objects, derived from
internal characteristics of those objects no doubt, but also strongly inlluenced by
interpretations of those characteristics.
In this project Supreme Court and federal circuit court opinions were examined for
the expressed treatment of a particular doctrine, of compelling interests in constitutional free
exercise law. The goal was to see whether the doctrinal signifier was consistent in form
and / or presence, or whether that presence is consistent figuratively only, a presence that
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In tills context, ascertaining tlie use of tlie phrase doctrine in a collection of cases tliat are tied
togetlier by tlie doctrine of compelling state interests in free exercise of religion law might shed some light
on whetlier tlie Court considered compelling interests a doctrine, or whetlier they considered dcKUinc at all.
wa.s largely rnterprelive or edilorial rather than tn the texts themselves.
The most obvious placed* to explore this was in the batch of cases collected tor this
project, authoritattvely placed within a West dtgest categoty of cases under the rttbrtc
rel.gious liberty and freedom of conscience and containing a standard, balancing test, or
doctrine otherwise known as compelling interests.^’ After collecting the cases, using a
database management tool (i.e. Folto-Views) the collection was searched for the occurrence
01 the phrase "doctrine," the text window30surrounding encountered occurrences was
•scanned. In the collection of 186 case opinions the word doctrine appeared roughly 201)
limes, 2/3 of those occurrences though represented discussions of so-called "religious
doctrine," not legal doctrine. This makes sense since the es,sential subject area of this
collection is religious freedom, and very often claimants argue that state proscribed actions
Stem from religious doctrine.^
i
The remaining occurrences though referred to legal doctrine in various levels of
abstraction. The following is a partial list of types of doctrinal formulations: "standing,"
fairness. Free Exercise," "intra-military immunity," "sovereign immunity," "least
restrictive alternative," "separate but equal," "dangerous," "mootness," "collateral
consequences, substantial compliance," "equal footing," "overbreadth," "void for
vagueness. First Amendment," "disallowing a defense of ignorance or mistake of law,"
"official restraint," "misplaced confidence," "invited informer," "plain view." Nowhere in
28 Obvious in tfie sense tfiat the collection was in possession, and that if tliese cases were in fact
tied togetlier doctrinally, they might well express diat openly. Please note tliat Uiis was not really expected
however, in fact it was expected tliat little overt doctrini recognition in tliese cases would occur.
90 A full accounting of tlie process of definition and collection, and tlie snafus along tlie way, is
included in subsequent chapters on West digest and reporters and Lexis / Nexis.
A text window is simply all tliose words and plirases which are wiUiin a certain number of
words ot a given word or phrase. In tliis case tlie window around phrases like doctrine was several
paragraphs before and after tlie occurrence of doctrine.
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Subsequently reports of occurrence frequencies for nounphrases in tlie collection were
examined. The plirase doctrine did not occur in great frequency, neither did it appear to change distribution
witli particular subsets of tlie total collection (i.e. state policy upheld, individual right claim upheld)
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ihe collection was compelling interests refen-ed to as doctrine, however related structures
were labeled or associated w.ih doctrine. For example, "the least rcstnctive alternative" is
compelbng interests sister under Conn stnct sctuuny practtces of poltcy evaluat.on
Challenged pol.cies under Free Exercise claims must have met both to pass constitutional
muster.32 m the cases for this project collection the "least restrictive means" test ,s also
called doctrine, compelling interest however is only referred to as a test, standard, or
synonym thereof.
3. Doctrine From the Outside
In scholarship on Free Exercise, and specifically the doctrinal sea change attributed
toMl. compelling interest is shorthand for a balancing test which is a part of free
exercise law (e.g. see Smith, 1994: 529). Considerable conceptual variability exists as
compelling interests is also called a balancing formulation, balancing component, and a
standard. The existence and characteristics of the signified practices and expressions
however are largely agreed upon, even if their normative quality or nomenclature is not.
Despite the lack of doctrinal language for compelling interests in the cases themselves there
is scholarship which speaks of compelling interests doctrinally.
Sanford Levinson s response (Levinson, 1994) to Smith provides a model for this
project's treatment of compelling interests as doctrine. Professor Levinson specifically
discusses Justice Scalia s Smith majority opinion and his attention to compelling state
interests. While the Smith decision not only repudiated the use of that phrase and any
associated practices in claims where a state action was said to incidentally inhibit religious
free exercise, Levinson suggested that if the compelling interests test had been applied, a
compelling interest lor Oregon's prohibition of peyote use could have been found.
Levinson argued that the doctrine of compelling interests need not have been exorcised, that
in examining social and political data such as newspaper editorials, polls, and legislative
Of course Uiis is prior to Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990).
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debate and dtscusston. judges eould have reasonably diseovered any existing contpclhng
.nterest. Nevertheless, Justtce Scalia jetttsoned contpelling interest doetrtne, decbntng to
look lor interests, instead restructuring expressed judicial treatment ol religious free
exercise cases. What is significant here is Levin,son's use of compelling interests as
doctrine, it appears unproblematic and as though his interpretive community would make
sense of it.
Other scholars in that community bolster this use of dcKtrine m work which sought
to explain legal change in the Supreme Court through a doctnnal lens. To measure change
political scientists Epstein and Koblyka (Epstein and Koblyka, 1992) operationalised
factors con,sidered independent variables in doctnnal shifts (i.e. dependent variables) in the
realm of abortion and the death penalty. Epstein and Koblyka used doctrine as an
abstraction for the particular practices and traditions in evaluating and deciding cases in
the,se two realms. There are three things of note in this work which pertains to this project:
lirsl, they unproblematically use doctrine to identify an area of case law, and the cases in
those areas arc then data in the analysis of said doctrine; second, they position their work
between lormal and sociological / behavioral efforts and their respective treatments of
lorms of law, and third, they suggest a socio-political significance for constitutional
doctrine beyond Judicial activity.
QPi fntffhr
^ emphasizes the importance of processes and constitutional doctrine ii
setting the parameters ol subsequent political and policy choices.
. . Our approachdoes not deny the utility of other, more sociological frameworks; tliey tell us much
about important linkages between law and society. Rather, for purposes of
^alytical clanty and depth, and because we think that law as articulated by the
supreme Court sets the general legal and political context for the resolution of any
given contentious issue, we coniine our study to an assessment of three factors that
work to promote or retard doctrinal shifts in the decisions of the Supreme Court:
1 he Court itsell, the political environment, and the organized pressure groups
lobbying the Court. (Epstein and Kobylka, 1992; 5)
Doctrine as Data strives to reler to doctrine similarly, to signify the expressed practices of
the Court otherwise known as the compelling interest balancing test or standard. From that
loundation, cases are collected which contain references to the practice as being at least
partially determinative. It is these case opinions which
exist at all outside of the knowledge experts of law.
must manilcsl doctrine it it is to
E. Process
- MefhoH
The robust model provides the basic parameters of the meUtod for this exploration
ol practices around information machines helping constitute doctrine and cases. The robust
model called for the definition, discovery, acquisition, and analysis of a collection of ca,ses
related by the compelling interest doctrine in free exercise law. These steps are dte vehicle
to study the ways doctrine is shaped through practices of information management. The
process now is more than an instrumental application of infonnation machines in an
analysis of law's texLs, it became a rellexive study of doctrine and the machines and
information practices which sustain law's knowledge base and are primary tools of law's
knowledge experts.
Doetrme typically comes to these machines in the minds of system designers and
users, It may be incorporated in the ways cases are organized and made retrievable, but
more likely doctrine remains an intersubjectivc phenomena attributed to cases, part and
parcel of other knowledge bases in and around law. Traditional case management tools like
West's digest and reporters were built around editorial practices of data object
normalization, subject area categorization, synopsis creation, and key numbering. New
tools employ diltcrent practices, for instance the universal full text indexing and Boolean
querying ol Lexis / Nexis, and concept occurrence Irequency and co-occurrence mapping
in the association thesaurus-'^^ inQuery. Each system and their associated practices are
examined tor the way they make doctrine and cases meaningful for a specific task, the
collection and textual analysis of a doctrinal clump of case opinions.
-
- InQuery utilizes an assoeiation Uie.saurus, or a table of co-occurring terms tuid phrases, to
enhance document retrieval effectiveness (Jing mid Croft, 1994).
D,K,nrinc is known >n a vaiicty of ways and comcxus, Docuinc as Data chooses a
narrow domain for examinaunn. How ,s compcilmg
.morose doonrno ,n froo oxcciso law
man.lcs.od in the two preominent machines (i.o. U-x,s / Noxis, Wes, digos. and ropo.-,o,s)
used by legal profcss.onals and scholars? And, how docs a now machine (.,e, InQuery)
shed light on doclrino's coherency in cases provided by those mainstay machmes? West
and Lex,s / Nexis are queried to, "identity and provide access to those federal appellate
cases where the compelling slate interest doctrine in free exercise law was pan of the
expressed decisional mix since 1963." The cases ultimately collected are divided into two
categories, corresponding to the supposed inlliiencc of compelling interest doctrine, Ihoso
where state interests prevailed and those where individual righLs trumped those interc,sus.
The ca,scs arc provided to InQuery to further explore doctrine's presence and inlluencc on
ihc rclricvcd cases relative to that basie breakdown.
Delinition represents the creation of search profiles to execute on full text (i.e.
Lexis / Nexis) and hard bound (i.e. West digest and reporter) systems. Profiles were
designed as mlomiation representations whieh, it was hoped, manifested the determinative
application of the compelling interest doctrine in free exercise cases. Compelling interests
show up m many areas of constitutional rights law, thus definition would be challenged to
gather only those data objects Irom the desired area of law, i.e. religious freedom. It could
be argued that il compelling interest doctrine is the subject of investigation then all cases
which use it should be included. However, it seemed that il meaningful patterns or
coherency were to be exposed in this fashion, that they were more likely to be observable
in a narrower subject area domain, with less textual chatter to confuse examination and
analysis.
Discovery is the execution of those searches and preliminary examination of results
to determine il in lact the returned data objects represent the doctrine as desired. Discovei7
is an expert knowledge laden step, notions of "on point" cases with respect to doctrine and
subject area depend heavily on interpretations and traditions of understanding cases and
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law. Acquisition represents the collection of cases and the creation of a tagged data set lor
ultimate InQuety text analysis. And InQuery analysis is the processing of the data set to
produce statistics which identify the most important concepts (i.e. the most highly
occurring) and their inteirelationships, thus opening a new manner in which to examine,
and ultimately manage, law’s hard data.
The following chapters roughly follow those steps (i.e. definition, discovery,
acquisition, and analysis). Prefacing these data set and machine specific endeavors, first
this work investigates doctrine as a construct in law, and specifically as a vehicle for the
compelling interest standard in religious free exercise law. The work ought to be taken as a
whole however, each chapter telling a tale about the ways doctrine as knowledge structure
is made meaning! ul through law's informational gates and gatekeepers.
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CHAPTER II
doctrine as logic
A. Introdiicfion
This project explores how legal information machines which organize and provide
access to appellate case opinions partially constitute legal doctrine in those opinions.
Doctrine is a knowledge structure coiTesponding to understandings and parameters of
practices in law, it functions as a logic through which legal events and objects take shape
and meaning. This chapter presents a survey of doctrine's place in jurisprudence by
examining its relatively unproblematic existence in the western legal tradition. To do so it
brielly addresses the foundations of doctrine by looking at Roman law and the early
European legal scientists' resurrection of that law. Bacon and Blackstone's search for legal
maxims and their codifying commentaries provide a bridge to the modern period. Finally,
theories ol lormalism and realism ol 19th and 20th century America are examined to show
distinct positions on doctrine, at once revered and reviled.
This survey crosses traditional lines of inquiry drawn between civil and common
law systems. It is done so as part of an analytical perspective which reduces doctrine,
facilitated by particular practices (e.g. judicial, scholarly, and editorial) and associated
understandings, to a knowledge structure present in many institutional settings and legal
traditions. While undoubtedly the substantive understandings of unique doctrine are
distinct between settings and traditions (e.g. civil and common), the thing doctrine, the
lunctional abstraction, has a clarity of identity over the boundaries of law's traditions.
B. The Power of Principles - Social Legacy of Political Language
Language presents the power to create worlds. Debates about the contours and
authority of these worlds have marked linguistic history. Within western institutions of
28
polmcs, war, religion, and law the power of language is expre,s,sed ihrough praciiee,s ol
knowledge experts. Docinne ts a knowledge simeture specilie to sueh
.nstituttons,
providing coherence to the meaning of their ntteranees. The elevation ot words and
phrases to dixitrine is an act of power, words and phrases take on greater significance when
as,sociated with official policy, reciprocally, policies arc often altributcd with rationality or
at least authority, when they become doctrinal.
In American politics, presidents have stamped domestic and foreign policies with
doctnne. President Monroe set the stage for a century of indigenous cultural and physical
displacement Irom central and western North America, while President Nixon committed
our national resources to eliminate foreign interference in South Vietnam and Laos. To
those ends doctrines ol war and politics were created and employed, events like Wounded
Knee and Mylai, rightly or wrongly, come to be associated with them. It is a difficult
proposition to suggest that these tragic events were caused by doctrines of war and politics,
but certainly the association between them in public and political consciousness after the
lact has socially constitutive power. Doctrine is but a sign, a string of words, however
words used politically to justify or contest authoritative actions are potent tools for
structuring perceptions and perhaps subsequent events. It is in law, where the edifice of
knowledge structures and traditions of understanding are highly defined and valued, that
this characteristic ot doctrine is most pronounced. In law doctrine exhibits a regular
palpable presence.
Doctrine is detined as a principle or body of principles presented for acceptance or
belief. In legal discourse, it is described as a, rule or principle of law, especially when
established by precedent. Its archaic use was as something taught: a teaching in middle
English, Irom the old French and Latin "doctrina," a progeny of doctor, or teacher, and
docere, to teach. The root "Dek," to take or accept is causative, the construct facilitates
agency. It is a term of authority, docti'ines come from on high, are designed to fill listeners
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with understanding, and serve to drive behavior, or al the very least, explain how a
particular behavior or authoritative action makes sense.
In law, precedent’s relationship to doctrine is reflexive. Precedent is itself a
doctnne, simultaneously it is a practice central to all other effective legal doctnne. The
specialized legal term closely mimics its more general meaning, "a convention or custom
arising from long practice" (American Heritage, 1992). Black's Law Dictionary condenses
precedent to a key phrase, "as furnishing an example or authority for an identical or similar
case atterwards arising or a similar question of law." All doctrine rely on precedent to
stretch them across time and space, to expand their influence over a range of official and
unollicial actions, and to get into the consciousness of practitioners and subjecLs alike. The
two are products of complex and interdependent practices within law.i
Rules, principles, and maxims are other constructs closely associated with doctrine.
In junsprudence they are used repeatedly and often interchangeably. Early European legal
science lor example, treating Justinian legal texts^ as data, sought to distill the essence of
Roman law, its lundamental principles which fall out with the application of scholastic
analysis. Those principles may have represented a hybrid of natural and positive law,
maxims ol both nature and man. Jurisprudence has dealt with doctrine somewhat
unproblematically if tangentially, by focusing on sources, forms, and the politics of law
scholars have explored whether rules or principles reign, whether there is anything beyond
positive forms and politics, and what, if any, the normative quality of law is. Throughout,
doctrine plays an important role as a knowledge structure for making sense of law.
"It means tliat a principle of law actually presented to a court of autliority for consideration and
determination has, after due consideration
,
been declared to serve as a rule for future guidance in tlie same or
iuialogous cases, but matters which merely lurk in tlie record and are not directly advanced or expressly
decided are not precedents." (Empire Square Reality Co. v. Chase National Bank of City of New York . 43
N.Y.S. 2d 470, 483)
2 6tli Century A.D. codification of Romtui law.
CL. Maxims and Principles of l egal Sri< m i>
Rome presenus an early recording
,,l an ordered syslem of law, will, iLs m.sliiuiions,
roles, and pracliccs providing impcius Ibr later European models.^ The Justinian
codilication was the first notable effort to cneap.sulate and make orderly the codes, rulings,
opinions of the then waning Empire. Roman law and order ideology, attributed to Ihe
codification, was a powerful contributor to the development of western social and poliiical
institutions and practices (Ullman. IbV.-i:
.53). European legal science was fueled by an
examination of tho.se ideological concepLs within the mintilia of the Justinian texts.
The Roman law in Ihe shape it received in Justinian's codification
.
. . embodied agicat many governmental ideas and principles as they came to be evolved in late
republican and especially in imperial limes.
. . what matters is not so much the
intrinsic quality ol Ihi.s law, which certainly was very high, but the inlltieiice which
11 exercised on the cvolulion ol govcrnnicntal praelicc and ihcory. (Ullman, 1975;
IcalLiics
I
missionaries, Gaul, superiority to local, lalin - Biblc| logclhcr with
the high degree ol lurisilc expertise, clan and elegance that charactcri/cd Roman law
make understandable why it exercised an irresistible innucncc in early medieval
hurope. At least in ideological respccLs a great deal of Europe was shaped by theRoman law in its Justinian codilication. (Ullman, 1975: 54)
Govcinmcnt and legal institutions in western Europe were less dependent on the
particularities ol Roman codes and legal customs, but rather relied on interpretations ol the
"jurisprudential axioms and principles enshrined in it" (Ullman, 1975; 53). Axioms and
principles were derived I'rom legal texts written in Latin, the language ol' the Church, the
language ol' authority. In some ways this early specialization inslituted the elite and
exclusive nature ol knowledge experts in law. Experts were ideological, and their axioms
- Ronuui law is the model lor later European eontinenial or civil law. It is Roman civil law
where most energy was applied by jurists and commenUitors ol the day, with common law being just that,
tlie law ol die everyday, the mundane interactions between individuals of lower political and SfK'ial status.
The positive enactment's ol Roman political institutions however attracted signilicjuit intellectual attention,
while the common did not. However, in their modern imuiirestations axioms and principle.s, originally
products ol .scholarship around Roman Civil Law, would tran.scend the divisions between civil and common
law traditions. See Blackstone's iirgument (Black.stone, 1809: 19) with the premise that sustained the
.secondary status of common law to tJie learned men of his lime.
conveyed law and order ideology above all others. Concerns lor justice and fatr procedure,
and about the relationships amongst citizens and between citizen and slate, were also
operative within that general ideological framework.^
The treatment of doctrine as data is traced to early European legal science and its
purpose to "give structure and coherence to the accumulating mass oflegal norms, thus
helping to carve new legal systems out of the older legal orders which previously had been
almost wholly dillused in social custom and in political and religious institutions" (Berman,
1983; 120). Early European jurists, studying at universities in Bologna and Paris in the
1 1th Century, scholastically examined the Justinian texts, i.e. the books of Roman Codes,
Novels, Institutes, and Digests. They did this despite the fact that most law at that time
existed in social and religious practices quite distinct from the edicts of some long dead
Romans.
The law that was first taught and studied systematically in the West was not the
prevailing law; it was the law contained in an ancient manuscript which had come to
122)
IDliiin library toward the end ol the eleventh century. (Berman, 1983:
The Digest stands out as the most important manilestation of the axioms of Roman law.
The Digest, "was a collection made up of fragments, snippets and excerpts of varying
length from the statements of the jurists" (Ullman, 1975; 55). While much of this material
was quite specific, dealing with questions of private law, the day to day interactions and
transactions between individuals, there were portions concerning criminal law,
constitutional law, and "other branches of law governing the Roman citizen" (Berman,
1983: 128). What was most important to the legal scientists were the general portions of
the Digest. These sections covered, "general principles, such as the definition of the law,
its divisions and sub-divisions, the law creative power of public organs . .
.
Of course tliis is a simplified model. The Romans were detail oriented, and tlie general axioms
mid attendant ideologies tended to reach fairly low levels of abstraetion.
and the cnlorccmenl of the law, procedural max.m,,, responsibihty, and
1975: 56).
so on" (Ullman,
Inlcre,stingly the Romans spent considerable effort on spceilics. Bermtm called them
"problem solvers;” articulating an organized treatise of legal principles and practice seemed
left to the end of empire. Yet they were concerned with consistent law practice and record
keeping, "they worked case by case, with patience and acumen and profound respect for
inherited tradition. The Digest in that sen.se was an anomaly, where
.synthesis of maxims
and principles was attempted after centuries of imperial and republican legal practices
(Berman, 198,f: 129). The knowledge stractures of principles and axioms .set the
parameters tor these traditions, establishing a role which doctrine would soon partake
filling.
European legal science had its data, and rigorous scholarship was applied to
determine the truth, the "embodiment of reason" within, "they took Justinians law not
primarily as the law applicable in Byzantium in 534 A.D., but as the law applicable at all
times and in all places" (Berman, 1983: 122). It was the legal scientist however who gave
voice to the Roman principles, perlorming the scholastic interpretation constrained by life
in an 1 1th century university
. .. It was they (European Juristsl who first drew the conceptual implications - who
made a theory ol contract law out of particular types of Roman contracts, who
delined the right of possession, who elaborated doctrines of justification for the use
ot torce, and who, in general, systematized the older texts on the basis of broad
principles and concepts. (Berman, 1983: 129)
Their ellorts to uncover Roman law's ideological edifice had profound effects on the shape
ol European institutions and thought to tollow, as many of these Jurists and their students
went on to occupy places of importance in developing western law and government.
Legal science at Bologna and Paris, and in other European universities, marked a
coming out for law and legal study. The influences of interpreted Roman law would be fell
throughout western Europe as legal scholars and practitioners were socially and politically
ascendant. Maitland labeled Ihe twelfth century as "the most legal, and that, in no other
age, since the classical days of Roman law, has so large a part of the sum total of
intellectual endeavor been devoted to jurisprudence" (Pollock and Maitland, 1899: 111).
Through the proce,ss of dialectical analysis the medieval lawyers were able
.systemati/.e
legal thinking, to slate the basic ideas with clarity, to develop the logical consequences of
legal principles, to reconcile apparent contradictions, to define, classify, distinguish, to
make mierconnecuons manifest and to eliminate irrelevancies - in short, to subject legal
thinking to perhaps the most intensive logical analysis it has ever known" (Cairns, 1949:
164).
Doctrine, in this analysis, is Ihe product of the early legal scienli.sts, they considered
it a di.scovcry, cither interprelively gleaned from the specific aspecLs of the Justinian texts or
Ironi the cxpre.sscd principles and axioms. Given their proclivity for sticking to individual
cases, spccilic statutes or codes, and singular issues, the Romans left the theorizing and
lexical structuring to those that followed. Perhaps due to the need to persuade in the
scholarship ol Bolgna and Paris legal science made doctrine an authoritative thing unto
itsell, given title and name, given status in the politics of interpretation. The Roman
scholars and jurists, likely convinced ol the ideological concepts undergirding their world,
may not have needed doctrine to be so sell consciously prollered. Nevertheless, whether
axiom or doctrine, they are knowledge structures for conceptualizing law and shaping its
practices.
D. Bacon and Blackstone
The eltorts in European universities were the beginning of a resurgence and further
development ol scientific inquiry in the West.^ Yet it would be several hundred years
betore this work would take on its modern manifestation, in the work of rational legal
^ The Moors arc widely held to have continued tlie tradition of tlie Greeks, iuid Romans to a
degree, witli respect to Matli, Geometry, Algebra, and tlieir applied pursuits such as Architecture.
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scholars,^perhaps most notably Bacon. Reason, rationality and logic arc central elements
in this scholarship, llowing out the Enlightenment's propositions that by applying
struclLired empirical analysis and induction Man could conceive of the world accurately,
Iree ol' superstition of the preceding era, yet tied together by totalizing notions of scientific
method and inquiry. Doctrinal legal science is an extension of the Enlightenment project.
Rational inquiry and scholarly practices were foremost in legal science of the 17th,
IXth, and 19th centuries, "and no fundamental distinction was drawn between the
exposition of basic principles of positive law, and the study of natural reason and justice"
(Simmonds, 1984: 19). Maxims and principles were the backbone of law in this model,
doctrine lunctioned as both a synonym for them as well as a subset of them. Maxims and
principles roughly correspond to the normative or ideological foundations upon which the
specitics ol common and statutory law systems^ relied. For example, justice was
considered a key principle, as a doctrine embodied in the mass of case law however it
would be very dillicult to find a specific referent or textual source. In this sense doctrine is
a normative abstraction. In its other role, doctrine was also more specifically rules of
practice loi lawyers and judges which help structure particular actions and interpretations.
A contemporary ol Bacon organized these two levels of doctrine under the rubric of
piimary and secondary principles, perhaps loreshadowing contemporai*y discussions of
primaiy and secondary rules in jurisprudence (Hart, 1961; Dworkin, 1985). John
Dodderidge, another legal scholar and commentator, "distinguished between 'primary
principles' which he identified with maxims, and 'secondary principles,' which he
identilied with rules" (Coquillette, 1992). Primary rules embody the ideology of a legal
system, whether that be fairness or justice or equity, secondary rules manifest those
primary principles in specific dictates, or so the theory suggests.
Sec di.scussion and Llic works cited in by Simmonds (Simmonds, 1984) as prototypical of
rational legal science.
^ The twe) systems and tJieir histories is a project unto itself, for purpo.ses here it is suggested that
tJie knowledge structure doctrine plays a simihir role in each, Uiough to different degrees undoubtedly.
Thus doclrinal legal science reduced law to a dual system. In the background, bul
certainly not insigniricam, were the rundaracntal principles and/or maxims t.l' western law,
growing out of social norms and customs, Chri,stian morality, and Roman law and order
ideology. In the foreground existed the accumulated mass of cases and codes, and the
rules and/or doctrines that help make them meaningful. Doctrine, essentially codified by
the legal
.scientists, join the two parks deductively. With the advent of legal po.sitivism in
the 19th century this propo.sition became more difficult, since the existence of principles
and maxims became predicated on their objeettve expression (i.e. positing), not their logical
deduction. However, doctrine did not .seem to wither along with legal .science, it remained
as a stgnilier lor a .set ol practices that judges and lawyers applied in the disposition and
organizing ol cases, whether inspired by eonstilulional, common law, or statutory lorces.
Nearly two centuries later Blackstone's Commentaries (Blackstone, 1809) would
have a prolound impact on the then developing legal consciousness and practices in
colonial America, serving the role of the Justinian texts for the early American legal
scholars and jurists. Blackstone's Commentaries
, the "codification" of English common
law in the 18th century, attempted to "reduce to short and rational form the complex legal
institutions of an entire society" (Boorstin, 1941 : 3). Such an effort needed constructs to
make sense ol the multitude ol practices and lorms comprising the English legal system.
Arising out of the development of rational science and its adherence to notions of right
reason, Blackstone attached considerable importance to the maxims and principles of the
common law he was attempting to sort out. In Blackstone's work doctrine took on its
modern lorm as a specific knowledge structure corresponding to an implicit rule or practice
in the disposition of legal cases. Principles were of greater abstraction and significance to
Blackstone, but maxims provided a connection between principles and more specific rules,
essentially maxims linked reason and doctrine.
Since he was interested in the "elements and first principles" which were the
components of a general map of the law, he could provide merely a general
discussion of the nicety of creating a contingent remainder; then the student "will in
It appears that Blackstone was objectively staying away from speetfie rules and/or docmnes
and their applications in lieu of the greater project of theorizing about the common law and
Its "first principles." However the need to connect principles with practice forced htm to
discuss maxims, operating at a somewhat lower level of abstraction, yet generally above
the day to day acts of judges and lawyers.
Blackstone’s use of maxim is distinct from, yet dependent on, higher level first
principles. Maxims, "summed up the proverbial wisdom of the past, and commended it to
the luture" (Boorstin, 1941; 1 14). Maxims were generally bridges between rules and
principles, though at times maxims were conflated with rules, symbolizing the "broad
guidelines which could be considered to underlie and direct loosely individual decisions"
(Cotterrell, 1989: 24). Doctrine comes into play here, while Blackstone does not appear to
have expressly dealt with it analytically, he uses maxims and rules in a manner that is very
similar to contemporary uses of doctrine, as word phrases describing rules or practices.
This conflation was not problematic for Blackstone, "the identification of maxim and law
did not prevent Blackstone form giving a maxim as the reason for a legal rule" (Boorstin,
1941: 115). Rules were given Latin names, e.g. "autrefoiLs acquit (formal acquittal)," and
were associated with universal maxims, e.g. "that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of
his life more than once for the same offence" (Boorstin, 1941: 1 15). This might today be
known as the double jeopardy doctrine, covering both rule and the maxim, functioning as a
knowledge structure for legal practice by exposing a history of corresponding decisions
and legal concepts. Boorstin essentially posited as much, suggesting that Blackstone often
used maxims as a restatement ol a rule of law, but "in a form which made it more easily
remembered or which endowed it with a solemn Latinity" (Boorstin: 1 17). However, this
transition ol rule to maxim was not a mere translation from one form to another, it was a
I'-ansniog, illcali.,,, implyiat; grealer
.sigailicancc r„r ihe asMiciau-
iiioic (iiillioriialivc, more signilicani.
d pracliccs, making ihcm
D^Ctrin^ in Modern
1. Coiiiiiioii l^aw
I lie common law iradilion dominales the American legal syslem.« While boih
Icderal and state conslilnlions made speeifie provisions lor law making and jndieiaries,
much or (he practice ol' law was, and still is, defined by the long standing practices and
concepts of common law. Cairrespondingly, much legal activity in ihe first ceninry of the
American experiment was private, i.c. pertaining to individuals and their interactions and
iransaciions, while public law, that concerning the structure of state, and the relationship
between state and individual, was of smaller scope. This orientation, and scholarly
attention to it, would change considerably in Americas second century, the following
discussion will attempt to survey jurisprudential thought around doctrine during this period
ol I lux. Specilically, it will be a treatment of legal philosophy's major focus, the
clarilication or analysis of, the "ideas or structures of reasoning implicated in, presupposed
by Ol developed thiough legal doctrine, or which constitute the environment of thought and
beliel in teims ol which the legal processes are justified and explained" (C'otterrell, 19X9;
2 ).
I listorical jurisprudence is the study of common law systems. Liberalism and
positivism shook common law's grip somewhat with notions such as the separation of
public and piivate, with the neutral state and attendant legal apparati overseeing an
otherwise unencumbered marketplace, and that judicial determination of legal realities
through the application ol rules and reason should be rational and interest free (I lorowit/,
1977:7-12). In contrast, the common law implied a direct connection between the
I hat system is a conglomeration of state and federal systems, llie prior was most signifieani in
die tirsi American century, it was not until alter the Civil War that federal roles increased considerably.
community (i.e. ihc Volk) and the law, and judges' application of rea,son was an cITott lo
be true to the established legal principles, maxims, and rules ol that community (Savigny,
1X31). Positivism in many areas of sciemilic and
.social inquiry was becoming the
dominant epistemology. Positivism required that all law be posited Irom some legitimate
authonty distinct from scKial or moral interests, and that there were no abstract principles
laying beyond, or behind, these positive eonstnietions.
Where Blaekstone's exposition of the common law treated the prolil'cration of
statutory law as complimentary, yet peripheral, to the centrally important common law,
Savigny, the Prussian jurist of the 19th century, integrated the two. As positivism might
have dismissed Blackstone for his search for first principles of law, Savigny in a sense
saved common law from the positivist ax. For Savigny, statutory or legislative law
complemented that which resides in the doctrines and practices of common law, "its
[legislative] task.
. .is that ol putting settled law into systematic form and clarifying law in
transitional phases where new legal principles rcHecting the developing common
consciousness arc emerging but not yet crystallized" (Savigny, 1831:1 52-3). Savigny's
incorporation ol legislation into a model ol the common law corresponded with the efforts
ol codification in America.
Savigny's writings had considerable influence on legal scholarship in Britain and
America in the nineteenth century, especially since the specter of codification - the
symbol ol rational legislative lawmaking dominating over judicial law finding -
arose to challenge common law thought in both countries. Because he offers a more
explicit theory ol cultural development than did the common lawyers, he supplies a
conception of legal development largely lacking in common law thought. (Cottcrrell,
Early in the 19th century most authoritative texts of law were relatively small and
unstructured collections ol cases and opinions, and handbooks explaining very specific
common law lorms of action (Horowitz, 1977: 12-13). The generally ambitious and
overarching treatises modeled by Blackstone would have to wait until these were replaced
by formalisms' conceptual categorizations and digests. Doctrine in this tradition tied
together these conceptualizations by shaping how cases were presented, interpreted and
perhaps ultimately decided.
Criticisms of the common law method focused on the un-principled manner in
which material was organized, and that there was "no scientific basis" in the collection or
organization then offered in treatises (Horowitz, 1977: 12). Formalism was the movement
to provide a scientific basis, and its conceptualizations were constructions "from which one
could logically deduce virtually all legal rules and doctrines" (Horowitz, 1977; 129).
Positivism in legal thought runs concurrently with the development of formalism. Flowing
Irom the work Bentham and Austin law was considered exclusively the domain of the
sovereign, or his agent judges, and to know law one need only observe the posited
proclamations ol sovereign institutions (i.e. executive, legislature, and courts).
Formalist conceptualizations were inherently tied to judges and a positivist law /
society dichotomy, positing an autonomous realm of phenomena and behavior for the
lawyer and jurist, separate from social forces such as politics.^ Fomialism in the late 19lh
century brought about comprehensive treatises and textbooks, as well as sowing the seeds
for the intellectual tradition of modem professional law schools (Dane, 1823-29; Hilliard,
1859; Story, 1805). Formalism has also been referred to as the doctrinal study of law, "or
in cognate terms, black letter law," or as legal positivism taking, "legal mles and reports of
cases as the universe" (Fitzpatrick, 1992: 3). Legal professionals were assigned the task of
applying doctrine and mles in a dance of practices around unique fact sequences, producing
a coherent, well reasoned law.
Doctrine played a similar role throughout, defining, or at least signifying, practices
and rules in particular areas of law, regardless whether those areas originated, or were
described, in a common or civil law tradition. Two nineteenth century English legal
^ Late 19Ui century legal formalism represented tlie crystallization of a legalistic mindset tliat had
emerged in the 17tli and 18th century English constitutional tliought and was furdier elaborated in liberal
political tlieory and post revolutionary American legal tliought. It was marked by a series of basic
dichotomies: between means and ends, procedure and substance, processes and consequences. In a world of
conflicting ends, it aspired to create a system of processes and principles tliat could be shared even in tlie
ab.sencc of agreed upon ends. (Horowitz, 1977: 16)
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schoiars place doccrine ,n bolh the common and tbrmalist camps, signilying doctrine's
versatility:
A glance at the statute book is sufficient to show that, from the days of Edw-ird I
Sefhlvo ™ «'n«nuous, and thrvety '~Td,ese
1 875^ 60
permanent eltects on the development of legal dtrclrine. (Broom,
The doctrines ol our law arc enunciated in decided cases - now published in anau hen 1C form - and in the treatises of learned writers
. . , Caserwhlcrhave beenjudicially recognized and thus have become precedents, must be confomied to
ad"u1ged""’(Sd1worih',*9S^^^^^
Doctrines most significant presence in contemporary legal practice is in those areas where
statutes are indeterminate,!^^ where constitutional provisions and clauses arc being tested,
and ol course, in the common law.
2. Formalism and Positivism
Formalism, holding to liberal notions ol a neutral state and autonomous law,
suggested that law was distinct trom social whims and lancies, and was better served by
the lunctional lormalization of doctrine and practice. Reasoning was a major pillar in this
proposition, it was the means by which rules and facts were combined and perhaps
produced. Judges' reasoning was not open ended nor decontextualized, but rather their
domain of actions was constrained within a range of acceptability or legitimacy;
The late-nineteenth-century etlort to integrate legal doctrine was accompanied by an
equally important attempt to create a self-contained system of legal reasoning that
would be immune to the charge that it was simply political. . . It aspired to import
into the processes of legal reasoning the qualities of certainty and logical
inexorability. Deduction from general principles and analogies among cases and
doctrines were often undertaken with a self confidence that later generations.
.
.
could only mistakenly regard as willful and duplicitous. (Horowitz, 1977: 16)
Inierpretation.s of statute.s may be a completely indeterminate act, but con.sensu.s suggests tliat
tlicre are contexts and traditions of interpretation tliat constrain tliat indeterminacy, perhaps constructing a
legitimate domain of interpretation
,
beyond which jurists risk irrelevtuicy.
D(Ktrine in ihc lomialisl case method was produced and reinforced by the relalio.isltips
between the legal academy and profession, and wtis used to structure how legal
practit,oners know and express law. It was perhaps the preeminent structure for the
formalist edifice, "the Formalist hero is the judge or treatise-wnter who best clarifies
doctrinal categories" (Gordon, 1984: 67). These categories and subsequent procedures and
rules made up the formal legal world, a world changing due to the increasing role of
legislation, and the belief that law and society, or at least policy n were more closely
intertwined than formalism held.
The lormahst / positivist project, while reaching its nadir in the late nineteenth
century, would lind a prominent twentieth century proponent in H.L.A. Hart and his
theory of analytical Jurisprudence. Generally following Austin's path. Hart suggested a
more sociologically sensitive version of positivism, where law’s creation was not merely
by a singular sovereign, albeit with numerous agents, distinct from social inlfucnces. For
Hart, law still came Irom authoritative sources associated with the sovereign institutions of
state, but that social forces acted through those institutions to enact contextually sensitive
law. However, with the ascendance of realism, positivists of this school would be far
outnumbered. Paradoxically positive lormalism has continued to survive in American legal
education, especially in the sense ol knowing what law is by legal students and
prolessionals. Juxtaposed with this belief is a realist understanding that the application of
that law, however dependent on lormalism, is a realist endeavor, highly dependent on
sociological and behavioral factors.
Early Progressives, in law iuid otlier realms, began to view policy as tlie sovereign arm which
l(X)k social needs into account and tirUculated tliem officitUly, if trtmsmogrified. This was at odds with
lormiil distinctions between law - state- society, <uid tlic till powerful rule / value dichotomy so powerful in
liberalism.
3. Realism
Realist or progressive scholars and jurists began to question some ol the concepts
underg.rding the formalist effort, notably the proposition that law and society were distinct,
and that doctrine was the epitome of rea,son and rationality within the traditions of law.
Realists suggested that to know what law really was one needed to observe and map its real
lunctions, not ifs proffered conceptualizations, rules, or doctrines. In fact it was these very
constructs that obfu,scatcd a clear view of laws
.social identify and c|tialitios. Specifically,
the roles of legal profc.ssionals, and the politics and ideologies which shape their
dcvclopnient and subsequent behavior, was decidedly non neutral, tied to .social interests
and forces, denying neat and clean dichtilomies. O.W. Holmes, writing before the realist
coming out, suggested their future, "for the rational study of the law Ihc black-letter man
may be the man of the prc,sent, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the
master of economics” (Holmes, 1897: 187). For Holmes .social
.scientific tools would be
the wares ol law's investigators, no longer would rhetoricians and logicians hold sway.
In Holmes Path ol Law his lamous "had man" passage suggested that if we really
want to know law, we should not he looking to the rarefied words of elite practitioners
wht) attempt to sum up the principles and maxims ol legal life. Rather, we should ob.scrvc,
utilizing the methods of .social science then proliferating, the actions of our bad man, to
determine what connection exists between his actions and his conception of law, for it is
the had man who tests the edges ot legitimacy and law. The bad man lives in the real
world, exhibifs real behavior, and makes real determinations as to his cotir.se of action.
Only by observing that man, a man tempted to breach the law, can .scholars and jurists
know the law, principles and doctrine matter little to the bad man, only expected results
played out in laws .social world. Realism denied the very existence of such tran.sccndental
formalisms and looked to mere men to understand law.
Fchx Cohen’s Iransccndcntal Nonsense (Cohen, 1935) has been suggested as one
01 the most signilicant early statements of the realist project, though he refened to the anti-
lormahst ellort as functionalism. Cohen used the term functionalism literally, rather than
exploring law’s alleged, or proposed, or expected, phenomena and characteristics, he
suggested that scholars reduce that which they study into terms of actual experience, into
the lunctions ol individuals and institutions. At its most basic Cohen posited that,
"functionalism represents an assault upon all dogmas and devices that cannot be translated
into terms of actual experience” (Coleman, 1994: 822). Law is full of such devices,
concepts that cannot be delined in terms of experience, and from which all sorts of
empirical decisions arc supposed to How.” Doctrine is likely preeminent amongst those
concepts. Cohen, m a death knell for formalism, speaks more of ’’legal concepts” and
"principles” than doctrine, but considering doctrine’s obvious presence and importance in
the lormahst model it is unlikely he intended to leave it out. In fact, the more he wrote of
what lunctionalism was replacing, the more obvious doctrine becomes.
The age of classical jurists is over, I think.
. . There will of course be imitators and
lollowcrs ol the classical jurists.
.. But I think that the really creative legal thinkers
(H the luturc will not devote themselves.
. . to the taxonomy of legal concepts and to
the systematic explication ol principles ol justice and reason, buttressed by correct
cases. (Coleman, 1994: 221)
Doctrine is implicated lully, the taxonomy ol concepts and principles can mean little
without doctrine, it is the primary structuring device, providing for the application of
reason and the production of correct cases.
Realism, cognizant of doctrine’s place within the formalist model, claimed it to be
one component ol a general, il not always well coordinated, policymaking enterprise”
(Gordon, 1984: 67). Horowitz summed the realist take:
From the beginning of the twentieth century. Classical Legal Thought found itself
confronted by an increasingly powerful critique of its basic premises. In one legal
field after another. Progressive thinkers challenged both the political and moral
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Doctnne was still clearly signilicam, but could no longer be the scienlilic and objeciively
reasoned product of formalism, it became fluid, shaped by judges subject to .social and
individual forces. Legal behavior, and the structures used to de.scribe or authorize that
behavior, was no longer considered that of objective professional practices like doctrinal
reasoning. Doctrine is u.sed in realist scholarship that explores terms like "rule," "dispute,"
and "precept" in case disposition, it is within these discussions that doctrine's fluid identity
is exposed.
Karl Llewellyn's Bramble Bush is recognized as one of realism’s sacred texts, if
that IS possible m a pursuit that denied the very notion of sacredness, and perhaps texts as
well. The place ot doctrine in Llewellyn's work must be largely interpreted since he uses it
as a referent for something else that he is interested in, not as an object of his analytical
attention itself. The most open discussion of doctrine uncovered was in Llewellyn's
response to Pounds criticisms ot realism. In it Llewellyn suggested some essential realist
positions, most notably the, distrust ot traditional legal rules and concepts insofar as they
purport to describe what either courts or people are actually doing," and distrust of the idea
that rules as expressed in the form ot legal doctrine, "are the heavily operative factors in
producing court decisions" (Llewellyn, 1931: 55-7). This may be the ultimate position of
the realists on doctrine, especially as it was construed by formalism, however we must dig
a little deeper as Llewellyn, and the other realists, tended not to address doctrine so openly.
Terms like "rule" and "dispute" coexist with "doctrine" in Llewellyn's discussion e)f
the art ot understanding cases. This begins with Llewellyn's exposition on "What lies
behind the case," and specifically the place of doctrine in the constitution of a case in the
appellate system. For Llewellyn the opinion is the case, "it is the Justification, prepared by
one judge whose name it bears, and concurred in by the court, for the courts deciding the
case as they have done" (Llewellyn, 1930: 37). Opinions and the decisions they support
arc abstraclcd, in the formalisl tradition especially, to a set of applicable rules and relevant
laets which Iramc the dispute before the court. In the Bramble Bush dispute seems to
have two related meanings, lirst representing the basic disagreement between
.social actors,
and .second, the legal ea.se presenting a profile of facts, rules, and doctrine;
Everything, everything, everything, big
to be read with primary rel'erenee to the
before him. (Llewellyn, 1930: 43)
or small, a judge may say in an opinion,
particular dispute, the partieular question
is
Delming disputes is a eentral praetiee for appellate Judges, rules and faels eonsume that
process. Setting laets aside, admitting they are clearly dependent on doctrines of inclusion
01 exclusion, I suggest that rules are the site of law's most significant doctrinal activity.
Rules, according to Llewellyn include black letter law, as well as the more interpretively
dependent rules ol practice to categorize and process cases, to frame disputes so they can
be decided against the backdrop ol established or developing rules and doctrines. Do rules
indicate the meaning ol a case though muses Llewellyn? In formalist models yes, they
situate the case and enable its disposition. In realist models this is short sighted, meaning
lor cases, and ultimately rules brought to bear therein, is determined "only as we observed
what dillerence these rules and these decisions made to people" (Llewellyn, 1930: 39).
True to the developing realist ideology if you wanted to understand cases, and by
association law, one needed to go out into the real world and measure impact, chart
behavior, and ascertain beliefs toward the legal system and its phenomena.
For other scholars of this evolving effort (e.g. Frank 1949; Levi 1949) rules were
crucial for understanding the distinction between formalism's legal orthodoxy and the effort
they embodied. Rules encompassed a wide range of constructs for Frank, he considered
rules to be the product of both legislation and judging, the prior objectively created by
willful action, the latter either already present in our Anglo-American common law tradition
or produced by the transformation of an already existing rule. Formalism might have
suggested that heretofore unenunciated rules merely needed discovery by rational judges.
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real,SIS like Frank were quae skepiical „r such a p,„p„sinon, and we.e
,me.es,ed in h„w
new rules were developed and applied in the day to day ope,a.,o„s ol courLs .2 „ is a, this
edge or rule developnicm where Frank's crilieal eneigy persisls today.
For Lev., rules and lacts are more inutrlwined than Uewellyn or Rank suggested in
the.r a,s,sessntenLs of legal practice. Rules are quite adaptable lor Levi, in his work on legal
rca.son,ng he suggested that rules arc molded and changed to suit variable I'acl paltcrns and
socal contexts. While the nomenclature of rules may remain constant, the actions signified
by ihc same words is subjccl to fairly constant rc-articulation.i3
Dean Roscoc Pound's sociological Jurisprudencei^ perhaps tackled doctrine most
lorthnghtly. In Pound's "broad view," law is more than a system of rules, "but a doctrinal
system in movement" (Cotterrell,19K9: 153). Pound used the term precepts to expand on
the idea ol positive rules, "precepts attaching a definite detailed legal consequence to a
dclimtc detailed state of facts or situation of fact" (Pound, 1941: 256). Precepts were
inclusive ol principles, "the authoritative starting points for legal reasoning," as well as
conceptions, "authoritatively defined categories," and standards, "defined measures of
conduct, to be applied according to the circumstances of each case" (Pound, 1941: 256-7).
Contrasting his work most notably with that ol Hart's analytical jurisprudence (Cotterrell,
1989: 156) Pound put forth an organicist, or sociological, view of law:
( 1 ) that law contains within itself the doctrinal resources for its own development in
the lorm ol values and principles capable ol giving content and shape to evolving
law; (ii) law has a natural momentum lor change, an inbuilt tendency to develop;
1
9
It should be noted the Frank is known as a fact skeptie. Tliis is Uiken to mean tlial lie is
criticiU of doctrines mid practices which are used to eonstruct, extract, situate the relevant facts for a legal
dispute.
1 'X
-
vSee Levi's discussion of the so-called inherently dangerous rule in product liability law. In it
he shows Uie development ol a rule which begins quite closely <digned with tlie Latin expression caveat
emptor, or the buyer beware, witli netirly toUil absolving of a retailers liability. Gradually tliis has changed
to increase a reUdlers responsibility tor ckmiages incurred after die purchase of a particukir pnxiuct
Pound claimed not to be a realist, largely I think because of he still felt that dcKtrine mid otJier
authoriuitive lorms were of vjilue to the legal enterprise, and not necessarily bmikrupt by their association
witli social and political forces under the guise of objectivity mid neutrality. Nonetlieless, legal scholarship
has included Demi Pound timongst tliat catch all called realism.
'ho legal system ,o
of the jurist is to keep these orderly processes onesaTl^k-tn'**"(Colterrell, 1989: 156)
^ ^ t l legal development working freely.
This view also suggested that the reason doctrine has come under such lire, by realists
espectally, is that, the essence ol the common law method has not been I'ollowed"
(Cotterrell, 1989: 158). The fomtal.st tradition, also associated w.th the term mechan.cal
jurisprudence, required that legal concepts like doctrine stand alone, on their merits and
logical structures to manage court practices. Doctrine was cut adrift from social interests
and context in the pursuit of mechanical application. Interestingly, it was not doctrine per
,se that .sociological jurisprudence was railing against, but rather the context free nature of
doctrine's use.
Rules of practice, categorization, and ultimately reasoning then are the working
tools of Judges, calling some of these rules doctrines is not a great stretch, and in fact they
do. Llewellyn and Frank used doctrine to refer to practices like precedent and stare decisis,
and used rules to describe specific doctrines as this project suggests. The distinction can be
tlattened by stipulating that doctrines like compelling state interest exist as a subset of a
general class of legal rules and practices. These rules may include broad notions like
precedent or specific constructs like the "strict scrutiny balancing test." In this project,
claims ol religious tree exercise violations represent the dispute, some might call this a
doctrinal space, it is constituted by rules and doctrines which further shape judges', and
other relevant legal actors, range of motion. Compelling state interest is one of those
doctrines, it represents an accumulated knowledge from previous cases and their facts,
related constitutional clauses and realms, and suggests actions which judges may take to
help them make sense, and ultimately decide disputes before them.
Rules make tlie game space, define how the
iuid resolution.
game is to be played, and provide for completion
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4. Life After Realism
While realism ,s generally considered a rclired movement m legal scholarship, ihal
may have more to do w.ih ihe tact lha, its prognosticators are lar gely gone, ihan ,he
obliteration of their ideas. Realist inspired efforts have been incorporated in a range of
scholarly pursuils. all with the common theme of investigating the interface and relatronsh.p
between law and society, denying the posilivi,si or formal dichotomy between them. In
addition to neo realist work, there has been scholarship which incorporates the realist
critique ol rule bound jurisprudence, but rather than attempting to understand law only
through a sociological or behavioral lens, reariiculates common law-like concerns for
communal principles beyond positive rules. And, to fill the space between ihe.se pursuits,
there is renewed attention to the instilulions and their practices shaping law, and hybrid
constitutive work suggesting that forms of law become meaningful, become real or
palpable, through
.social practice. The social reality of law iisclf is related to Ihe behavior of
judges, lawyers, and citizens as well as the legal forms and structures most a.ssocialed wiih
tradilional orthodox approaches to law, like constitutional texts, and perhaps even appellate
court doctrine.
The following does not purport to exhaustively track all of these, rather it attempts
to build a bridge between the realist attack on doctrine and formalism and contemporary
examinations ol doctrine as it structures judicial actions. In this vein, it explores the work
of Ronald Dworkin (Dworkin, 1977; 1982), and specifically his theory of principles,
especially as it contrasts with lormalism and positivism ol the modem variety described by
H.L.A. Hart. Dworkin's work represents an effort to come to terms with what he
considers their major tailing, specitically that judges exercising discretion ai'e acting as
legislators in the creation ol positive law. Dworkin counters with his exposition of
discretion as part ol law, not legislating, and it is a valid notion in law because it stems
Irom the essential principles that undergird legal mles and procedures. This is followed
Wilh a concluding discussion of che post realist critical effort in
activity brings doctrine front and center.
legal scholarship, its basic
Fom^ahsm rested on the idea that law is a collection of rules posited by legitimate
political authonty, whether that be the executive, legislature, or courts. Where rules were
tound lacking, that is, an appropriate rule could not be made to fit the dispute before a
court, then Judges would solve these 'hard cases" by exercising discretion. Their
discretion was considered a legitimate positing of law, derived from whatever sovereign
sources that judge or court found appropriate. Dworkin disagrees, but his position differs
Irom the dominant realist inspired view that discretion, as well as literally all decision
making, is the result of non legal 1 6 forces, such as political ideology and interests. Both
agree however that decision making was not exclusively a mle bound activity as the
orthodox positivists said, but Dworkin parted with the Realists on just what was driving
decision making. Much like the common law tradition and scholarship that fomialism
railed against, Dworkin argued that beyond the specific practices and rules of law were
principles of law that structured how and when rules were invoked, and more importantly,
provided a normative backbone within law.
Dworkin s strategy is, therefore, to show that principles, which cannot be reduced
to legal rules, are treated in practice by courts as legal authorities which cannot be
Ignored, that they are essential (not optional or discretionary) element in reaching
decisions in hard cases. Indeed, Dworkin seeks to argue that in all cases a structure
ol legal principles stands behind and informs the applicable rules. (Cotterrell, 1989;
Rules and principles are distinct in Dworkin's model. Rules are specific codes of conduct,
both procedural 1'^ and substantive, which satisfy some theory of recognition (e.g. Hart's)
that positivism put forth to define the domain of rules. Principles are not so tight, and I
suggest despite Dworkin's use of the term doctrine to refer to broad practices such as the
Meaning extra legal, Irom outside Uie realm of a legal apparatus, deriving from interests luid/or
psychological factors.
PrcK'edural rules which structure court function, for processing <uid resolving disputes.
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doctrine or "judicial discretion" (Coleman, 1994: 4(K)), or the docume of "poliltcal
responsibility" (Coleman, 1994: 42(1) that pnnciples and doctnne have .some cro,s.st,ver.
Perhaps dtattrine could fit between rules and principles, providing Dworkin with a
knowledge structure to transform principles mto operative frameworks w.thin which rules
can be created, applied, and eventually altered or discarded.
Principles are standards to be observed, "not because it will advance or secure an
economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of
justice or laimess or some other dimension of morality" (Dworkin in Coleman, 1989: 389).
Dworkin writes that pnnciples have a dimension that rules do not, namely that of weight or
importance. Whereas rules are fixed in their applicability and accountability, principles
have sliding valuations depending upon the proposed application. Rules by definition
cannot conOict, lest one rule be proven unusable or plain wrong, but pnnciples, because of
this weighting and sliding characteristic, can overlap and conOict (Coleman, 1989: 393).
Doctrine has characteristics ol both conditions, in free exercise cases selected for this
project, principles and doctrines abound. Principles of religious liberty and neutrality
toward conceptions ol the "good life" are the conceptually abstract propositions behind
judicial processing ol such cases. While doctrines, or tests, or perhaps even implicit rules,
exist to facilitate that processing. The compelling interests doctrine is one, others include
the test as to whether a legitimate religious practice even exists, whether it was interfered
with, and whether the allegedly interfering state policy represents the least reshictive means
lor achieving its necessarily legitimate end.i^ While these tests are not codified in any
statute enabling judicial behavior, they are employed by judges as legitimate practices in
deciding free exercise cases.
Principles are simply less "positive" for Dworkin, they "emerge, flourish and
decline gradually through their recognition, elaboration and perhaps eventual discarding
18 The jurisprudence and practices of religious free exercise cases to be explored in succeeding
eliapter.
over time in the ongoing history of the legal system" (Coucrrell, 1989: 1 7(1). They
undergird the legal system, whether that be private or Constitutional, and ground the rules
that positivism recognizes, or those that realism either ignores as archaic refercnis for legal
action or criticizes for their in.stnimental qualities. The interrelationship between rule and
pnnciple (and doctrine?) is powerful (Dworkin, 1982}, and perhaps this has undermined
the principle/ rule dichotomy one finds in Dworkin's earlier work (i.e. The Model of
Rules). Resting on the assertion that all law is a matter of interpretation, principles for
Dworkin, and by association doctrine, have to be present for rules to make sense.
While Dworkin may be instrumental to the study of law's forms and phenomena
and their connection to constitutive social contexLs, the Realist backdrop in scholarship is
still dominant. For this reason, and the fact that neo-realist attention to doctrine is obvious,
I conclude this survey with a critical approaches lo doctrine.
Critical legal scholarship, or Critical Legal Studies (CLS), tackles doctrine most
forthrightly, problemitizing its indeterminacy and interpretive fluidity, and therefore by
association, attacking the liberal edifice housing it (Barkan, 1987). Inspired by realism's
rule skepticism and attention to the law and society nexus, and Marxism's claims of legal
instrumentality and lalse consciousness (i.e. legal ideologies), critical scholars continued to
explode the legal orthodoxy of liberalism. Critical scholarship though separated itself from
each in important ways. While the underlying critique of liberalism and its legal forms ties
CLS and realism indelibly, CLS moves to another level of relativity. CLS appropriated the
intellectually popular notions ot post-structural or post-modern social theory, which rest on
deontological views of law and society. Society and its institutions are contingent, not
natural. Realism stopped well short of this, claiming instead that a particular version of
social institutions and practices was not "right" and needed to be improved through
progressive law. This of course conflicted significantly with the judicial conservatism of
the early 2()th century. CLS differs from Marxism similarly, but appropriates from neo-
Marxism the idea oflaw’s relative autonomy i9 which moved CLS further still from
traditional realism.
Lesi becoming too confusing. CLS essemtal characterist.c is its opposition stance to
liberalism and legal orthodoxy, its denial of the separation of law and society, and later ius
suspicion of the idea of law's complete instrumentality at the hands of the purveyors of
CLS addresses doctrine through its associated attack on reason and reasoning. Reason is
liberalism s key to applying law fairly, and Roberto Unger's treatise on liberal political
thought captures its importance to the critical effort. In Liberalism reason provides a
"technique of rule application" that is supposed to guarantee that "laws are applied
uniformly" (Unger in Hutchinson, 1989: 20). Unger suggests that the technique of reason
is in tact a machine, one which provides tor the analysis and categorization of specific
data and contexts. Reason represents "the capacity to deduce conclusions from premises
and the ability to choose efficient means to accepted ends" (Unger in Hutchinson, 1989:
21). I suggest that doctrine is data, constructed data to be sure, in the technical process of
reasoning, it structures what reason can conceive of, and provides practices / options to
conclude the disposition of cases. The distinction between law and society is maintained
See work (Hay, 1975; Thompson, 1975, Colliirs, 1982) which explores law defying strict
insUumentality.
legal ideology and power:
—.vvwo, uii,. uucu Lw uiiucKsuuiu me msioncity and ideology of the
m
thinking about and acting in the world is extremely important.(Hutchinson, 1989: 3)
by asserting that reason ts an
.ntellectual proeess, a professional process, a techn.cal
process, one disconnected from the surrounding maelstrom of politics and interests.
CLS attacks reason, and therefore doctrine, by going after the separation and
neutrality metaphors of liberalism. It was untenable to critical scholars that reason in law
could be so neatly apolitical. Therefore they sought to expose the political or ideological
elements within the practices and constructs that support the technique, docu ine is one of
the most important of those. Ultimately CLS set about to show:
Benrath the patina of legalistic jargon, law and judicial decision making are neithersp rit nor separable from disputes about the kind of world we wanuXem Legalcasomng consists ot an endless and contradictory process of making refininc ^reworking, collapsing, and rejecting doctrinal categories and distinctums Doctrinalpatterns can never be objectively justified and consist of a haphazard cluster of adhoc and fragile compromises. (Hutchinson, 1989: 4)
Critical scholars started to unpack reason in law, especially in those cases at the appellate
level where the most signilicant questions of law are addressed.
Reason is an abstraction, doctrine however is the body being taken apart for signs
ot some internal logic, some transcendental order to structure reason. CLS said there was
no preordained method of reasoning that could be replicated as in a physical experiment.
All that mattered was how various doctrinal applications and interpretations were strung
together in the present case, such that the reasoned product made enough sense to those that
listen. 20 CLS pursued not merely the different interpretations, i.e. through so-called thick
doctrinal analysis (e.g. Klare in Hutchinson, 1989) of doctrine, but sought explanation in
the political contexts which gave rise to competing interpretations (Cotterrell, 1989: 211).
This has not rendered doctrinal study obsolete in the same way that perhaps Realism, and
certainly later judicial behavioral models in political science, might suggest. Doctrinal
analysis and critique is significant not only for uncovering reason's indeterminacy but as a
on
^ This raises tlie issue of legitimacy of judicial reasoning and case opinions embodying it.
Certainly judges are concerned about what otlier judges, especially at lower courts, will do in light of
pre.scnt decision. But, tliere is anotlier level of legitimacy tliat scholars of more sociological studies of law
are concerned witli, (e.g. Scheppele, 1988), namely tlie constitutive tuid resonative power of doctrine in
individuals and groups outside of jurists.
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structure that has some wider social significance, that perhaps constitutes social
relationships and actions around law.
==;SB=iH3
illeSimate if for'^vd
motives that the judges themselves would treat ast ce to confront them
; it 'requires the analysis of the coherence ofjudicial explanations ol outcomes.
,
. But the goal is neither an aUemad“^^
fV outcome.’ Instead it is to show how a judge’s formal rationaleof he decision (which presents itself as mere legal reasoning) (£'^1110 rSlpolitical significance of what is being decided. (Cotterrel, 1989; 212)
F. Conclusion
Doctrine has served a remarkably similar role through nearly a thousand years of
western law, as a logic, as a site where contests of meaning can take place, and where
judicial practices can rest reasoning and argument if need be. It is a nimble structure
though, whether aligned with maxim or principle, or seemingly discarded at the base of the
realist heap by critical scholars and jurists, it continues to breath life into what judges do
and say, and in the ways law is made socially real. This chapter has tried to show that
regardless the context and period, that the basic shape of that logic has been consistent,
despite the vagaries of its output or product.
CHAPTER III
COMPELLING INTERESTS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
A. Introdiirfinn
The lollowing surveys religious free exercise jurisprudenee to explore the
development, presence, and application of compelling interest doctrine. In the tradition of
constitutional doctrinal scholarship, the focus here is on the Supreme Court's treatment of
religious tree exercise claims. The legal and political thought which gave rise to our
particular variant ol a liberal treatment of religion provides theoretical context for the
Court's subsequent constitutional discussion. The concept of compelling state interest is
manilcstcd m a judicial test balancing between the constitutional rights of individuals and
state interests m the performance of its activities (c.g. public welfare, police powers). A
city, state, or Icdcral law claimed to interfere, either directly or incidentally, with certain
lundamcntal rights may be judicially tested to determine whether its compelling interest
prevails over those rights.
In the post Carolcnc judicial world,’ compelling state interests extend to
procreative behavior, where a state may intervene in women's prenatal choices, and define
a range ol options and actions available to those women (e.g. Roc v. Wade . 410 U.S. 1 13
(*^73); Akron v. Center, for Reproductive. Health . 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services . 492 U.S. 490} Federal and state governments have been
compelled to prohibit trade in, and production of, child pornography, asserting its interests
in protecting victims (e.g. New York v. Ferher. 458 U.S. 747 (1982)). When
lundamcntal rights to liberty and cquality^arc abridged by government actions courts have
^ Sec U.S. V. Carolcnc Products Co .. 304 U.S. 144 ( 1938) as tlic watershed opinion in die
development judicijil activity in areas of civil liberties and later in individual rights.
^ In die post Cttfolene world of double standards (Brighiun, 1984) appellate courts have paid
special adenlion to rights considered fundtuiienuU to constitutional democratic America. Of course, diis
held policies up to Sirict scrutiny, cstabl.sh.ng whether the action's means were least
rcstricuve of the rights and its ends represented a state, or social, compelling intere,sl.
Compelling interests have subsetiuently shown up in tree pre.ss cases (e.g. Simon and
Schuster. Inc, v Members of NY State Crime Viciinw 5,(2 u.s. 105 (1991)), in
reapportionment / reverse discrimination cases (e.g. Shaw v Reno 509 U.S. - ( 199 .5 )),
in residency requirement / equal protection ca,ses (e.g. Shapiro v. Thompson s.n a a,
y . Rodrigue/
.
394 U.S. 618 (1969)) and most importantly speech rights casos3(c.g. West
Virginia Board of F,l v Rarnelle
,
319 U.S. 624 (1943)). Finally, compelling mterests
have an important role in free exorcise law, displacing earlier formalist distinctions between
bcliclsS and actionsS.
This chapter prCsScnUs a hkstorical survey of free exercisSe law within the American
tradition ol religious liberty, and specifically the evolution of the compelling interests
doctrine therein. That history became more active in the middle of the 2()th century, after
the Carolene era ,shilt m judicial focus.^ Maybe bowing to realist criticisms of formal rule /
lact constructs, judges began to interpret and incorporate interests more aggressively in
keeping with then dominant balancing tests. This heightened explicit political
considerations by judges as they constructed and weighed those interests over ever shifting
doctrinal grounds. Reciprocally this may have enhanced political concern with judges,
altering legal consciousness in and out ot the legal prolession.^ Compelling interest
may be anoUicr d(X.'lrinal area which ebbs iuid Hows widi die contingencies of Uie era.
• The preferred position of 1st Amendment rights begtui willi free speech mid poliUcal .speech
contlicLs, where notions ot strict scrutiny judicial mailysis were employed. Such doctrines were gradually
adopted lor tlie treatment of otlier 1st Amendment areas like free exerci.se.
A
An era is a label attached alter tlic fact, it is used in practices of scholarship mid story telling as
a knowledge structure tliat helps tlie reader or recipient make sense of tliat story. Undoubtedly eras are
simplilications and details are lost, traditionally tlie era that begmi around Cmolene labels a period where tlie
Supreme Court, mid otlier ledenil appellate courts, were considered to have elevated tlieir involvement witli
cases of civil and individual rights.
The claim being made is tliat federal appellate courts (both Supreme and Circuit) have been much
more in the politictil lens of Americmi society since Carolene .
doclrine in iLs modem fom, emerged from chis period,*. Ii is mteresling u, nole ihai ihe
Court's effort to remove ttself from one realm of poHtics. i.c. Icgtslative involvement with
economy and property, seems thwarted by ils embrace of another political realm, that of
civil and individual rights.
Coincident with the enhanced status of civil and individual rights in American
jurisprudence was the rise of interest group and social issue politics.^ Religion played a
significant role in both, giving authority to rights assertions in the face of majoritanan
policy and shaping the mobilization of a broad spectrum of interests around those soils of
assertions.8 Religion has been elevated to new levels of influence in politics, whether that
means the President embraces a conservative Christian-styled opposition to abortion or the
local school committee requires the judicially permitted equal time for theories of Creation.
The politics ol law and religion bring more attention and energy to bear on courts and
judges, despite their nominal neutrality and institutionally constrained relationships with
politics. Notwithstanding such attention and political significance, the jurisprudence of
religion may be undergoing another moment of change, moving from the era of rights (i.e.
accomodationist) to one of deference (supposed value neutrality).*^ Compelling interests
Perhaps re-emergence is more accurate. Compelling interests have existed tliroughout American
legal history, tlie particular variant discussed witliin however can be traced to Lockean ideas about tlie
separation of law and religion and tlie weighing of competing interests in eitlier realm.
n
See work (Karst, 1993) which examines how interests become articulated and expressed
politically.
O
The supporting interests of tlie Religious Freedom Restoration Act were quite diverse, all
coming togetlier in tlie wake of tlie Supreme Courts treatment of compelling interests and religious practice
in Smith .110 S.Ct. 1595, (1990).
^ As ol tills writing tlie compelling interest standard had been suspended by tlie Supreme Court
.
Originally, in tlie peyote case (i.e. Smith) the Supreme Court struck down tlie test as it has been
establi,shed in ( Sherbert v. Venier ,374 US. 398 (1963)). The succeeding Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, Congress accomodationist effort to restore tlie compelling interest test, was struck down 1997 in City
of Boeme v. Florcs .117 S.Ct. 2157, (1997).
have been an obvious target in that move, it is an endangered notion
values and judicial practice
representing political
B. Free Exercise Hi<;fnry
1. Locke and Rousseau
The European invasion of what is now the Americas was spurred by the dynamic
tensions of religion, politics, and economics in I7lh, 18th, and 19th century Europe.
North American colonization was in part the result of the European religious conllicus of the
first half of that period, with English Protestants of one sect or another making the largest
contribution. They lied direct persecution as well as the more indirect dimensions of
prejudice and di,scriminalion, they sought to not only freely practice their religions but to
establish them as newly dominant. Colonial charters and later
.state constitutions facilitated
these desires, representing a patchwork of religious toleration in colonial America.
Such a diversity of legal treatment of religion pre.sented a challenge to federalist
ellons 10 establish a national identity and charter." Taking their iheoreiical leads from
writers such as Locke and Rous.seau, the federalists expressed an institutional de.sirc for a
tolerant neutral slate .separated from the factionalism of religion, yet dependent on the social
organizing and interest channeling powers of religious institutions.
Locke s ^cond Treatise and Rousseau's The Social Contract presented Founders
Madison and Jeflerson with models for the relationship between state and religion. The
state was to be tolerant of religion by separating religion from the public sphere. Locke
may have been more insistent on this separation, perhaps most fearful of the influence
religion had during the English Revolution. Privatization of religion was the solution, a
See (Aleinikoff, 1987) for a di.scussion of tlie political and judicial contexts in which tlie
practice of balancing interests developed.
^
^ Prominent Founders Madison and Jefferson represent those witli most influence over die
treatment of religion in Uie Constitutions Bill of Rights.
nominal removal of n entirely front the realm of state instuut.ons and publtc life. Rights to
rehgtous freedom became the vehicle for this, encapsulating the privately held .stock in
religious practices, distinct from state dictates, but only to a degree. Practice has proven
that dichotomies ot public and private have been difficult
and political.
to sustain, just as those of neutral
Rous.seu's civic republicanism seems to seek a less separate place for religion, or at
least not being so confident about separation. Religion's social signtficance was such that
it should have access to the processes of state as other interests or groups. Rou,s,seau
sought the "de institutionali/,atton".2of religion at the same time as the creation of a civil
religion, hence creating a substitute for religion in the public sphere. Both Locke and
Rousseau recognized however that personal liberties like that of religious exercise must be
limited, cither by social contract or others interests in safety and property.'S
Lddke's A Letter Concerning Toleration ( Locke, 1955: 17-23) was an explicit
cllort to .set out principles in support of the tolerant liberal slate and religion. Scholars have
made direct connections between the Founding and these principles, specifically between
Jefferson's Bill for Religious Freedom, and Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance as
well as his later efforts on the Constitution. The overlap has been summarized in the
following principles:
1) True belief is inspired by reason, not force; 2) Civil magistrates are not
competent to judge matters of religious truth; 3) The domains of church and state are
separate, and, therefore, a citizen's (religious) opinions should have no effect on his
civd capacities; 4) Civil governments may punish sedition and other similar
activities which represent the movement from opinion to overt activity against peace
and good order. (Sandler, 1960: 1 10-116)
1
9
An early form of non-establishment, tlie removal of official political roles for religious
organizations.
1
For Rousseau tlie scx'ial contract implied a sacrifice of liberty for tlie security of tlie group and
its protection from an anarchical domestic and international world. For Locke liberty is only legitimately
constrained when tiie well being of otliers, or society generally, are damaged sufficiently. Of course tlie.se
boundaries imply politics in tlie tests of balancing interests.
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The tmal pnnc.ple may represent an early articulation oi the compclltng rntcrest pnncple,
later to be a doctrine m free exercise cases. It certainly is consistent will, both Uxtkc and
Rousseau's notions of legitimate restrictions, or abdicairons, of personal religious liberty.
The hheral stale requires such concessions in the maintenance of law ruid order. In the
subsequent American experience much would be made of the distinction between belief and
action, the prior utterly unassailed by the whims of Lockean Magistrates but ihe latter
measured as all other social or political actions. Maintaining the distinction though proved
difficult.
Locke speaks most directly to this issue. Specifically, where does toleration end in
the liberal stale? Michael Malbin’s Religion and Politir^ iM-Aihin 1973 ) historical
examination of the First Amendment and Locke’s Letter Concemi up TnlPr.H.n purports to
show that the state brokered no exceptions for opinion or behavior which are contrary to
legitimate interests ot civil society, i.e. "had an adverse effect on the proper concerns of
civil society" (Malbin, 1978: 32). Malbin summarized Locke’s letter to mean that
Magistrates, or the state, "must have discretion in determining what (e.g. either opinion or
action) might have this kind of an adverse effect" (Malbin, 1978: 32). Given this, those
that transgress civil society’s law because of religious motivations must face state
discipline, but it is up to the Creator to meet ultimate judgment. There are matters that lie
beyond man and state, and mistakes may be made, but neither of these assertions alter the
magistrate’s supremacy in earthly matters of public policy.
2. Jefferson and Madison
The experiences of American states between the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution were formative of the federal apparati for religious freedom and toleration.
Jetterson and Madison’s efforts in the Virginia legislature and in the drafting of the federal
Bill ot Rights are examined here. This examination is against a backdrop of diverse legal
conditions for religious exercise and establishment. There were states which guaranteed
iree exercise, (e.g. New York Conscitution of 1777. Article XXXVIll; North Carolina
Consliiulion, 1776, Article XIX; Virginia Coixsiiiulion of 1776, Section 16; Mas,sachusetus
r nsiitulion of 1780, Part I, Article II; New Jersey Constitution of 1776, Article XVIII)
yet some of those (e.g. Massachusetts') provided for the aid of an establi.shed church. In
other states free exercise was limited to those who believed in God. Some stales had
religious oaths of office and religious tests for office holders (Schultz, 1994; 24(1).
Virginia however is considered the state producing the seeds for later federiU constitutional
clauses on the relationship between church and state.
The Virginia constitution of 1776 was the product of George Mason and James
Madison's words. Mason proposed the "fullest toleration" of religious expression, or "the
duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner discharging it," was driven by an
individual's reason and opinion, not the dictates of state (Hunt in Malbin, 1978; 21). And,
that all men should enjoy ihe fullest toleration in the exercise of religion.
. .unpunished
and unrestrained by the magistrate, unless under the color of religion any man disturb the
peace, happiness, or safety of society" ( Malbin, 1978: 21). Madison apparently fell
Mason's language of toleration and exceptions to religious free exercise unacceptable, and
he proposed instead to ensure the "full and free exercise of religion" (Hunt quoting
Madison in Malbin, 1978: 21). Madison proposed that rights to free exercise preexisted the
State s prerogative to extend toleration, and the associated task of identifying legitimate
religions and beliefs. And secondly, and most important to the future of compelling
interest doctrine, that protection for religious belief be extended to related actions which
may disturb legitimate social interests. Only those actions which "manifestly endangered"
society presented exceptions to free exercise and could then be precluded said Madison.
Malbin suggests that this was an early example of the clear and present danger test later
seen in political speech cases, I suggest it also provided a foundation for compelling
interests, certainly setting up the belief / action debate to follow. Nevertheless, the Virginia
cc,nvcn,.„n ad,
,
pled a c„mp,„„„,sc pesiuon, ind.cadng then- unca.sc will, Madison's level o,
Ircc exercise.
Between the raUneation of the Virginia constitution and the addition of the Bill of
Rights to the Federal Constitution in 1791 there were two other sigmlicani legislative
actions that lurther relined the status ol church / state relations. In 1784 the General
Assessment Bill wtus prolTered to provide lor state support of the Episcopal church,
establishing it as Virginias olTicial church. Madison's opposition to that bill, his lamous
Memorial and Remonstrance of 1785,15 espoused the unalienable nature of free exercise
rights vis-a-vis the state. Perhaps cognizant of the Virginia legislature’s lack of comfort
with his high standard for exceptions to free exercise rights Madison sought to put forth a
less aggressive standard. Madison formulated a distinction between opinions and actions,
hencelorth the belief / action distinction, and the right to hold opinions or beliefs freely was
a natural right beyond the positive law of state. Actions however were protected only to the
degree that they were associated with religious worship. There were still interpretive
dilliculties with this standard, but it was an obvious attempt to lessen the stringency with
which states had to allord latitude to actions claimed to be religious (Malbin, 1978: 26).
Jellerson stepped to the lore in this debate as well, providing an alternative to the
General Assessment Bill when Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance carried the day.
Jellerson s Bill lor the Establishment of Religious Freedom was passed in 1785
culminating the discussion opened by the General Assessment Bill the year before.
Reiterating the notions ol Ireedom of religious opinion present in previous documenUs
Jellerson weighed in on the exception to free exercise troubling Mason and Madison, and
the Virginia legislature to be sure. Distinct Irom Madison, who explicitly sought protection
Tliat religion, or the duly we owe to our Creator, and tlie manner of di.seharging it, ean be
direeled only by reason and eonvielion, not by loree or violenee, and tlierelore all men are equally entitled to
the Iree exerei.se ol religion, aeeording to the dielates of eon.scienee; and dial it is the mutual duty of all to
praeliee Christiiui forbeiu-imce, love, and charity toward each oUier ( Hunt. 1784: 167).
R'’ For text of tlie address .sec James Madison, Writings . Hunt, ed., Notes of Speech Against
As.se.ssmenls For Support of Religioun, vol. 2 (Nov. 1784).
lor actions construed as worship, in addition to Uic absolute protection lor opinions
Jefferson concluded that all actions, even those of religious symbolism, were subject to the
police powers of Che state (Malbm, 1978: 28). The result was a sharp division between the
protections for opinions and actions, a distinction present in tree exercise jurisprudence
until the 1960's, where it perhaps bowed to the elevation of protections for symbolic
speech (i.e. actions) and the lack of confidence in dichotomies in law.
3. Reynolds to Braunfield: Beliefs, Actions, and Human Sacrifice
The First Amendment's religion clauses are generally considered to be the product
of events and actors in Virginia between 1776 and 1791, as well as the philosophy and
writings of Locke and Rousseau. The religious clause included the term "exercise," not
opinion nor action, and if one had sought the intent of Mason, Madison, and Jefferson,
there seems no unified answer would result. This indeterminacy would propel judicial
treatment ol beliefs and actions into the late 20th century. It should be noted that the First
Amendment originally extended protection only from federal actions, this fact is largely
responsible for the relative inactivity in free exercise law until Reynolds v. U.S.. 98 U.S.
145 (1878). Most states though adopted constitutional and/or legislative provisions in line
with the 1st Amendment of the Constitution. Scholarship on the Supreme Court^^ suggests
that Court business was focused elsewhere, and that federal law and policy makers were
unlikely to pass many statutes or regulations governing day to day life of the citizenry, that
was still largely the states' domain, and would take the Civil War to alter significantly.
Reynolds is the first of the religious free exercise cases paid much attention in
doctrinal scholarship. The case is noted for establishing the Jeffersonian model of belief /
action distinction. The decision upheld a federal law prohibiting polygamy, the discussion
See scholarship (i.e. McCloskey, 1960) for general analysis and argument tliat tlie Court and
die circuits were more concerned wiUi tlie formation of tlie nation and its institutions and tlie federal / state
relationship for tlie first 100 years of tlie American experience. After tliose issues had been settled (at least
lor tliat moment) issues regarding tlie place of industrialism in American society and politics and tlie role of
civil and individual rights would be addressed
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01 Ihc exceptions to the free exere.se right is significant. Chief Justice Waite contended the
First Amendment removed all opinion from Congressional reach, but that it "was left free
to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order"
lEmiflds. 1 878: 1 64). Waite trotted out the human sacrifice cxamplc.i’ first in a piuade
ol ten-ihles that would result if free exercise really reached actions in the name of religion.
This could not be, .secular policy had to supersede minority religious claims where that
policy was a valid means toward social cohesion and safely. Chief Justice Waite included a
pa.s.sage that is especially enlightening to this project. Waite writes that "to permit this (i.c.
religious based exceptions for valid .secular prohibitions of actions) would be to make the
proles.scd doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit
every eitizen to beeome a law unto himself" ( Reynolds . 1878: 166-7). It captures an
essential quality about this study as well as this area of law. Waite is describing a war of
doctrines, one religious, i.c. Mormon polygamy, the other civil, i.c. public welfare through
personal practice regulation. Compelling state interest doctrine, paradoxically, is the site of
that war, providing rules of conduct and a playing field where the attendant politics may be
expreSsSed.
This doctrinal analysis depends on scholarly authorities in legal scholarship and
political science to shape its basic lorni. Before heading down this path further it may be
uselul to question the nature ot that torm. The belief / action distinction is centrally present
throughout this scholarship, however there is work that displaces the formalist doctrine of
distinguishing between belief / action, or opinion / practice. In that work,i^ politics,
moreso than doctrine, is most determinative or significant in understanding the free exercise
17 Human .sacrilice is Uie classic example of tlie most terrible coirsequence of an absolute right to
Iree exercise. It shows up in future tree exercise cases as a rationale for limiting Uie exercise of behavior
de.scribed otlierwi.se as religious..
See Epstien and Walker (1992: 79) quoting Brigham (1984: 77) who suggests Uiat it was
politictil, <uid or moral, considerations moreso tlian doctrine which explains tlie Courts decision. This
project incorporates tliis, and posits tliat while indeed politics is determinative, tliat doctrinal forms in
opinions play a role is in tliose politics. First we try to determine what is tliere in tlie forms.
luany. For example. Epst.en and Walker chose lo mclude a discussion of Pierce v
268 U.S. 510 (1925) in their civ.l liherty case hook directly following that of
WHS. Pierge was also a free exercise case, where dte Court struck down a mandatory
public education standard in Oregon, one which effectively outlawed parochial or other
non secular schools. Not that this case is uninteresting or unimportant, but its profile in
free exercise doctrinal scholarship is subdued, perhaps because it "virtually ignored the
SsmiMs belief / action distinction; instead, it rested its niling on the view that the society,
i.e. as opposed to the Mormons, engaged in a 'useful and meritorious' undertaking"
(Epstien and Walker, 1992: 80). So. as this project embraces doctrine in the explanation of
judicial events in a particular manner, I am ever cognizant that politics are behind the.se
cases, as well as likely within doctrine itself.
The period between Reynolds and Sherbert in 1963 has several cases which are
doctnnally signilicant.19 Constitutional law scholarship also claims that a major shift
occurred in this period, reorienting the Supreme Court and federal circuit courts and their
activity domains. The Carolene footnote is considered the nexus,2o with Justice Stone
articulating the terms of that shitt. Specifically, the Court was going to defer to political
directives with respect to economy and property, while at the same time closely scrutinize
those cases where civil or political rights were at risk . 21 This period is the subject of much
scholarly attention, and an exhaustive overview ol the fight over unenumerated liberties,
like that of contract in Lochner. v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and its doctrinal
After the preceding paragraph tliis has several meanings. Doctrinally instructive in botli Uie
way tlie cases unfolded and how tliat is portrayed in scholarship and opinions.
90
That nexis is merely tlie swing point, witli considerable attention paid to llie first 35 years of
tlie 2OU1 century's law and politics. Likewise there is much attention to tlie 35 years, or more, after
Carolene and its so-called active judiciary. See scholarship which discusses tliis in light of a perceived
double standard in Supreme Court practices. See Brigham (1984) and Abraliam (1982).
9
1
‘ The so-called double standard, see sources above, specifically Brigham.
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companions,22is not proffered here.23 it is important to reeognize that a climate of
deterence to state interests was ascendant, despite Caroleno'>; r,
lor judicial activism on civil rights.
eonentation of the potential
Given the new condition espoused after Carolene, deference to state interests in the
regulatory / administrative scheme became the defeult condition, the growing area of civil
nghts law, and the later development of privacy (the classic modern unenumerated liberty)
notwithstanding. Civil nghts of speech, assembly, and voting were the first influenced by
the post Carolene judicial paradigm which paid attention to textually fortified rights and
raised political interests to new heights. The protections afforded civil rights took form in
judicial opinions and practices corresponding to doctrines like strict scrutiny and
compelling interests. The deterential default however seemed to weigh against them in
those doctrinal decision matrices. So, while compelling interest was transformed from
political speech cases to tree exercise cases, the likelihood of superseding state interests
remained low.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.
,
298 U.S. 238, 297 (1936) (invalidating tlie Bituminou.s Coal
Conservation Act of 1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Com, v. United
Stau^ 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (su-iking die National Industrial Recovery Act); Hammer v. Dagenhart .
247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (striking federal child labor laws); Chicago. Milwaukee & St. Paul Rv. Co v
Minnesota
,
134 U.S.418, 456-57 (1890) (requiring judicial inquiry into reasonableness of state railroad
regulation). AUgever v. Louisiana. 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (striking statute tliat regulated insurance
agreements as violation of right to contract).
For a more detailed di,scussion see: (Horowitz, 1977; Sunstein, 1987).
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iMwcl l y
, r„.OTin i . 3 10 U.S, 2%,
,
I
.MO,. ,he l„,s, a ,sc„.,s ol cases
.nvolv,,,, „ce cxccsc dain.s h, Jehovah W„ncs,se,s, i„co,
„o,a,e,l ,he „ee exeai.. Cause
-ul eeamnuc, ,hc helie, / acion d.shnchon .4 Jushce Rohe.J.s openc, ,he dochina, doo, a
l>h however ,n a Madisonian dueciion by snggesiing d,a, eonduc, was no, emnely Ivyond
Ihe p,o,ecive free exe.ci,se undueha, Jn.siice Rohens siales ,ha, hee excxi.se
"e.nluaces
iwo concepls, I reedon, ,o believe and heedon, ,o aci." rhongh Jnshce Robeds goes on ,o
say Ihe I irsi is absolnie yel Ihe second can,,,,, be in hen ol ,he proieclion ol s,H.iely. The
Ireedon, lo acl nmsi have app,-op,iale deliniiion n, p,ese, ve ihe enloicemeni ol ihal
piolecion, ihns leaving ,he inlerpielive door open a hi,. Neveilheless, Rolx-ris is cediled
will, having moved Tree exercise away Iron, a so-called sirong beliel / acion dislinciion,
LiMllwsdl was lollowed closely by Mineisville .School Pisnici v (h.hhh xio u.S.
‘ a:esl VireiniiiBoaidorihhic-aiio,,', ,< 3 , ^ jj ,,34
^
well as Ihjnce v. Ma,s.saclnis.-( ls 321 U.S. 2% (104,1), all ol' which Iniiher dcrined Ihe
appi-opi iale slandards loi- l,ee exeici.se 1 ighLs. In (iliMlii, anolher Jehovah’s Wiinc.ss case,
Inslice ITanklniier w„„e lor Ihe Conn as il upheld a Hag .saline law, di.scharging die Iree
exerci.se claim by a.s.sei ling Ihal Ihe slale inlcresls in Ihe |)olicy weie oh such palriolic ami
pohlical signilicance Ihal Ihey were clearly valid and liininphed. Jnslice l•|allk^nrlher
ex|,hcilly ado|,led die language of inlercsl balancing lalher an beliel / acion. liann-iic
overlui iied (johdi.s
.
Ihongh Jnslice Jackson's opinion resled on ireedom orex|,ie.s.sion
lalher Ilian Iree exeici.se in Bjirnelle. Neveilheless Jackson's winds aic insirnedve loi die
olliei clauses ol die birsl Amendmeni. Jack.son wroie dial Ihrsl Aincndinenl righis "aie
siisceplible ol reslriclion only lo prevenl grave and immediale danger lo iiileresls which die
Slale may lawlully protecl." And since abslaining Irom a Hag saline was cleaily an acion,
inn .simply opinion, die C'onrI was moving rnriher slid I'rom Ihe beliel / acion di.slincdon.
CiUUwUl is inKlilionally conceived ol evaluating the nature ol the |K)liey at issue, and whether
it was a valid .secular fX)liey, notwithstanding whether it pnxiueed an indirect burden on lice exercise. I he
ea.se is understtuxl to have turned on C'onneetieut's attempt to identily religion lor licensing, thus while Ihe
ends ol Ihe fxdiey may have a legitimate public wellare rationale, Ihe means lo achieve them were
unacceptable in its potentially di.sec|nilous IreaUnenl ol religions beliel.
6H
.ncorporaung boU, balancing and a slid.ng scale of proiecuons for acdons claimed rcl.giou,
Fmally Pnncfi aniculaied ihe d.fficulty the Court was hav.ng tn th.s area^ Wh.le uphold.ng
the prohibition of distributtng Jehovah rehgious materials by minors, Jusi.ee Rutledge's
opinion indicated that free exercise claims were not beyond consideration, and perhaps had
some merit. Such consideration notwithstanding the opinion described a balancing of
mterests, whereby those of the public regarding child welfare superseded that of Prince's
free exercise (Frankel, 1994: 71). Justice Murphy's dissent is instructive for what was to
come, he said that "convincing proof' was necessary to show that the child's religious
actions were harmful, and necessarily concerned a public welfare rationale. Such
convincing proof may be compelling interests in another discussion; that discussion was
about to begin.
B raunlcld, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) has an interesting position in doctrinal
scholarship, it is one of those cases that has added significance because it represents the
one betore" an important lineage began. Such cases may be credited as providing a
doctnnal spnngboard, or moving doctrine within one step of re-articulation. Braunfeld is
unique however m that the professed reasoning and operative doctrinal logic is essentially
that which presently comprises free exercise jurisprudence. Rather than focusing on beliefs
distinguished Irom actions as the Court had been doing, Chief Justice Warren declared that
an otherwise secular public policy could not be superseded by religious rights if that policy
exacted only an indirect burden on religious practice. Essentially Braunfeld represented
the proposition that free exercise was an antidiscrimination clause, therefore de facto
disparate impact had little bearing in an arena where only de jure discrimination was
semtinized strictly. The dissent of Justice Brennan gives voice to the doctrinal era about to
open, relying on the free speech strict scrutiny model he pondered, if not downright
criticized, the nature of the compelling state interest which overwhelmed, if incidentally, the
Orthodox Jewish interest in working on Sunday instead of the Saturday Sabbath.
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4. Modern Free Exercise: Compelling Interests Weigh Heavily
In the period between Sherben v. Vernei, 374 U.S. 398 ( 1963) and Emnlovnn-n,
Division. Deparlmcm ol' Human Resources of nr,-,.„n „ e^as 4^,4 pj ^ 872 (1990)
compelling mutres, dtx-trine was copied Iront tree speech junsprudenee tree exerctse,
. itlmg the strict scrutiny standard. Whtle ,t had always been accepted law that explicniy
targeting religion through policy was severely constrained,25
,he post Sherben free
cxerci.se ca.scs largely locti.sed on when, and whether, a policy who.se incidental ellecLs
interlcred with the free exercise ol' one's religion could be prohibited. II IVcc exercise was
signil icantly burdened by a state policy, as was claimed in Sherben then a tougher
Standard ol review of that burden was justified by the Court.
Justiee Brennan's h^erbert opinion inquired as to whether the interests of state or
soeiety were "compelling," and whether the means employed to satisfy that interest were
the "least restrictive" of religious exercise. In Sherbert the incidental impact of a state
unemployment bcnclits law upon the decision of a Seventh Day Adventist to refuse
Satuiday work was not sustained by the state's interests in a functioning unemployment
bcnclits system. Free exercise appeared as a pseudo-entitlement in Sherbert
. and this
seems sensible when viewed against the backdrop of developing welfare state judicial
activities. No longer would a policy's claimed secular validity be enough to sustain it, nor
would the bclicl / action distinction be determinative, instead interests would have to be
explicitly idcntilicd and balanced against claimed rights. Much balancing would be
accomplished bclorc ^niith and the Court's subsequent abandonment of compelling interest
doctiinc, but very little detailed or analytical idcntilication ol those interests accompanied
that balancing. 26
2 ^ Explicit Uirgciing ol a practice which may be coirstitutivc of a religion can be .sustained for
secuhtr purpo.ses, but the hurdle is raised very high, at least in tlieory.
See Gottlieb (1988) lor a deUiiled examination of tlie compelling interest doctrine as a foil for
claims ol lundtunenUil rights. In it Gotlieb argues that the major critici.sms of finding fundamenuil rights
Irom constitutional inlerences should also apply to compelling interests, essentially they are each sides of
the siUTie coin and should both be subject to simihir amdysis and tirgument. Gotlieb finds that this is not
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II has been noied (McConnel, 1992: 127; Sullivan, 1992: 2I.S) ,ha, the Suptente
Court wa,s eonsorvauve^’ in its application ol' the compelling interest doctrine, or at least in
ttccepttng its application, in free exercise cases. In the 27 years of the doeu ine's pre.sence
in tree exerci.se cases, the Court found that free exercise claims tnumphed in hut one case
outstde of unemployment benefius law, the area opened by Sherbea. That ca.se is the
lamous ffisconsin v, Yoder 406 U.S. 2(tt (1972), with its protection of an Amish
tndividual from criminal prosecution for pulling his children from
.schooling at a young
age. The court rejected other types of free exercise claims by stating that compelling
interests were pre,sent or by rea,sontng that the levels of scrutiny represented by compelling
interest doctrine should be supplanted by a le.ss stringent rational basis test (Sullivan, 1992:
215). The second condition has two manifestations, first where state administrative
interests in .secure institutions (e.g, military, pri.sons) effectively lower the required
standard tor accommodating alleged religious practices. Second, culmtnaitng in Smith, that
otherwise valtd .secular policy need not be examined under strict .scrutiny so long as it was
not on its face dtscriminatory, and that any burden on reitgious practices was incidental and
did not cocrcc actions contradictory to religious belief.
Compelling interest doctrine remained determinative in unemployment benefits
cases in the period between Sherbert and Smith. Specifically in Thomas v Rovipw Rtv.„-fi
oLthc Indiana Emnloymeni Divisinn 450 U.S. 707, (1981), and Hohhie v
Unemployment Appeals Commission 480 U.S. 136 ( 1987), the Court struck state laws
which were lound to burden religious free exercise without the necessary compelling
interests. Thomas atlirmed an entitlement to unemployment benefits when an individual
relused work because ol religious objections, i.c. the production of tank turrets. The
state's interests in providing unemployment compensation effectively and fairly, and only
tlic case, lliat in fact die deterential posture of tiie judiciary to state interests is quite out of line witli tiie
olten articulated critique of its activi.sm in tlie area of civil and individual rights. See al.so Levinson (1994)
lor a search lor compelling interests in tlie politics and state institutions of Oregon prior to Smith.
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This is meant to imply tliat tlie Supreme Court chose not to be expansive, some might say
tliey were apologetically backpedaling in giving life to compelling interests in free exercise.
U.
.h..,se who lost their jobs "Icgitintately." did no, outweigh the Inct that Ihe nteans ,o du.sc
ends not only burdened Thontas's religion, but coerced hint to violate a tenet titereoi
.
Hobijk extended this reasoning, and docti ines perltaps, to a Florida case. A
Seventh Day Adventist
.sought nnentploymem bcnefiLs pursuan, to tern, ina,ion over relusal
io work on Saturday. Aga.n the state's tnterests bui dened IVee exe, ci.se by iorci.tg a choice
between a parttcular livelihood and Hobbie's rehgious tenets. The controlli.tg con,polling
.merest doctrine had a distinctive doniain where tho.se interests scented insuHicicnt,
uncntploymcnt benefits ca.scs where the policy would force a choice between job and
religion.
1 he exemptions Irom policy as in Herbert were closed olT to other areas, yet the
compelling interest doctrine would be incorporated in that process, hence maintaining
doctrinal authority in other areas of free exercise law. In Gillette v 11 .^ 401 u.S. 437
(1971) the Court weighed the interests of the U.S. military against those ol' both
prospective servicemen and active servicemen.28 For both however, while their religious
exercise was certainly burdened by membership in the armed Ibices, or by being subject to
conscription, the interests ol the military and state were signilicant and brokered no
exemption as in unemployment beneliLs policy. Perhaps we can view Sherheri and Gillette
as poles on a spectrum of interests, the Court had staked out the ends, the task then
becomes finding the boundaries between them.
What about state interests in social security and internal revenue? Would they
provide the boundary sought? The case of U.S. v. Lee. 4.55 U.S. 252 (1982) moved that
boundary closei to Shei bert by upholding state interests in the social security system that
would have required Amish employers to deduct and then submit to the IRS social security
taxes. Similarly, in Hernande/ v. Commissioner. IRS. 490 U.S. 680 (1989) compelling
state interests in a lunctioning tax system ovei^whelmed Church of Scientology members
28 This was a consolidation of cases.
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aUcmpLs 10 deduct from Ihc.r taxes payments made to that church lor (he practice ol
"audit, ng."29 The Coun, while skeptical of ihe religious nature ol andiling in this conlext
teed its decision of Ihe compelling mieresl docirine, choosing nol to investigate Ihe nalure
or essence of Scientology's claim to religious slams. So m each of these inslances, as
recently as 1989 in Hgmandez, the compelling mteresi docirine was active, though where „
was superseded by an individual's free exerci.se claim was stuck on unemploymeni
bcnclits, and Ihc ever lonely Yoder
.
The end ol compelling inlerest doctrine in free exercise law with Snihh, other than
in Ihe dormant area of explicitly di.scriminatory policy,
.seems sudden in light ol Hernandev
the year bolore. Using Karl Llywelyn's ideas, one could say dial juslices, and indges
generally, could easily argue that significanl fact pallcrn differences distinguished Smith's
dixilrinal irealmenl. But, as is evident, Jusiice Scalia m Smith went out of his way to show
why Ihc compelling intcrcsi docirine did not belong. The Court's Smith decision is at Ihc
end of a counlcr-currcnl liiany of cases within Ihc Sherbert to Smith penod. Thai is, in
doctrinal conslitulional law .scholarship Ihcrc is an established practice of looking hack from
these watershed cases to determine where ihcy come from, scholars basically deny ihc
possibility that a doctrinal .shift can occur suddenly, without hiiild up of some son. The
following build up shows how a dcfercniial judicial posture was crafted by first
distinguishing the legilimate inslitulional spaces for making a compelling interests
determination, and second, by eliminating the lest altogether along with strict scrutiny of
olhcl-wisc valid non-discriminatory secular policies.
Auditing is tui initiation rite, consummated with payment by aspirant members to die Church.
The old de jure / de lacto distinction of equal protection lore. So long as tlie policy did not
facially discriminate against religion, or as it would later determine in Church of the Lukumi Rahalu Ave v
C ity qI Mont Hialctili, 1 13 S.Ct. 2217 (1993), did nol in etlect target a specific insular religion or iLs
practices, tuid it served a legitimate end, tlien it need not be tested against free exercise claims.
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5. The Beginning of the End for Compelling Interest Doctrine
The definition of icgilimale mstituuonal spaces for the application of compclhng
interest doctrine seemed settled, or at least accepted, until Gol.lman v 475
U.S. 506 ( 1986) and fflLone v. Shaha//,482 U.S. 342 (1987). The doctrine had been
determinative in areas as diverse as miliuiry conscription and internal revenue
administration. With these two cases, the institutional spaces of the military and prisons
became significant as to whether the doctrine could be invoked or not. In Goldman and
flLonc the dtxnrine was objectively jettisoned due to the controlling effect of a particular
fact: the state institution proffering interests. Free exercise claims in the military and
prison would henceforth be held up to a less than strict scrutiny "legitimacy" standard, the
challenged policy need only be a legitimate means to an administrative end, one viewed
dcrcrcntially by the judiciary.
The Imal phase in the pre Smith period is written by the Court's attention to notions
like valid secular policies and "incidental burdens." Bowen v Rf^y 475 U.S. 693
(1988) tested the ettorts of parents to deny acquisition of a social security number.^i The
lorccd enumeration ol citizens was a valid policy representing a legitimate government
interest, as if it mattered anymore, and that the manifestation of those interests occasionally
incidentally burdened the free exercise of religion. The case of Lvng v. Northwe.si lndi:m
Cemetery Protective Association
,
485 U.S. 439 (1988) completed the sweep by upholding
the construction ol a Forest Service road through public land considered sacred to Native
Americans. Moving beyond the balancing of interests, the Court maintained that not only
was the road policy neutral in that it targeted no particular religion or religious practices, but
that any "incidental burdens" were subsumed by the validity of that neutrality. Lvng
established that unlike in unemployment cases, where a policy forced a choice between
01
- The social security number was considered a soul robbing practice, going well beyond tlie claim
ol" stigmatization.
religious exercise and penalty (i.c, denial of unemployment hcnel'iLs), the policy here had
no such implications, the burdens were incidental and lorced no such dilemma,
Smnh presented the Court with another unemployment hcnclit case, and would
seem to have fit under compelling interest doctrine as practiced through Hobbic. Members
of the Native American church in Oregon were tem,mated from their jobs, paradoxically, as
counselors at a private drug and alcohol abuse clinic, for using peyote. Oregon law at the
time prohibited the use and possession of peyote, and more importantly, stale
unemployment benefits were contingent on the cause, or context, of one's unemployment.
In Oregon, one lired for misconduct could not receive unemployment compensation, and
certainly actions contravening stale felony statutes could be construed as such. Smith, and
co-pctitioner Black, claimed that their free exercise rights were unconstitutionally
constrained by the coerced choice between their jobs (and by association their
unemployment benefiLs) and their religious practice of ingesting peyote. They pul forth a
case profile, an image, suggesting this ca.se was little different from Sherhen Thomas
and HtiblM, where individuals were compelled to either contravene religion or state law.
Compelling interest doctrine was a central element of that profile, and the Court could have
been rca.sonably expected to continue its tradition. Justice Scalia, cognizant of the "valid
secular" and "incidental burden” infiuences in cases like Lvni; and Rtiy, and consi.slently
pining for deference to state legislatures, look strict scrutiny and its compelling interest
doctrine on.
Justice Scalia's opinion denied the application of the compelling interesSt doctrine as
the Sherbert tradition intimated. Smith established that free exercise challenges to generally
applicable, religion neutral laws should not be evaluated with strict scrutiny, but rather a
variant ol a rational basis test. Simply, if the law banning peyote was rationab'^^and of
There was little discussion of what constituted rationality, perhaps all tliat is needed is tlie fact
tliat a deliberative / repre.sentative body passed die law. Probably more accurately tlie test for rationality is a
religious neutrality test, little attention to policy means is required
course noc on irs race
..serin,,„aro„, ,„e„ .Here was no cause for a cons.i.nuona,
,ssue ,o
be ra.sed. „ exemp.ions u, othcwise rai.onal nennal laws we.e ,o be developed „ shonU,
be done legislatively. ^3
Jusdee Sealia made ,wo signilicam points about con.pell.ng inceresi doeirine. I.ns,,
Ihc Sherben standard or practice was invoked whc,e a choice between a job, and
subsequent unemployment ent, dements, and rel.gious exerci.se existed, not between
comm.ttmg a crime and rel.gious exercise as Smith did. In keeping with Llewelyn's notion
or narrowing the relevant lact domain ,so as to .shape precedential choices, Just.ce
.Scaha
claimed Smiih wa.s really about somelhing quite diircrem. Second, he took on the doctrine
itscir, noting a "parade ol terriblc,s" thal would have resulted it it had not been Ibr die
Court's selective, and pro state, application ot compelling interest doctrine. Ii is Ihc
selective nature ol the application thal .seems to trouble Justice Sealia, such
.selection is
problematic, and should be left to political bodies to decide.-''^
33
- A.s a nialtcr ol lad iJiis occurred in Oregon, passing a law in tJie wiikc ol Snnili dial esUiblishcdan cxunpiion Irom the pcyoic prolnbiiion laws lor religious praclices, ouLside ol prisons ot course.
•mnii d .
h die compelling interests test is to be applied at all, then, it must be
i nc t^s^ i- n''
commanded. Moreover, il compellingm rest really inetins what it says (and watering it down here would subvert its rigor in the other fields^
‘ "‘>rchy, but that diuiger increases m direct proportion to die society’s diversity ot religious beliels
;
ml Its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely because we are a cosmopidrnin nation
’
<ide up ol people ol almost every conceivable religious prelerence, Braunleld v. Brown and precisely
because we vtdue mid protect that religious divergence, we cminot allord tlie luxury of deeming
presumptively invalid, as applied to tlic religious objector, every regulation ol conduct that docs not protect
<tn interest ol the highest order. The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally
required religious exemptions Irom civic obligations ol almost every conceivable kind - ranging from
compufsory miliUiry
.service, see, c.g., Gil lette v. U.,S.
,
401 U.S. 437 (1971), to the payment of Uixes, .see,
c.g.., LLS. V. Lee; to health and .safety regulation such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, .see, c.g.,
Runkhoq.ser v. .State
.
763 P.2d 695 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), compulsory vaccination law.s, see, e.g..,
LmJc V. Shite. 237 Ark. 927, 377 S. W. 2d 816 (1964), drug law.s, see, c.g., Olsen v. PEA. 279 U.S.
App. D.C. I, 878 F.2d 1458 (1989), and traffic laws, .see Cox v. New Hampshin' 312 U.S. 569 (1941); to
social welbu'c legislation such as minimum wage law.s, .see Tony and Susan Ahuno Foiindaljon v. Secretary
ol Labor, 47 1 U.S. 290 (1985), child labor laws. See Prince v. Mas.sachnseiis
. 321 U.S. 158 (1944),
animal cruelty laws, see, e.g.. Church of Uie Lukumi Bablv Ave Inc, v, Ciiv of HialtMih 723 F.Supp. 1467
( 1 .189).
. . environmenUil protection laws, see U.,S. v. Little
. 638 F.Supp. 337 ( 1986), and laws providing
for equality of opportunity for the races, e.g. Boh .lones University v. U S . 461 U.S. 574 ( 1983) .
A.S a l.nal note on Snolh Justice O'Connor's concunencc of iudgmen, should bo
ntcnuoncd. iffor no oUrer rca.son than
,s generally considered ,o be Ihe iextual and
mtelleclual inspiraUon lor the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C 20(K)bb to
2(K)0bb-4 (Supp. V 1994)). Justice O'Connor suggested th.s was as good a place as any
u. apply compelling interests doctrine, and one where its application would have been
relatively unproblemaltc, as there certainly are compelling soc.al and state interests in the
pr,.hihit.on of drugs. She. the author of Lyog, d.stingu.shed this case on the nature of the
religious interest burdened, and the manner tn which it was burdened. In Lyng. the
burden, while real, was incidental to a legitimate state function, and importantly did not
lorce the wholesale abdication of a centrally important religious practice as in Simih.
6. The Aftermalh: Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Beyond
The reaction to Smilh was politically active. The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, proposed in 1990, was finally passed in November of 199.4, providing a doctrinal
endpoint to this chapter's survey. RFRA was an explicit attempt to legislatively salvage
compelling interest doctrine. It is unusuai for a doctrine to be so obviously discarded as in
Smuh and then resurrected by direct congrc.ssional and presidential action. It is much more
common for a ca.se like Smith to inspire legislative bodies to create individual exceptions to
laws which had been conslittilionally contestable. To re-articulate a judicial, and in this
case a constilulional, standard was nothing if not a controversial congressional action. In
the Spring ol 1997, the Court struck RFRA in City of Roerne v. Flon\*s
,
1 17 S.Ct. 2157
(1997) as an unconstitutional expansion ol Congress' 14th Amendment enl'orcement
powers.
RFRA was "an ellort to enact the theoiy that the free exercise of religion is a
substantive civil liberty ... an attempt to create a statutory right to the tree exercise of
religion (Laycock, 1994: 896). Congress actions are an extension ol its enlorcement
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, much the same as applied in the
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Voung Rights Act. Poluical inlercsLs, often of very divergent natnre, were allied to
suppttrl RFR A, and parlteularly its reinstatement of the eompelling interests ditctrine to free
exercise law. Groups like the National Association of Evangelicals, the Mormons, the
ACLU, and People for the American Way lined up in hehind RFRA ISteinfels, 1W.1:
A I «). Opposition from Catholic Bishops, due to the potential ahorhon tmpl,cations, as
well as Irom prison administrators, who feared overaggressive interference with piison
administration slowed RFRA's enactment. Several senators stalled the hill's pa.s,sagc unlil
an amendment was propo.scd to exempt pri.son administrators. That amendment ultimately
lulled, and the pri.son i.ssuc hecame the most rhetorically, and judicially, contentious of
RFRA's subsequent appliealion.35
Provisions of RFRA addressed the intent of the Constitutional IVamers, attributing
to them the expressed desire of proteeting the unalienable right to religious Tree exercise.
(42 U.S.C. 2()()()bb (a)(1)) Speeilically, where "governments.
. .substantially burdened
g-; 9104 loui 'V
discussion of prisoner challenges: See Merritl-Bev v. Delo. No
RFR A
(determining iliat the court need not reach the elTeci of
hnrHt n direshold showing Uiat Uieir exercise of religion was subsUiniiallvbu dened by the correctional center); Smith v, Elkins. No. 93-15185, 1994 U S App (9ih Cir Mar 2
'
1994) (remanding for determination of RFRA’s effect on a pri.son rule prohibiting inmates to communicate
in a loreign hmguage where plaintill had alleged dial prison discipline for praying aloud in Arabic violated
his constitulional rights to Iree exerci.se of religion); Ctuiedv v. Boardman 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994)
(noting dial had prisoner’s assertion in his brief, that a saip .search by female officers particularly burdenedhim because he was a Muslim, been mnended to the complaint, diough likely doomed under Smith, such a
claim may succeed under RFRA); Prins v, Coughlin. No. 94 Civ. 2053, 1994 U.S. Dist. S.D.N.Y. Aug.
3, 1994) (denying injunctive relief to prevent a prison transfer where plaintiff failed to show diat u-ansfer
imposed a subsUintial burden on die exerci.se of his religion as required under RFRA); Boone v.
Commis.sioner of Prisons, No. 93-5074, 1994 U.S. Dist. (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1994) (finding that plaintiff
prisoner laded to make die direshold showing under RFRA diat confiscation of certain religious dcKunients
xUid a lilteen-day cell restriction was a subsUuitial burden diat eidier pressured him to commit an act
lorbidden by his religion or prevented him Irom having a religious experience which his faidi mandates);
Mesbintt V, Mil//,CP, 854 F . Supp. 1 16 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting diat RFRA rai.sed the government’s burden
to demonstrate a compelling, rather tliiui legidmate, interest, but furdier determining that government need
not nuike such showing where plaintiff prisoner failed to esUiblish diat he was denied the right to practice
his religion); Campos v, Coughlin. 854 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (determining diat because prison
directive which prevented Stuiterian inmate from wearing religious beads did not have a rational relation to
even the government’s legitimate interest, it was unneces.sary to apply RFRA’s higher sUuidard); Allah v.
Mgaci, 844 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (concluding diat RFRA provides die .suuidard of review in
controversies involving pri.son rules that subshintially burden prisoner’s religious practices); Lawson v,
X44 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (determining dial RFRA’s standard required the DeparUiient of
Corrections to use the least restrictive means to furdier its compelling interest, which it failed to do);
religious exercise wiihout compelling juslilicalion," RFRA was intended to provide
recourse. (H.R. Rep. No. 88. 11)3 Cong.(l993) and cite 42 U.S.C. 2(l(K)bb (b)(1))
RFRA provided:
(a) Findings
The Congress finds lhal -
(5) the eompelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal eourt mlinp<;
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this Chapter are -
( I
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbcri v Vorru^r f t c
( 1 >>63) and Wiseonsin v 406 U.S. 205 ( 1 972) andm
u
guarantee its applieation in all eases where free exereise of relieion is
substantially burdened. 42 U.S.C. 2000bb
^
Explicitly taking on Smith, RFRA provides that "government shall not substantially
burden a person's exorcise ol' religion even if the burden results Irom a rule ol' general
applicability, except as provided in stib.section (b) of this section," i.o. except where the
compelling governmental iniere.st and least re.strictive means tests arc met.
RFRA applies to all governmental burdens on religious conduct,
including every branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or
other person acting under color of law) of the United States, a State, or a
subdivision ol a State." Reacting to Smith's perceived dismantling of compelling interest
doctrine Congress perhaps pushed its Section 5 powers under the 14th Amendment. That
constitutional provision has been interpreted as a remedial power to take national legislative
action against laws and policies that restricted or interfered with due process rights (e.g.
voting). Challenges to RFRA focused on this power push, while the rhetorical war was
waged on RFRA's use by prisoners to file so-called frivolous challenges. RFRA would
collapse due to the prior but would cam dubious distinction from the latter.
.
Flores represents the death of RFRA, falling upon its explicit expansion of
Congress' enlorcemcnt powers under Section 5. The opinion of the Court by Justice
Kennedy, comparing RFRA to the Voting Rights Act, showed how Congress' power was
remedial, not pro-active; and most importantly, not pro-active in the sense that it sought to
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alter a Con.slicuuonal right, something the Court eon.siders fixed in the Con.stitut.on, The
Court e.stabli,shc.s authoritative intcrpreiat,on.s ofcon.stiiutional nghus, Congrc.s,s may enact
law,s to protect tho.se nghus, but trad.tionally only after a law or policy negat.vely i„lluence,s
those rights. Congre,ss heard what the Court had to ,say in Smith, d.d not agree, and
pa,s,sed legi,slat,on overtly contradicting the result of Smilk and explicitly articulated what
the appropriate dixnrinal standards ofcon.stiiutional free exercise rights were. Justice
Kennedy's opinion found this unacceptable. For that moment, and likely for .some time,
compelling interest doctrine was effectively eliminated from free exerci.se law with Flores.
C. Conclusion
The preceding analysis ol'eompclling intcrcsl doctrine was a sell' conscious allcmpi
to explore an area ot constitutional rights law in the tradition of scholarship around such
rights. Compelling interest doctrine can be seen as a part of a larger history cngulling the
Court and American politics generally. In time of formalist old, before the age of
incorporation, when facts and law were thought clearly distinct, and where neutrality and
tolerance were ideological pillars ol doctrines like belief / action dichotomies, interests were
ol political significance only, they had no standing yet in law. With the watershed events
ol early 2()th century constitutional law, destroying protections for economic liberty and
substantive rights of economic liberty, and replacing them with a deference to legislative
policy making and heightened scrutiny of policies which interfere with political rights, the
role ol interests became enhanced. The strict scrutiny appropriation of compelling interest
doctrine accommodates both ol these tendencies. Strict scrutiny is symbolic of the federal
judiciary's self proclaimed intention of being more active in the area of political, and
ultimately individual, rights. At the same time, compelling interest doctrine provided a
ready made construct for incorporating the state into discussions of those rights. In such a
way that they could quite effectively trump those same rights, and in the area of free
exercise examined here that was more than often the case.
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('IIAPTKR IV
M^(JAL INFORMATION MA('IIINFS
A. liUrodiirHon
lools do MOI make a cral'lsman's finished prodiiet, his labor and skill are his own,
bill dial piodiiel is inlimalely connected with the devices and methods employed m his erart.
Tools allow the individual to create in a particular fashion that which may not be possible
without them. Some lools are instrumental to a trade or craft, such that the objeels created
would not exist without the advent ol those tools, or at a minimum, they would not be as
linely finished or useful. 'Pools help create parameters of the possible, they provide spaces
01 potential lor creativity to take hold and make something, to add meaning and value to the
human endeavor. Those parameters however are limiting as well, they free/,e the range in
which cie.ilive eneigies may be applied. It is at the point of frustration and recognition of
limits that individuals push at those parameters, either adapting existing lools or building
new ones, to move beyond the status quo ol a productive domain that is no longer
salislying to the users ol those lools, or to the consumers of the goods produced.
'Pools for managing information present many of the same issues, except that in
social arenas like law, the product ol legal actors and their lools of information management
have impact upon the lives ol a multitude of social actors beyond the immediate circle of
tool users. 'Pools of law's information management are both enabling and constraining.
Doctrine as Data attempts to explore how some of these lools, and practices associated with
them, help shape the meaning of doctrine, an abstraction of law manifested in federal
a|)pellate case opinions. It has been suggested that the manner of law's information
presentation is nearly as significant as the information itself, certainly it is central to the
S I
meaningful content of that information, and thus the actions and bclicls that How from
conceptualizations ot that information.!
The need for managing legal informauon is linked to the development of legal
traditions and institutions dependent upon specific knowledge bases and experts to interpret
and act on that knowledge. Record keeping in a tangible medium is not required, pre-
literate cultures had law, or at least a stock of behavioral norms and attendant traditions of
observation and enforcement, organized in the minds of experts and subjects alike. This
project though is grounded in Anglo-American law. a tradition now fully dependent on
writing (i.e. the ability to record data meaningfully on a portable durable medium) and
Structured sensemaking around law's written hard data.
In Anglo-American law information management has been called upon to provide
meaningful access to the texts of case opinions. Information systems, or machines, are
created to record, index, and catalogue case texts. As the body of texts has increased, and
the needs ol legal professionals become more complex, information systems’ categorization
and organization practices have been stressed, and meaningful access become more
challenging. Two hundred years ago a lawyer might need to keep track of relatively few
cases2 ol precedential value to his substantive and jurisdictional area of practice. Today, in
the wake of over one hundred years of comprehensive and universal case reporting by the
likes ol West Publishing, and the adherence, at least in practice if not theory, to notions of
stare decisis, precedent, and analogical reasoning, the scope and complexity of a practicing
lawyer's information needs has increased significantly.
^
1
1987 ; 25 )
See discu.ssion of West s structuring power for the knowledge base of indexed case law (Berring,
There are a variety ol information systems employed in and around law, certain systems more
significant for diis project. Those which allow for access to appellate cases of the federal courts are most
usetul to professionals and scholars probing such notions as precedent. Rather tlian paying attention to
systems which allow local police to monitor sex offenders or tlie local district court to record and make
available case and trial reports, tlie project pays attention to appellate cases of tlie federal variety, tliose hetird
in die Supreme Court or Circuit Courts of Appeal.
- Adlierence to practices like stare decisis require tiiat data objects be categorized tuid normalized to
lit ptirticular meanings. Witli tlie incredible increases in tlie rate of case opinion publication it becomes
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ii. Yearbooks. N()miniiHv«> Reporte rs, and ihv vvihi
The c.minK,,, law look l„rni in rclali,,,, iccl,nic|uc.s l„r managing anllmnialive
i'>l<.nna(i„n,
,cchnic|ue.s ol |nc,senlali„n, reasoning ami argnmeni, rule applicalion and
uhi.nalely decision rendering and reporling. Wriling and prim I,as had an nnporiani role to
play ,n Ihe slory ol law's inlormalion machines. In ihe i2lh ccniury, ihe expansion ol ihc
Hnghsh royal conns and Ihe heginning ok record keeping hy ihose conns in pica rolls
linked Ihe I nlnre ok common hiw with texts titid tinderstanding them.-i
I'-arly l•;tlglish common law inlormalion systems were dependent npon individtial
ektorts ttnd taletiLs. Ixgal pntetilioners were the repositories ok legal knowledge, hnl even
m Ihc lotig lormalivc period olThccommoti law Irottghly bclwecti Ihc I2lh atid ifiih
cetilnry) ihcrc were wrilten records atid ititcrpretatioits ol conn acliotis. Utilil the late IhIh
and early 2l)lh ccniury Ihe power ok intellect atid traditiotis ok interpretation was still Ihe
core ol law's inherent (or contrived'.') coherency, as recorded anihorily was still
supplementary. I he lirsi recorded, and .so-called aiilhorilalivc, legal inlormalion
.system
was Ihc Yearbook.-''
I he Yearbooks were recorded cleniciits oreoiirl proceedings as well as aiilhors’
notes ol the signilicance or implications ol' those proceedings/’ Despite the anthoritalive
powei ol Ihe Yearbook it was an inlormal system ol' record keeping. Yearbooks were
(lilliajll lor prcccdcnlial (rails to be maiiUaiiicd, simply, a studious aud rigorous researcher can potentially
Imd all lorm ol cases to back up a variety ofarguineut positions. Such variability defies the old structures
ol stare decisis and analogical rea.soning as exhibited in traditional legal education and practice models.
Inlormation systems which attempt to continue (he structuring of tho.se models while simultaneously
pubh.shmg copious numbers of cases are inherently stressed, or are .stre.ssing upon things like stare decisis.
A
See work which surveys legal information systems (Gro.ssman, 1994),
For a more thorough di.scussion of (he Yearbooks see Hicks (1923: 94-102),
Eletnents ol court proceedings and authors' notes might be a dillieult distinction to sustain upon
clo.se examination, generally (hough the prior refers to points of law and decision.s, perhtips factual p;it(erns
as well, tho.se things considered relatively iinproblenmlic in ca.se reporting. The hitter might tlien be
undersUuKl as an extension ol the 'elemeiiLs of court proceedings,' or interpretations of (hose proceedings by
(lie author.
volumanlycealoO lo, a c„n,n„,ni,y
,,l lawyer,s and
,„d,c.s. Imccsnngly um.i il,e l„l.
cenlury anihnnsh.p was anonymous, perhaps sipnily.ng a des.re lor percepiions o, legal
oi-|cc„v,ly. or nrore hkely ihe laci iha, n,any nulivldnals were re.sponsihle K,r ihen ere.
«‘'<-nan, Lm: Yearhooh coverage was rpnie l.nnied, exiendn.g lo ca.se,s which
were lorinnale enough lo be recorded by nidividnal elTorls.
Nomlnauve reporls succeeded Ihe Yearbooks.^and represenled a nu.re lonnal
version ol ed.led nuerprelabons ol conn ca.ses, Keporls
.nclnded wnllen pleading,s. which
l>acl largely replaee.l oral pleadings, r, shdemeni ol ihe i.ssne ol law al haml. and a repori ol
Ihe opinion, e,s,senlially dealing ihe model lor modern reporl.s.* The docirine ol precedent
spurred Iheir devclopinenl as lawyers songhi anlborily, and a co,n|x-lilive edge, lor Ihen
n.se orca,se hi.slorie,s and argnmenis ol poinls oh law. Like Ihe Yearbooks Ihe Noininalive
rcpoils were largely inlormal, an inlormalion
.system dial develo,x-d hecan.se ol a markei
aeed.Vone winch Inrlher solidilie.l Ihe common law's preemmeni characlerislies (c.g. ca.se
Ihrsed and preccden, organixe.l). Nominative reporls were also voinniary crealions, hnl
anlhors were responding lo ihe desires ol Iheir conlemporaries and ihe inleresls in law's
prolTcrcd coherency and aiillioriiy.
Nonnnalive reporls prolil'eralcd
.somewhal in America in respon.se lo Ihe perceived
need ol eslabli.shing an American variani ok common law,i"yel one which was .slill very
7 ’See I hek.s alx)ve and hi.s di.scu.ssion ol Ihe lirsl noininalive reporl.s (eirea 1571) Iniereslnmlv Ihe
r!
wonhl nol appear nnlil ihe mid7 0.V Ins eondilion is il.sell worlhy ol examinalion, ihe power ol reporlers was lii-lilly hound wilh ilsa i^iage, since a lelalive minoriiy would he conver.sani in I,aw hrench, knowledge ol law's luineiples indluiels, nol lo nienlion ihe ca.ses giving lile lo Ihein, would he lighlly held and managed.
X 'See general drsciission ol Noininalive Reporls and ihe inihience Ihey had on ihe rornis ol modern
case opinions ((;ro,s.sman, I W4).
^ Did Ihe reporler lill ihe need or did Ihe crealor ol ihe reporler ihen sliimilale a way ol praclice a
way ol acciuiring and luaiupulaling aulhorilalive inlormal ion? This is a challenge lhal conlemporary
Maikeling Rh.Ds are con,sidering in diHereni conlexis. In my line of analysis Ihoiigh I slick lo consi
guns and siiggesl lhal caiisalily is imillidireclional.
See excellent irealmeni ol dillereni legal inlormalion lechnitiues in relation lo common law
Herring (19X7:32).
sliliilive
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much conneclcd lo Us English hcncage. NominaUve reports were alone ,n the reporting and
organ..,ng ol Amencan ease law lor only a short period, by the early Igtligs courts
ihcmselves had begun to integrate ease reporting into the.r institutional m.xf Judges,
lawyers, and legtslators ree„gn..ed the
.s.gntfieanee of an information system to court
’
i unetion and legit.maey by a,,s.gn.ng reportmg dut.es to court employees, or suheonnaetors
m some instances. Neverthele,ss. the law, conceived as the principles and tenets inherent in
ihe ma,ss of ca.ses, was still largely unrecorded. Written reports, whether nominative or
court sponsored, were few when compared to the case law from which they emerged.'^
Lawyers and Judges were still forced to organize and manage the information neces,saiy for
their respective practices, the reports, while increasing in importance and depth of
coverage, as well as providing a model of what was possible, could not completely
comprise an individual's inl'ormalion system.
The combination of nominative and court reports was subsumed by the organizing
and universalizing power ot the regional reporters privately provided by the likes of West
publishing. 13 In the mid to late 1 8(K)'s courts were creating an increased supply of reported
opinions, and at the same time the task of organizing them became more than individuals,
either private or court officers, could feasibly manage. i4 Dilemmas of scope and breadth,
as well as structured knowledge representation and organization, made the previous
methods ditticult. The West Publishing company appeared to normalize the knowledge
^
^ See general di.scus.sion ot early reporters and tlieir signit ieance to Uien developing Courtinsuiuuonal practices (Joyce, 1985).
* ^
12 Berring cites Hicks, in 1848 Uiere were 800 volumes of law
reports (Berring, 1987).
1 3
- West by no means was alone in its efforts, mid of course it still has competition (c.g. Lawyers
Edition Reporters, Lexis / Nexis, iuid a raft of Internet laeilitated arehives and indices)
l"! In substance our law is excellent, full of justice and good sense, but in form it is chaotic. It
has no systematic arrangement which is generally recognized mid used, a fact which greatly increases tlie
labors of lawyers and causes unnecessary litigation" Terry (1920: 61).
rcprcscntalion scheme,
ol American lawyers.
cover all Juri.sd.ction.s, and provide a low eo,si produet u, the market
C . Law and I nformation
1. Information Systems
The soctal reality of law has consistently been the prodttet of coneeputali/ations of.
and actions relattve ut, legal forms and informatittn; whether those are conceptual, /.ations or
actions of individuals faced with contemporary legal insltlulions, actors, and practices or
with pre-modern oral cultures and Justice traditions.'-' Law helps structure understandings
of authoritative, individual, and collective actions, Uicxse understandings are grounded in
direct experience and .second hand knowledge, acquired from authoritative and informal
sources.'' Informal sources can be as abstract as intcrsttbjcctivc knowledge bases (i.e.
cultural values and predtspositions grounded in empiricism and hearsay) which maintain
cyntetsm and distrust of law and law enforcement in minority communities of urban
America (Mcarcs and Kahan, 1 998). Fomial, or authoritative, sources of legal knowledge
include legal education, and most importantly for Doctrine as Data, .systems developed to
manage law's hard data, i.c. federal appellate case opinions.
svsien, h,.|i, I hw , ? “> I'" “I " 'vgal
t his kind ot magic is necessary it law is to work. Akso, Ethan Kalsh (Katsh, 1989: 8-9) conUiins ageneral di.scussion ol law’s intormatiomU qutdity. Law does not simply consume or produce inl'ormatioirlaw structures, organizes, and regulates information. The effectiveness and operation of law depends on
’
controlling access to .some inlormation and highlighting or directing attention to otlier infonnation.
'
^
See Wilson ( 1983) for a thorough discussion of how individmUs gaUier knowledge of their
social worlds. Wilson suggests tliat for tlie most part individuals gatlier knowledge Uirough .second hand
accounts, tliat it is simply impossible to experience enough of tlie world to gatlier enough intellectual
cxlder lor a lull .sexual life. Therefore, assessments of what and who to believe when confronted wiUi .second
luuid knowledge, or accounts, becomes critical to individutU tuid sexial life. Determinations of audiority is
key to tliat endeavor, <uid such determinations are often grounded on political, personal, or even fashionable
cnXria
Berring suggests (Berring, 1994: 7) tliat legal education was constructed on, a foundation of
abstract legtU tliought and tliat Uiought was given structure tuid metuiing by Uie information system tliat
produced legtU educaUon. Berring attributes Uie Ltuigdellitui case meUiod and its relation to die law library
as die key lactor in die developing educational system.
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Legal authority in Anglo-American law is found in ca.ses and practices of making
sen.se ol them. Biackstone's attempted codification of Anglo common law pnncipies ,n an
organ..ed treattse set the stage for a market which sought synthe.sis and stntcture tn an
expandtng domatn of legal material. While Black.stone's work has been enticed for bias
and oversimplification of disparate case material,.* he nevertheless estabhshed expectations
that common law princ.ples could be ascertained by scholars and .,udges from case
optnions. That act would make use of knowledge structures or abstract.ons to order and
organtze data tnto mean.ngful categories or narratives (e.g. intellectual tradition.s). Doctrine
ts m a class of knowledge structures hke that of pnncipies and tenets, an abstraetton which
ts meaningful to understanding cases. Common law prtnciples. tenets, and doctnnes could
all be dtstilled from appellate cases manifesting law’s structure and parameters.
tavVSeW
Written judicial opinions are the bedrock of American legal education and practice. ><> Dean
Langdell s ca.se method and the Harvard Law school library set a standard, building a
Iramework lor American legal life and its authoritative materials which has remained
vibrant and contemporary through its association with law's preeminent information
system, the West digest and reporter.
Information systems are mechanisms or practices to store and provide access to data
objects (i.e. a database and organizing / access techniques). Data objects are discrete
See Duncan Kennedy s analysis (Kennedy, 1979)of Biackstone's work
.
^ driving force behind tlie legal system, tlie concept of abstract legal principles as extruded
roin liie opinions of appellate judges has survived the succeeding waves of jurisprudential tlieory crashing
on die beaches of American law. Legal realism, critical legal studies, critical race tlieory, and each otlier
variant on tlie traditional tlieme laid siege to tlie old grand tlieory of tlie common law. But tlie system of
legal research, of finding primary sources and interpreting diem as if diey are [*16] nuggets of absolute
audiority and trudi, survives and flourishes. (Berring, 1994: 49)
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lilies which conslitulc the base units ol' an inromialion syslcm, ihcy arc the stnlT upon
Which ihese systems are huilt^ Data ohjects can he of all variety and type, index cards will,
names, phone numbers, and addre,s,ses are simple data obiects m a rolodex inlormalion
system. Alphabetization of the rolodex is one possible organizational
,siruclure,2o ihus
u,sers know how lo look for desired dala objects and addition of new dala objects to the
system is regularized.
Inlormalion systems help make dala objecus understandable though their
organization and retrieval mechanisms. Nol that Ihe dala objccLs are meaningle,ss unle.ss
encapsulated in such systems, but reliance upon iheir form, location, and access routines is
significant to ihc information seeker, especially when there arc many dala objecks and the
struclure of the system corresponds to prevailing categories or knowledge bases about
lho.se data ohiccts.2i Information systems structure elements of meaning for dala objccis.
This IS especially
.so for syslcms indexed or organized on subjcci areas a.ssigncd by human
hands (i.c. editors). Sy.stems which index exclusively on the textual conlent of dala objects
may also impute significam meaning to those dala objccus. but ihai is likely more lied lo the
querying / .searching activities of users, and the pre-existing knowledge ba,ses they bring lo
bear, rather than the editorial actions of .system designers and managers. If anything, ihe
latter systems (c.g. lull text Lexis / Ncxis, Wcsllaw, or probabilistic inference InQucry),
challenge or at least problematize some of the abstractions and knowledge sUucturos
associated with cases by law's knowledge experts.
While most such indexes are alphabetically ordered tliere are other ways ot iUTiuiging tlie cards,
by Irequency ol contact by numerictil address, by relative fondness for tlie referenced individujil. The
organizational scheme is only limited by tlie dillerent characteristics which can be derived from tlie daui
objects and tlie desire ol tlie indexer to structure tlie dtitabase so as to implement tliose desires.
21 See lollowing discussion of tlie West digest and reporter system luid its correlation to prevailing
notions of law's categorization into subject areas tuid classifications of daUi objects (i.e. cases).
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2. Law's Information Machines
.nlormafon systems their associated practices ot orga„..at.„n and ntanagentent
iransiorm data to inl'ormatton tor users of those systems, in iaw these systems ntanage an
ncreastng array of data, from enormous eivii iitigation document eoiiections to Supreme
Court bnefs and opinions. Doctrine as Data pnmaniy focuses on
.systems managing
iederai appeiiatc case opinions. Presentiy, the Judges opinion ,s considered the most
authoniative data object for these sy.slems; while
.systems like Lexis / Nexis al.so tnclude
statutes. adm,n.stralive rules, and a wide range of .so-called
.secondary
.sources, the primary
data object for legal authority is still the ca.se opinion. This was not always the ca.se, as
lawyer's arguments were at one time considered part of the authoritative onip nion, and
included in the data object. The implication is that these information
.systems relleci
understandings and a.ssumplion.s at moments of system creation and maintenance. Such
rcllcclion does not significantly alter the data object's physical pre.sence in a medium, but
Irom that fixed point of information on paper, or electro-magnetic disc, the conceptual
content IS subject to mediation and interpretation by system designers and users.
Systems which manage law’s authoritative materials are more than just automated
document handlers, they also tend to structure or alter meanings attributed to that material.
The objects incorporated in, and then transmitted between machine and user, is information
rather than simply data any longer. Machines organize data in particular ways and allow
access to that data through structured queries and interface protocols. Objects flowing from
machine to user have identifiable, if complex or contested, meanings. Meaning here is the
result ol a lunction of practices, one which takes into account the words or symbols
representing that data object, a so called empiricist notion,22as well as the context, expert
knowledge, and associated interpretations of those objecLs in and out of their specific
99
Sec discus.sion (Brighiun, 1978: 17) of positivi.st or empiricist theories of language and
metuiing of Wittgenstein and Harrison.
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mlormation machines. While meaning ,s ollen in dispule because of Ihc lu/./,inoss ol such
things. Ihis projcci auempts U) pry at some structures and practices around Ihese machines
which help make case opinions and doctrine meaningful.
Case opinions can represent dilTerent things, for insianec a doctrinal sea change or
affirmation, a statement of die law in a particular conslitutional area, or a travesty of just.ee.
Work, and law, at least parually facilitated by these machines carry with them concepts
attributed to such informational objects:
current system to replicate itself
^ Painlessly. Their categories mirror precedent and existing
h^lat
''
^‘a SaT ' '=8^' ‘'’'™«''t and constrain novel approachc.s to^
^
u
Within one or more of thef>e sSystems finds the
ol legal research greatly simplified. Beginning with one idea, such systemsquickly bring to light closely related ideas, cases, and statutes. xSeSm ikea workshop full ol well-oiled tools, making work easier. Relying on ton
exclusively, however, renders innovation more difficult;
innovative jurisprudence may require entirely new tools’ tools often left
undeveloped or unnoticed because our attention is absorbed with manipulating old
ones. (Delgado and Stefancic, 1989; 208)
^ ^
It is very difficult to completely separate legal scholarship or practice, and therefore law's
social reality, Irom the structuring power of these information machines and the knowledge
bases upon which they are drawn.
3. Machines and Abstractions
Data is ol course infomiation, it is a representation of some observable
phenomenon, representation is by default a conceptual transformation, with meaningful
attributes being attached or attributed to that data. Any attempt to distinguish data from
inlormation is problematic, but what can be stipulated is that highly categorized legal
inlormation systems attach more interpretive authority to data objects. Systems which treat
case opinions as merely related collections of phrases and terms as Lexis / Nexis or
InQuery does implies a lower level of abstraction than that of West's digests and reporters.
Abstraction is a mediating power of infomiation machines, and it is considerably more
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on
‘lillicul, ,0
.sustain highly ahsiraclctl conccp,.s in n,t,dunes winch do no, calego,i/e
inlc-pteitve notions I,he utea of law ,..e. as u, the Wes, digest,, hu, ate touch tnote likely ,o
tiotc Ihe pre,sence, occurrence rrec|„ency, and distrihntion ol concepts (t.e. as ,n InQttery)
wiihin a rclalcd collection ol' objects.
Data as Doctrine was designed io step away as far as possible from abstraclions
nihcrenl in indexed inlornutlion systetns, to minimi/.e the impact ol expert knowledge on
.searches and subseqneni analysis. But as will he discu,s,sed more in sub.sec|nenl chapters,
the core identity or profile of the dau, colleclion is defined by an abstraclion, free exetci.se
ctopelling interest doctrine. Re.searchers can try to treat ca.ses as nterely data ohieefs
containing particular terms and phrases which identify ,ho.se ca.ses as doctrinal, bn, if the
goal ts lo collect ca.scs which exhibit an abstraction like doctrine (i.e. at least compelling
interesf doctrine in free exerci.se law), one will, as many synonyms as compelling ittferesls,
you should be prepated to consult ttn abstracted index or other knowledge ha.se.23
Ralher Ihttn stcpptng away from abstraclion, it became ihe focus of alicniion, the
prachcos ol inlormalion machines which either attribute or alter the meaning of the
abstraction doctrtne became the object of this project's investigation. By attempting to stay
away Iron, abstract,ons it became ail the more apparent that they are central lo an existing
knowledge ba.se aboul law, and that different information systems have distinct inflitenccs
upon, and arc inHucnccd by, lhal dominanl knowledge.
4. Machines, Practices, and Meaning
Mechanisms lor managing case opinions, Ihc hard data ol' law, aUempl Lo satisfy
ihc desires of evolving information markets. Since the turn of the century West Publishing
has leigned supreme in satislying these needs with its universal coverage, unic|uc indexing
7 '^ See work (e.g., Blair and Maron, 1985; Herring, 1986; Dabney, 1986) wliieli .show dial legal
lull text retrieval may miss a number ol on point eases when searehing lor a complex expression or
knowledge structure repre.sented in a variety ol ways ;ind applied across a number ol eontexLs.
.scheme, and slams as Ihe relcrenee backbone ol law libraries. Wesl's indexing and marke,
dominance has placed a dislincl slamp r,n law and legal educalion, delining ways ol'
knowing, and
.shaping our underslandings of Ihc source malerials of American law .24 |, j,s
ih.s Stamp which incubales new desires and markels, inspiring
.scholars and informalion
professionals lo explore new ways of knowing and acce.ssmg ihose same malerials.
On-ime legal databases like Lexis / Ncxis and Wesilaw, compaci di.se legal
documenl libraries, and Arlificial Inlelligence software
.syslems lo assisl legal professionals
are law's newesl informalion machines, perhaps salisfying developing marker needs.
I he.se looks reside wilhin Iwo basic camps for compuler a.s.sisled legal re.search: informalion
relricval and cxperl syslcms.25 Informalion rclrieval and expert syslems are designed lo
a.ssisl u.sers by modeling and ultimalely aulomalmg certain law practice la.sks.2<- Expert
systems, which often akso contain informalion lookup and retrieval funclions, lend to ulili/.e
a lop down Slruclurc, asserting ihe existence of a relatively fixed and quanlifiable legal
expert knowledge ba.se, one crucial lor organizing and inlerpreiing data, and that such
cxpcrii.se and its application lo discrete ta.sks can be modeled in software algorithms and
databasScs.
Expert sSysSlcms attempt to mimie legal reasoning through rule struetures (i.e. il7
then statements) whieh produee diserete answers or outputs. The major ehallenge with
expert systems is that eapturing legal reasoning and expert knowledge in diserete I'unetions
is quite rigid, it represents a snapshot of legal knowledge and praetiee, and presupposes
that the snapshot will be valid lor some time, or at least will ehange only inerementally and
thus ean be altered with new il / then rules. Perhaps in some areas of legal praetiee this is
24 discussion ol tlic power ol West Digest and Reporters in the creation of law's "universe of
thinkable tliougliLs" see Herring (1994: 15-16).
See work (Zeleznicow juid Hunter, 1994) For a more thorough ireaUnent of tliese two models.
The piUxidigmatic task is: lirst, tlie pre.senhition ol <m inlormation need (e.g. perform a .search
ol cases for precedent or construction of mi argument for a given factyiaw pattern); .second, the development
ol mi inlormation representation lor that need; and ruially looking-up mid reporting Uie findings in a
memiingful way.
92
appropria^-. whcc "hard ca,scs" ol' ca,cgon.aUo„
„r are n„n,n,i.ed, and
discrete answers are legitimate. 1 U.wever it seems unlikely that tins is the norm, that ,n
lact, most areas „l law practice rec,uire l u.xiness and interpretation for the tmttlog.cal
reasoning and argtmtent satd dominant tn that practice, and ln»iness ,s dilTrcnlt, if not
impossible, lo model in struelured il7 then rules.
Information retrieval applications, like Lexis / Nexis, Westlaw, and InOtiery, shy
Irom the aggre,ssive stance of expert systems. Adopting a bottom np approach, inibrmation
retrieval applications ntilixe elemenfs of the dau, ohjeefs them.selves lo sUnetnre organi/aiion
and access. Inlorntation retrieval systems put the power in the hands of system
.users
rather than designers and associated knowledge experts. Such systems can be corustdered
wide open tools, allowing the parameters of practice available lo knowledge workers to be
as nndelined as they wish, really only being constrained by the limits of their search
strategies and the language and structure ol opinions as they are created by indges.27
Systems like InQuery for retrieving and examining legal texts may akso allow for Ihe
derivation of knowledge from within collections of related diteuments, knowledge that may
not be obvious lo legal knowledge experts, and that only shows up over the stretch of a
related document collection.^* For this project InQuery was appropriated lo .seek
knowledge about a collection of documents (i.e. case opinions) held together by a distinct
abstraction, the compelling interest doctrine within Free Exercise case law. InQuery, and
olhei culling edge inlormalion retrieval systems, improve document retrieval relevancy
This IS no small consU-aint. Search techniques in Uie age of Boolean searching (more on this in
subsequenl chapters) are restrained by lack of experience and exposure of users (luid Booleiui logic is not
easy once you pass die basic AND / OR operators). New interfaces (i.e. Natural Language searching)
reduces die skill level neees.sary ol a searcher, die.se systems rely on technology like that of InQuery, which
seeks to map relationships between daUi objeeLs based on the presence of terms and phrases, as well as the
creation of synonym look up tables (i.e. as.soeiation thesauri) which expand searches greatly by ineludine
synonyms to terms in die original search profile.
In diis work (Aronow, et. al.: 1995) InQuery was used to nuuiage a national daUiba.se of
doctors notes regarding asdinia ;uid breadiing related disorders. InQuery exposed knowledge about asthma
alUicks that dtx'lors were not audioritatively aware ol, but when a large collection of dextors notes was
examined tor textual relation.ships it was tound that night coughs had a high correlation to ineidenees ol
asdinia exacerbation, thus adding to the stock of knowledge about asthma
through more nuaneed
“undersianding" of both the expressed informal.on need (i.e.
database query) and the infomtattonal representation of documents in the collection (Jing
and Croft, 1995). Rather than importing all knowledge from experts to design document
collection handling, InQueiy and other information retrieval
.systems employ a limited
amount of expert knowledge while looking to the documents and relationships inherent in
them to derive further knowledge.
All of these systems utilize defined practices for manipulation and organization.
Meaning for cases is tied to those practices. In systems such as a Yearbook knowledge
experts (i.e. lawyers) were the key players, they defined not only what the data object
should look like, or contain, but they also chose which cases were of import to their
relevant community of lawyers and judges. The Yearbook recording lawyer was
responding to the needs of variable markets, they were neither universal (i.e. representative
of all data object types) nor comprehensive (i.e. covering all jurisdictions and courts), it
was an idiosyncratic endeavor. Meaning for data objects was inherently tied to each market
and the community of lawyers populating it, to their needs and wants, and how those
desires were translated into the activities of the recording lawyer.
West's digest and reporters on the other hand were universal and comprehensive,
normalizing the data objects to an extreme, at polar opposites from the idiosyncratic
approach ot the Yearbook authors. Particularities and nuances of the data objects were
undoubtedly lost in West's editorial and organizational efforts, where as they were
emphasized and brought forth in Yearbooks. More significantly. West adopted a subject
categorization scheme and editorial practices which assigned headnotes and places for cases
within that scheme, further attributing and altering the meaning of cases. Such schemes
also lock up or take a snapshot of the existing knowledge base of law in those categories,
notwithstanding their incremental strategies for growing beyond that static representation.
Computer systems like tull text Lexis / Nexis and InQuery treat the cases as
relatively unstructured data objects, with very little editorial organizing as with West's
94
hardbound producdon. Fu„ cext replaced ed.toria, nred.auon w.d, Ure power u, n„d data
Objects based on textual content. InQuet, expands that power by tdenttlying assoctattons
between words and phrases in the collection, thus increasing the reach and scope of
queries, and potentially enhancing the suxtk of knowledge about such collecttons. The„se
systems are entenng a world of legal educatton, research, and pracuce which has been
intimately fed to West and the law library. Subject area classification and categonxatton are
not part of these computer tools, all that matters is the content of the dtK-uments and dte
conceptual relationships and patterns within collections. Since West has been the default
lor over 100 years there is predefined meanings associated with cases in that system, and
with collections of cases corresponding to particular subject areas of a digest. Computer
tools olten problematize that structure by bringing into question what really lies groups of
ca.ses together beside West editors and long standing epistemological traditions in legal
practice and education.
DKI INIIKW and I)IS(OVKKY - I.KXIS / Ni.;xis
A, llltroductioil
i.s an nxannna(u,n ol M,o use nl l,nxi.s / Nnxlx u, clKn a >lala
.so, n,
npix-llalo ca.se- „,nn.on.s. The elala
.sc-, ,s c„,„c-,„ and cl„n,a,„
.s,H-c,lic: a
co„,,x-ll,„t, „„c-,c-s, halancn,
,o.s, w„„in IVc-c- c-xc-,ci.sc- „l ,c-l,,i„n ca.sc-.s a, ,S„|„c-„,c- (
I•d,l.-,al Ci,c,n, Cnns.s nl Ap,K-al. Thai clala
.sc, i.s Ihcn pn,cc-s.sc-cl hy ihc- l,„.)„c-,y
„,a„a):c-,„c-„l
.syslc-n, ,„ ,„clc-, in analyze- occ„nc-„cc- r,.-.|„c-ncK-.s and cn-
ocainviicvs ol koy coiicopls across llial collcclioii.
Dnia n-.sidc-.s in inlnnnalion machim-.s, and is
.shape-d and made- knnwie-elpe-ahle- by
piaclice-s loi Imle-xint; and prnvidiiif; acce-.ss In ihal elala. I'lil.s pi„je-c,
.snnplii m ii.se- ilie-
docliine- nl cniniK-Minp
.slab- inle-re-sl.s in l,e-e- e-xe-rci.se- law as a .se-a,ch prnlile- In, die- s„h|e-c,
cnile-clinn. I Inwe-ve-r, il he-cnine-s appare-nl Ihal an ah.sliaclinn like- cninpi-lliiij; nil,-re.si
dncliine- clialle-npe- Ihe- a„ln,nale-d Inll le-xl
.se-a,ch and cnlle-clinn capalnl„ie-s nl Innis hke-
l.e-xis / Ne-xi.s. In lad, alle-inplill(; Ibis lask prnhle-nializ.e-d dnenine-'s In, in ami p,o.s.-,ice- in
ca.se- npininn.s, and hi,ni};hl In lij;hl Ihe-
.sipnilicance- nl inlennialinn inaclinics and piaclice-s
lei
.sn.slainini;, in challe-npinp, e-xi.sliii(; knowle-ili;e- ha.se-s. To e-xplnie- Ihc dala .se-l a.s a
le-pre-.se-nlalinn nl eincliine- in cnn.sliliilinnal law Ihe- mie- nl niachnic.s in inanile-slinj. dncliine-
lliroii^li dial dala is addrc.SeScd.
1^. Ful! i\“x(
I. Itack^roiiiul
(’()m|)iilcrs and dalaha.scs prc.scMil now o|)porlimilics lor legal inlormalion machines.
I liese machines emerge Irom >seveial inlellecinal sireams: onl ol compulei syslems
<) 6
engmeenng and Ihe creation of operating systems configured to manipulate documenfs.i
and also from development in Artificial Intelligence computer science which uy to miniic
human intelligence, or at least some intelligent human tasks, and finally the de,sires of new
and old legal infomtation market entranLs to tacilitate computer assisted legal research.
Artificial Intelligence efforts in law are divided into two basic camps, infomtation retrieval
and expert systems. The following introduces information retrieval technology of full text
databases, systems well entrenched in the markets of legal practice and scholarship, and
representing the most accepted and commercially successful of computerized legal
infomtation systems. This market has been largely dominated by Lexis / Nexis and
Westlaw and their on line legal databases, yet with the proliferation of compact disc-
technology and vast computer networks there is an increa.sing airay of sy.stems and
products providing access to law's data.
Full text systems like Lxxis / Nexis are document retrieval machines. They are
designed to manage document collections by organizing and storing data objects in a
database, creating indices to those objects, and providing a query language to manipulate
the index and gather relevant documents.2 Law has traditionally been at the forefront of
document retrieval and information management, however it required the burgeoning
aerospace and applied science technologies of the 1960's to spur markets for full text
indexing (Krevitt Eres, 1980; 134). The associated explosion of technical documents and
intormation objects drove the development of "finding aids," computer systems for making
masses of information meaningfully available to users (Krevitt Eres, 1980: 134). Indexing
techniques evolved with the processing power of computers, allowing for the brute force
and universal coverage of full text, where every term in a document collection is indexed.^
^ The dominant computer operating system, aside from die ubiquitous Microsoft enuaiiLs in tlie
PC market, has been UNIX (Kaare, 1983).
2 For a more formal model of information reU-ieval see (Dabney, 1986: 7)
.
The tlirec major developments leading to full text: first, Uniterm, an early 1940s multi term
indexing system developed by Mortimer Taube; second, Unitenn was supported by ccxirdinatc indexing
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I-. A, ,l.e Universnyo,
J,.l,n I „„-,y „evelo„ed
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.sy.sie,,,
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.n„ |,,„nie e»u„ decisions
ihc n.ix ,Ko.se, Iddd: 106-7,. Ol.io, lawyers look „„,e o, Horiy's wo.k, and
.suraesldl I, niodel lor a lepal rn.alion
.sysieni he .same leclinol,.,;y
(OKAK - OIno Bar Anion,aled Ke.search,
conlacle.l a privale linn, I )ala ( •„,p„,alion, and .sol,died llie clean a Inll lexl lepal
i"l""nal,on lehieval
.sy.slen, ihal would he acee.ssihle via dedicaled dial m phone hne.s,
wonid allow individnals ,o .sirnchne an, I execnie Boolean
.seaiches. and wonhl delive. ,l„.
,«|„esled doennenis lo ihe n.sens. In Idhd, pc, haps .sensing die
maikelplace in law. Mead Dala Coipoiaiion pnicha.si-d Daia Coipoiadon ami l.exis/ Nexis
was honi loi„ yeais laiei. We.sl enleied die digiial niarkel in ITO will, ils own conipiiln
assisled sysleni, yel d was only Inhiiogiaphic dalaha.se (i.e. noi lull lexl will,
ahsiracis and leleiences lo Wesl's haidlmiind versions,, l ids deci.sioii (i.e. hihhographic
naliire ol indexing, was ,eciilied in l',7X when Wesllaw was launched, e.s,seniially
dnplicaling Lexis/ Nexis's Inll lexl capahiliiie.s, and .siippleiiienling dieni widi Wesl's
lieadiioles and relerences lo |,age niinihers in die hardhonnd
.sy.sleni.
Iinpiiivcd conipiilei |)ioce,ssing power and nicniory capacily weie only pari ol die
sloiy ol lull lexl s develo|>nienl in law. (,ne in,del examined eleineni o, die siory is die
iinplicil adack on Ihe slaliis ijiio ol law’s inlormalion inanageinenl. Lexis / Nexis
K pie.senicd a iiiaiin challenge lo WesI, hy hodi |)ioviding a coinjteliiive
.service, hnl l,y
wliii li uses sens anil Venn diiigiains In eoinpaii- c|iiei y eoiiee|ils Inilinse in llie nnlex (i e dnnleaii i|iiiny,
Innady, an anlnnialed niileiing seheine was ilevel..|nd in die lale l,S(l,s hy Hans ,'elei l.nini wlin li leennlnl,
and nidexnl on, die oecniieiice nl every lei in in die dneiiinenl enlleednn (Kievill Lies, Idkl; I Id,.
au<i.„g value u, .he data ohiec. (i.e. ,he ong.nal case opin.on^) hy enabling
.searchers
developed Wes.law as a d.rec. response
.0 Lex.s / Nexis, a. presen, Wes. is s.ill s.ruggling
to catch up in the expanding on-line market.
2. Organization and Indexing
Theoreiically subjec. ca.egorixaUons and .heir edi.orial m.erpreu,,ions ol ca,ses are
made less signif.can, by lull .ex. n,ach.nes like l.xis / Nexis. These machines do no.
organize ca.ses inu=rpre..vely,
.hey u.se bru.e force
.0 manage documen. collecions. Ra.her
than relying on .he subjec..vi.y and elegance of an ednorial scheme wh.ch ca.egorizes ca.ses
or iheir parks for indexing, each case opinion is considered a .ex. documen, compri.sed of
terms and phrases. Case tex.s are organized in.o fields corre.sponding
.0 elements of .he
opinion (e.g. name, dale, body of opinion, opinion wriling judge, dissenl, di.ssenl wrilmg
judge). Ca.ses are primarily indexed on ihe lerms and phrases which conslilule ihem,
therelore rehicval of cases depends on die presence and paliems of Uiose lerms and
phrases. Fields provide another level of indexing by breaking cases in.o sections which
correspond
.0 su-uctural areas of significance to writers and readers. Short of creating
fields in documents
.ha, correspond
.0 subjec, categorizations machines like Lexis / Nexis
Will not present law's mandarin materials in the traditional way.
An inverted list index is used to manage these documents. Each unique term and
phrase encountered is entered into a master term/phrase list for the collection. Each
occurrence ot a term or phrase (i.e. its location) is recorded in the inverted list, creating
relerences Irom list entries tor each term and phrase to the documents containing them.
Searches are term or phrase based, users query these machines to return cases with terms
I /NT
^ anoUier story to be told regarding proprietary claims to case opinions by WesUaw and
exis / Nexis. Essenually Lexis / Nexis is foreclosed from using any West reporter text or ciUitions
wiUiout licensing from West (who is not inclined to do so). Therefore Lexis / Nexis has had to procure
access to ca,se opinions incrementally, via official reporters and by soliciting individual judges.
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Strengths and Weakne.sses
The slrcngihs „l lull icxl a,c bcsl
.seen in conirasl lo prollccd weak„es,ses nl ihc
ed,ced indexing and c.unplex layering ot p,.e-exis,ing l,a,d bound
.systenes like Wes,,.. In
lh..,se systens which depend on l,nn,an ediling
.here is Ihe po.ssihiliiy ol variance Iron, ihe
c.hln,g
.schen,a which will ,.esnl, in croneons referencing, or worse, lo.ss of dala ob|eci
ahogeiher.
-I he power lo aece.ss many cases quickly and ll„-ougi, muliiple channels of
c|ue,y,ng far exceeds whal an ind,v,dual can do nianually, depll, and delail can he a.huned
cpnckly, wilhoui n,uch i|ue,y prcpa,alion or background
,e.sea,ch. Al base Ihough, Ihc
...ajor dislinelion, and .some would say improvement, is Ihe direci conncclion belwcen
.e.sea,cher and dala. The normali/,alion of West subieci calego, i/,ing and olher ediling
enforced a systemic status quo, full lexl challenges lhal mosl directly by no, incotporaiing
categories. The dala is wide open, available lo all tho.sc who know how lo ask qucsiions
mosl easily represented in Ihc provided c|uery language, and iho.se most aware ol how ihe
system organizes its documents.
Nex.s ''i
lor lJic.se dauiba,scs. Enhaiiccnicnls lo both Lexis /t .111(1 Wcsllaw liave added riilereiitial and probabilistic retrieval tecliniques iiilerlaeed by Natural
ype a suiluicc or collection ol lerni.s/ phrases wliicli lie/slie thinks is .signilicanl or captures his/her
icrnis or phncscs is nol solely deierninialive, it is po.ssible lor a documents relevancy to be relatively highbecause it conuuns synonyms or associated terms and phrases to iho.se supplied in the ciuery TheiidormatKin repre.seiihiiKin ol the query is expanded Irom Ihe query’s constituent terms and phrases by Uie
u.se ot such tools as as.socialion iJie.sauri (ba.sed on things like co-occurring or synonymous phrases)
See nice di.scu.ssion ol lull text (Berring, 1986: 41-4,3).
Thus can be a weakness as wel, as a strength. Full text ntaeh.nes allow re.searehers
U. query databa,ses of law's ntandann ntatenals without expHeitly
.ncorporattng a subiect
categonxatton like tho,se of tradtttonal digests and reporters. But legal real.ty ,s a re.sult of
many years of legal practice and pollt.es grounded on. and expre.s.scd tn, knowledge fed to
ex,sung
.ntomtafon ntach.nes and their practtces of.ndexing and access. By default, legal
re,search endeavors origmate front an
.ntellectual tradition which ,s pred.cated on pan.cular
ways of knowing law. Therefore, when questions are asked of a legal inforntation
machine they a,ssume, and reaffirm, that the temts of those questions mean
.something
relative to a specific historical authoritative interpreuttion. When questions are about"
subjects not typically indexed, e.g. black women and employment discrimination, we may
be left wanting. Maybe there is no agreed upon unity of knowledge pursuant to certain
suhjecLs in traditional machines like the digest and reporters, but there are analogs and
ckxscly related areas of law upon which to draw reasonable assc.ssments. The analogies
and relations arc created relative to expert knowledge bteses and information practices
sustaining them. So, when questions are asked of Lexis / Nexis or Westlaw, il is more
than likely that tho.se questions arc the product of knowledge practices of the edited world
ol digests and doctrine. The structuring power of default conditions is significant.
4. Other Challenges with Full Text
Full text inlormation retrieval depends entirely upon the words in the data objects to
be stored and accessed. In subject indexed systems humans have to interpret words, and
distill sense Irom not only the physical presence and stream of words, but the associated
contextual and conceptual understandings of those data objects. In law this is pronounced,
part ol the meaninglulness ol cases has long been associated with an interpretation and
^
Sec Richard Delgado's discussion of West Digest categorization scheme and his sample setuch lor
cases on Black women and employment discrimination (Delgado and Stefancic, 1989). In it Delgado notes
that since tliere is not a subject categorization as such it becomes difficult to find tlie relevtuit ca.se law, imd
tiius It becomes more difficult to lu-ticulate claims of black women regarding workplace discrimination.
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placemen, o, those cases m knowledge bases and pracuces. Full tex, as an organixauonal
technique ignores such meanmg, this is both advantageous tor tts liberating quality, bu,
also disadvantageous because contextually sensitive mterpreuttions are deiaui, in law.
Full text presents three basic problems assoc,ated wtih dependence on words as
organization base units: synonymous words, ambiguous words, and complex expressions
(Dabney. 1986: ,8-19). These problems focus on a panicular characlen.stic of the forms of
case opinions, and their place in interprelation and statemenfs of the status of law. Legal
writing, particularly case opinions, relies on a group of practicing actors who are similarly
schooled and situated vis-a-vis social and political phenomena. Legal wming is dependent
on many practices, implicit and explicit, which give levels of meaning to the words and
phrases comprising such things as cases.
Information retrieval has as its staled lask the effective prixiessing of user queries to
identily relevant data objects to that u,ser and then returning those documents for iheir
perusal. Measures of recall and precision lend to provide benchmarks for assessing
retrieval efficacy. Recall measures how well all relevant documents were retrieved (i.e.
percentage of total relevant documents returned), while precision measures the percentage
ol relevant documenis in of all those relumed.* The study of Blair and Maron (Blair and
Maron, 1 982) is the most noted examination of full text systems for their efficacy at
document retrieval.
5. Blair and Maron Study
Blair and Maron tested IBM's Storage and Information Retrieval (STAIRS) full text
system tor recall and precision. The STAIRS system had been specifically configured as
o
See Berring’s discussion of recall (Berring, 1986; footnote 51): "Recall is Uie ratio of tlie releviuit
dtx'umeius retrieved by die search to die total number of relevant documents in die database. For example,
il a database consisted ol 1000 documents, 100 of which were relevant, dieii a .search diat retrieved 50 of die
relevant documciiLs would have 50% Recall. Precision is die rado of relevant documents retrieved to toud
dcxuniciiLs retrieved. For example, if a search retrieved a total of 75 documents, 50 of which were releviuit,
then die Precision would be 50 / 75 or 66%."
an expen a,s,s,s.un. (y« rcrieval xysicm) in a co.p„,aic law s,,,,
1 he database consisted of roughly 4,),.X.„ docuntents and nearly 35.M)(X, pages o, text
STA.RS aliowed tor Bt.olean ,e.g. coordinate tndex.ng, querying o, the database, as well
as lachtated held level searching within data ob,ects. STAIR.S also en, ployed a don,tun
spec, I,c thesaurus^., find synonynts and related terms and phrases to t,t,ery tenns and
phrase, thus expanding the po.ssibiiities lor the particular inlormation representation of that
query.
Researchers were pre,sented w,th ,51 information reqttesus by litigating attorneys,
each request was translonned to a STAIRS query, executed, and the returned documents
were screened by researchers and attorneys, if the atuuneys estimated the recall to be less
than 7,5% then the query was relonnulated. Recall a,s,sessments are curious. To as,sert that
recall was less than 75% attorneys wotdd have to know of specific materials not rettn ned.
or know of an area not dealt with in the returned materials, or simply act on a httttch that
something was missing. This would prove to bo the most problematic of the two
measures.
Precsion was de, ived alfcr the last iteration of queries for each of the original 5
1
information request by the attorneys. Piecision values were pretty high, on average about
79%, howeve.', the recall, estimated to be at least 75% by the attorneys on the lly, was
dolcrmtncd to be only abotti 2(1%. Blair and Marc, suggest that their attorneys randomly
sampled the materials in the database to determine that there were in fact many desirable
diKitiments yet to be lound by the .search engine, thus low recall. There seem to be
problems with this method ol unulysis however.
I xr .
I icsaurus IS a look-up Uiblc, they can be automatically or manually
cons^uclcd lor pjirticuhir knowledge domains ( e.g. .specilic thesaurus for eontexLs of corporate liability law
or asthma diagiu)stics m mediail research). Queries are expmided by adding Uiesjiurus entries for a givenquery s tenm and phrases. Thesauri depend on particular relationships or associaUons, most are grounded on
synonyms. The InQuery .search engine utilizes an automatically constructed tlie.saurus, an InFinder, to
expand user queries. InQuery uses an as.soeiation tlie.saurus, dial is, ratlier Unui ero.ss-refereneing based on
siniilar memiing as with a traditional tiie.saurus, InFinder cross-referenees on co-occurrences between terms
(Uici pliriLscs.
The auomeys sUucurcd Uicir cvaluaUon of
.curncd and non-roturned malcnafs on
Characcensdcs both l.nked to and tndependcnt of part.cular tcmt or phrase occurences in
the data objecus. Tlte concept of an "on pent" case ,s wedded to ex.si.ng
.nformahon
systems and knowledge practices, subject categorization is an example of a knowledge
practice that has some significance here. This being the case there will be a bu.ll in recall
drag or gap. simply, if the evaluating lawyers are hring.ng w.th them not.ons of on pomt,
then a full text system is going to never reach lofty recall heights. Random sampling and
extrapolation ol tendencies lound is a sound approach, hut the evaluators arc part of the
variance prtiduced, they structure the recall gap. A random sample of attorneys would
improve this, spreading the decisional weight around a bit. Neverthele.ss, Blair and Maron
make a strong case that the recall assc.ssment process is valuable and is accurate given the
context ol this particular information retrieval experiment.
Why? IS the next question.io The indeterminacy of words and the complex concept
laden environment of legal information is the likely culprit. Words have synonyms, and
depending on the context the domain ol synonyms can change considerably. Thesaurus
construction for domains of data, and use in conjunction with search engines can alleviate
this problems somewhat. Words are also ambiguous, subject to competing interpretations,
There is little that can be done to make computers distinguish between competing meanings
ol similar words and phrases, other than developing association or use profiles which
indicate particular word / meaning combinations likely in textual contexts that are subject to
luzzy categorizations. Certain meanings for given words can be ascertained by paying
attention to those words and phrases most closely associated with them. This is a harder
stretch than a simple synonym or association thesaurus. Complex expressions represent
perhaps the greatest challenge to full text.
10 For good discus.sion see work by Berring and Dabney (Berring, 1986; Dabney, 1986).
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aw
.nvolves
,dea.s. sometimes neatly correlated to narrow textual express,on, often
' ough much less so (Chtldress. 1984). For those concepts wh.ch are arUculated ,n text
but not necessanly linked to a ttght donta.n of words and phrases full text is not ten ibly
uselul. Th.s begs the guest.on, what t.es these concepts together, or more to the point,
what ties the ca.ses together said to give life to these concepts.
For this project doctrine, and a particular knowledge repre.sentalion of one, ,s the
collating concept. Nevenheless, the doctnnal choice (i.e. compelling mterests), alhe.t a
complex knowledge expression, is fairly common and distinct, with little apparent
ambiguity, but with many synonyms. The complexity does give way in a sense ,o textual
regularity, or at least it is suspected to. With Blair and Maron in mind Doctrine as Date set
forth to use full text Lexis / Nexis to define, delimit, and acquire a collection that
rea,sonably articulates the compelling interest balancing test in the realm of free exercise
law. That endeavor however tends to suppon Berring, Dabney, and Blair and Maron's
contentions about the constraints of full-test systems when querying based on a complex
expression.
C The Process - Lexis / Nexis and DoctHnP
1. Definition and Discovery
1 he case collection was to be defined in purely textual terms (i.e. possessing
particular terms and phrases in defined patterns), querying and collecting from a database
of cases was to be largely automated, and then some cursory human examination of those
cases was planned to tag the data objects to manifest some basic distinctions, essentially
creating subsets of data. The primary distinctions were whether the claim to religious free
exercise violation were sustained or not.^^ Finally, each virtual subset, and some
Otlicr tagging includes cases dial involved prisoners. Prison cases repre.sent distinct treatment
ol Iree exercise claims after O’lone v. Estate of Shabazz. 482 U.S. 342 (1987). Prior to Uiese cases die
compelling interests doctrine was part of die evaluative mix, or balancing of interests. There fore cases
prior to diese should legidmately be in die data set after however die balancing test was dropped in favor of
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c«mb,naUon,s
.hcreoi; were Co be analyzed lor concep, ocacTcnce.s and co-oceunence
n.s using Che InQucry probabilisuc miormalion rcirieval system. The poim of ihc
InOuery exploration was to determine what the most signifteant
,x,-etitTing eoncepts in eaeli
subset were, and then determine what other phrases are most highly a,ssoeiated with them
U was hypothesized that this analysis might be useltil for understanding what the doctrine
compelling interests imputes in the decisional mix of these ca,ses, and whether there is
consistency or coherency represented in oecurrence frequencies and co-occurrence
Ircqucncy associations which may be correlated to doctrine's presence.
The lollowing de,scribes the attempt to .satisfy the first element of the constructed
suiry, to define and collect the ca.ses con.sidered relevant to the compelling interest doctrine
n Ircc cxerci.se law. That attempt however exemplified the lltiid nature of diK-tiinc, and ius
attachment to knowledge ba.ses and traditions which, while they may be articulated in some
information machines, are not readily pre,scnt in full text systems like Lexis / Nexis.
Doctnne is already meantngful. largely defined and understood by knowledge workers like
this re.searcher. However, attempting to capture it in a textual form as described herein
shows Ihc intcrsubicclivc nature of doctrine more fully, and perhaps probicmatizes any
centrality or coherency that may be allribulcd to ca.scs
.said manifesting it by the knowledge
experts who teach in law schools, who write constitutional commentary, who reside on
Icdcral appellate benches, and who order and structure acce.ss to law's hard data.
At iLs simplest, this phase represents the acquisition of federal appellate opinions
manifesting compelling state intorc.st doctrine, and the division of tho.se opinions by
dispiBition, producing several files to be processed by InQucry. While reviewing legal
research rclcrcncc texts the lollowing passage .seemed significant to this pha.se, as well as
to Ihc larger questions of the project:
a adniinisirative purpose rationjility test. That is, il iJic challenged policies were administratively rational,
then it was not an issue lor tlie courLs to intervene in.
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Why was il Ix-llcr lo use cninpulcr dalala.scs ol law lor narrow searches, like lor a lael
palleni or jiiilge, or lor a eilalion or parlieular ulierance, hiii nol elleelive Ibr hroaci
concepis? Were nol so-called hroad conccpis Ihc coinpilalion of smaller legal lingnislie
uinls.' I he passage indieales dial Ihcre is somcihing ahoul hroad eoneeins, perhaps
docirmc lor inslance, which is hard lo coinplelely caplure in words, or al lea.sl words we
iiiighl cxpccl lo he markers ol dial doelriiie.
Legal praclilioners and scholars Iradilionally learn doelrine IVom die experl
knowledge bases ol legal ediiealion and academic disciplines, llmnigh experience. Ai die
oiilset, Ibis work died lo mniinii/e reliance on lliese knowledge bases, galliering opinions
by searching lor cases wilh only die broadesl hallmark characlerislic lerms and phrases,
i.c. docliinal markers or signiliers. '2 Despite die power of Lexis / Nexis anlomaled
colleclion was impeded, yel il made obvious an clemenl ol' die siibjecl doelrine dial die
se<iich piolile missed. I his clemenl presenls a gap, one worlh sliidying as lliis projecl
explores die conceplual conlenl of judges words. Such is a first step, for clearly how we
gel il depends on how we know il, and ol course die reverse, how we "know il"
depends on how we "gel il."
1
9
Doctrinal markers or sigiiilicrs are iJie key deseriplive concepts ol dial doelrine; they :ire
niili/ed lo execiile .searches tor desired compelling stale interest / tree exercise ca.ses.
2. A Doctrinal Signifier
The initial step was defining case charactenstics (i.e. dixtrinai signiftcr or profile)
and domains which provide guidelines for identifying data ohjecfs in Ute database. This
•seemed to he the easiest part of the endeavor, at least until some Lexis / Nexis quenes were
executed and questions arose as to scope and expression of the doctnne, not to mention ihe
role compelling interests played in the decision represented hy the case opinion. The
presence of the signifiers "compelling stale interest" and "free exercise" was the e.ssential
criterion for selecting case opinions. The domain of cases had to he delimited not only by
suhicet matter and pre.sence of doctrinal signifier, hut temporally as well. Coinciding with
expert knowledge about free exercise law from commentary,
.scholarship, and pedagogical
expencnce, it was known that the compelling interest doctrine, as pan of the strict scrutiny
Standard, became operative in free exercise Jurisprudence in 1963.
Authoritative knowledge around constitutional law had a profound effect from the
beginning. That knowledge is the product of scholars and judges, and is articulated in
commentary, texts, and scholarship about the compelling interest doctrine in free exercise
jurisprudence. In addition to the basic subject area domain knowledge experts stipulate
that tree exercise Jurisprudence, at least at the Supreme Court, was divided into doctrinal
phases, and the phase articulating compelling state interests seemed to begin with the
famous Sherbert in 1963 and end with Smith in 1990.13
The data set is explicitly drawn from Supreme Court treatments of compelling
interests and tree exercise, as well as those carried out in the federal circuit courts. This
posits that the Supreme Court s behavior and doctrinal expressions in opinions are used to
deline a data set including landmark Supreme Court cases, and less known Supreme Court
1 ^
- As it would turn out die deaUi of compelling interests in SmiUi was perhaps overstated. There
conUnued to be religious freedom cases at die federal circuit level where comfxilling interests were pjirt of
die decisional mix. Additionally, die Religious Freedom Restoradon Act (and in 1999 die Religious
Liberty Protection Act
)
condnued to keep compelling interests in free exercise law. Thus die data set
would include cases diat came after Smidi
. It is aiiodier project to investigate die way Supreme Court
decisions become policy and praedee in die lower courts.
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^'CIS Insi, rnakn.p
.Indsinns,
„,u.s, an.l
Kivinp me l„ .loeu ines, when ,cally ,| is vcy „l,en ihe ,evcr.se. Cnnsulonni; iha, ve,y Inile
comes l„ Ihc ( 'on,i un.le, ign.al inns.l.cln.n any kmga. niany cases pass ilnonyh Ihe
Chen, IS riisl. And as wonid he ihe ease in ilns dala sel, even alle, Ihe eompdhnp nne.es,
m-ch ine was jellisoned hy Jnslice Sadia n, Smilh .several cncnil can, ca.ses .snh.se,|nenl lo
Him aelnni deall will, Ihe ilocn ine, piving lile lo ihe Snpienie Conn's decision hy
"ilerpreling Smilh and niakinp
.li.simcl decisions allectmp Ihe slalns ol law. Hence Iheie is
n di.scmsive give and lake helween Ihe Iwo appellale leveks. Neve,lhele.s.s, ihe
.•dil.nial, o,
expul knowledge |)raclice.s, in law and .scholaiship aie lixed on ihe Conn. I his pmjeci
declines lo challenge dial, Inn does incorporale a more holislic view ol die Snpienie /circnil
docliinal lelalionship,
.snggesling dial in would die Conn's Irealmenl ol conipellnig
Iiileiesls helween a idlk'il and Smiih he inslniclivc, hnl .so loo would he circnil conn
iremnieni in dial .same period. AHerall, il is die docliinal iiandesled in a lexi
colleclion which are lo lx- exploied, dial colleclion .should he delensihle on docliinal
giound.s, despile hierarchical or insliliilional consideradons dial may Ix’ used lo ciid(|iie lliis
(Icdsion.
Inlormalion aiilliorily ami Ihc syslcms and pracliccs associalcd wilh dial aulhoriiy
slriiclured whal could sensibly be asked or proposed. The way an area ol law and eases is
known is Ihe produci ol exposure lo sysleins inhereni in aeadeinie disciplines, libraries,
and prolessional lile. (laps or c|ueslions arise Iroin Ihe slaliis ol Ihose knowledge bases,
Iroin Ihe condilions Ihey represeni, and Iroin Ihe apidiealion ol new looks and research
agenda., u, the eomextual world Urey authoritatively de.scribe. Con, pell,ng intere.,, d.Ktnne
clearly more than just cases, more than just data, hut can it he manifested in ca,sc,s and
data? can those data ohjccLs be the site of doctrine for analytical purpo.ses? Or to study
doctnne must the analysis be focu.scd on the interpretive communities and their practices of
making sense in, and ol, ease deeisions?
3. Initial Queries and Results
Initial eltbrLs to define and discover the relevant data objects were simple queries of
lull text Lexis / Ncxis, and they sought to find Supreme Court and federal circuit courts of
appeal ea,se opinions with little human involvement save for proposing the quei^ and
perhaps downloading the results. However, this human researcher felt the need to examine
query rcsulLs lor some rather loose determinations of recall and precision. No attempt was
made to statistically calculate cither because it was concluded that very high precision, that
is lew false positives (i.c. few returned documents that were not on point), was nccessaiy.
Recall, typically the most significant statistic to information retrieval efficacy, while still
important was seemingly less so than precision. It was determined that a few missed data
objects were acceptable because they would, hypothetically, still adhere to the same
doctrinal patterns as those documents returned, therefore their absence should not have
altered results in a signilicant way, unless of course there were lots of missed documents
such that patterns were obliterated. A few false positives identified meant unacceptable
precision however because those mis-hits might introduce a concept occurrence or co-
occurrence that would give a false impression of the conceptual content and pattern in the
collection. This analysis ol doctrine could withstand missing some data objects which
were on point, but could not handle many objects that were inappropriately included for
lear of stilting the conceptual representation. False positives cannot be easily controlled for
using lull text Lexis / Nexis however.
Bul, arc not false posiiivos only thal because of researcher interprelahon? Do no,
-sc returned cases satisly the queries equally well wiih Ihosc hits considered appropriale
candidates for the data set7 This
.ntpHcates the knowledge representation of the que.y, iha.
in some instances, that does not match up with what the user really warns, or more
pointedly, is broader lhan Ihe user wants, thus capturing more cases than nece,ssary. Also,
are no, these false positives likely represeniaitves of compelling mterests? If i, is that
doctrine that ts of mterest, Ihen why exclude cases which are part of its discourse? The
answer is straightforward, to capture a data sot which, as a clump, can arguably represent
compelling mterest doctrine's determinative inlluence in free exercise law. Cases with
compelling inlcrcsl language, and even application, from Establi.shment for instance will
likely represent a different set of standards and / or metrics.
The text of "eompclling state interest" and "free exercise" and a date range between
1 963 and 1 990 provided initial query parameters. The first set of queries were executed on
Lexis / Ncxis in the Gcnfcd library and Courts file. Hits are from the following courts: US
(Supreme Court), USAPP (Circuit Courts of Appeal), CACF (Court of Appeals for
Federal Circuit), DIST (Federal District Courts), CIT (Court of International Trade),
CLAIMS (Federal Court of Claims), TC (Tax Court), BANKR (Bankruptcy Court),
CUSTCT (Customs Court), CVA (Court of Veterans Appeals). To delimit between cases
Irom the Supreme Court and Icderal circuit courts of appeals and those from all others
listed further querying or editing would be necessary, however there arc very few
compelling interest tree exercise cases from these other jurisdictions. Querying performed
two invaluable tasks, : first, to put the researcher in touch with the data through a machine,
to give him the chance to take a measure ol the data, to sec its inherent and implied
qualities, second, it problematizcd almost every concept that the initial queries relied on.
Appendix A outlines and describes the basic queries of the iterative search process,
beginning wide open and subsequently narrowing and rcarticulating to attempt a better fit
between the desired information representation, or approximate representation, and the
researcher’s develop.ng underscand.ng of the
.nfornradon sysconr's handling „f da,a ohioccs
(I.e. relevance feedback). Each query in Appendix A was execmed in Lexis / Nexis
mceraclively. results were available en mass and could be scanned individually using Lexis
/ Nexis' Lexsee case lookup facility.
P. Resulting Shup. poptHne i.nH
False positives, those cases hit "rightly" but that were not really on point with
respect to the desired application of compelling interests in free exercise, brought dictai4
and authoritative understandings of free exercise case law to the forefront. Full text
searches of ease opinions treat all terms and phrases similarly, save for those instances
where lields are employed, and even then all terms and phrases meeting the field
requirement will be treated similarly. Full text machines cannot distingui.sh between dicta
and the meaningful or determinative text of the decision. Doctrinal terms and phrases as
presented in the Lexis / Nexis queries are just as likely to occur in dicta as not. DiKtrine's
textual presence in cases is easily sustained, but determining which doctrine is most
significant becau.se of its presence in the ratio dicidendri^ depends on more interpretation
than IS currently incorporated in full text information management. This indicates notions
ol doctnne are well established already, such that we know pretty much what sorts of cases
ought to be outside the set. For instance, to study compelling stale interests in free exercise
cases we know that cases about religious displays on public properly (e.g. Establishment
clause) that discuss areas of case law related to free exercise are not useful, fall out of the
scope here. The set is to have cases which manifest the compelling slate interests doctrine
in Iree exercise law, scholars and practitioners can pretty well ascertain when a case meets
that criteria because the categorization and inclusion based on doctrine or other subject area
14 Dicta is considered tliat part of a written opinion which is not piirt of tiie decisional mix or
rationale or reasoning (i.e. die ratio decidendi).
15 Ratio decidendi is considered tliat part of written opinion which contains die decisional mix or
rationale or reasoning.
di.sCincion,s is un cxpcnencc driven sk.ll. Machine learning, and ihe model, ng ol lunnan
mtelhgence and Ure c<,n,siUuenl skills lor case ba.sed learning and reasoning.
,s siill in iis
nascent form.
Doccrinal synonyms lor a complex expre,ss.on (Dabney. 1986) po.sed a .sigmlicam
dilemma. By randomly
.sampling free exercise ca.ses relumed with a wide open Lexis /
Nexis search (i.e. ca.,es with phra.se "free exercise" in them between 1963 and the present)
It became clear that there were other ways to expre.ss the notion ol a balancing of inleresLs
implied by strict scrutiny standards (e.g. compelling government inlere.sts. overriding
government interests, overrtdtng state interests, interests ol highe.st order, compelling
.iuslilicalion lor imposing this burden). Full text is devoid ol the luzxy logic with which
human readers and editors make
.sen.se of data collections, people can relatively easily
determine when a data object is related to a cxpre.s.scd inlormation need. This phase ol the
project was laced with rinding a way to incorporate that luz/.y logic in the doctrinal
delinilion and di.scovcry elTorts, and given the problems of ambiguities and complex
cxprc.ssions in language, it looked as it the authorities of fuzzy categorization, the West
editors, might have to be eonsulted.
The challenge exposed here is the separation ol' analysis from the knowledge
structures which have held sway lor roughly a century ol' American legal lil'e. This proJecLs
attempts at separation lail early, by asking questions about doctrine like compelling
interests subject categorization is implicated, thus structuring a domain of possible results.
Some believe however that lull text will have a profoundly different inlluence on law,
where useis going online in Iree text, "liberates them Irom any requirement to fit their
thoughts into a pre-existing form" (Bening, 1987: 26,27). It remains to be seen whether
research can in lact even evolve without some pre-existing form and move beyond the
practices of knowledge management which create things like logic and sense and rationality
in law's information space.
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A. Introduction
resides i„ machines, and is shaped and incrperaled imo knowledge hy
|..•ac,iccs lor n.dexing and access. This proJecM .songhi ,o nse con.pciling slale inleresis as a
search prolile lor the snhjecl colleclion. 1 lowever, il hecanrc apparen, lhal ahsiraclions like
compelhng inleresi doclrnie challenge antomaled Inll Icxl .search and colleclion capahdiiies
ol Kiols like Uxis/ Nexis. In lacl. allempling ihis la.sk will, lx,xis/ Nexis p,-ohlemali/cd
docirine's lorn, and pie.scnce in case opinions, and hi'onghi lo light ihe significance of
inlo, n,alio„ machines and p, aclices lo sustaining, or challenging, existing knowledge ha.ses
ol law. To heal the data
.sel as a ,ep,c.se„lalio„ ordocninc in conslilnlional law ihe „,le
u,lorn,alio„ machines in nianilesling or facililaling doclrinc needs lo he add,e.s.sed. I'his
cha|>lcr focuses on how Ihe West digesl and ,cpo,lc,
.syslen, p,„vides accc.ss lo, and
iillimalcly helps shape eoneepliiali/alions ordoelrine and ease opinions.
Sinee Ihe liirn ol ihe cenliiry West Publishing has reigned supreme in salislying the
mlormalion needs oh Ameriean lawyers, propelled by its universal eoverage, uniciue
indexing seheme, virlual monopoly ol eireuil eourl opinion publiealion, and stains as the
lelerence backbone ol law libraries. West’s indexing and market dominance has placed a
distinct stamp on law and legal education, dcrining ways of knowing, and shaping
understandings ol' the source materials of American law.
' Il is this stamp which ineubales
new desires and markets, inspiring scholars and inrormalion prol'cssionals lo explore new
ways ol manipulating those same materials.
* We,sl ha.s llic power, ilirou}>h iJic digc.sl and
IliouglU.s" (Herring, 1994; P'S).
reporters, lo help create law's "universe ol iliinkable
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B. West
1. The Development
The combination of nonnnative and court reports (see Chapter 4) was suhsumed by
the organizing and universalizing power of the reg.onal reporters privately provided hy
West publishing^ m the mid to late IStKfs courts were creating an tncreased supply of
reported opinions, and at the same time the task of organizing them became more than
individuals, either private lawyers or eourt officers, could feasibly managed Dilemmas of
scope and breadth, a.s well a,s of knowledge representation and organization, made the
previous methods difficult. The West Publishing Company appeared to nomialize the
knowledge representation scheme, cover all jurisdictions, and provide a low cost product to
the market of American lawyers.
West integrated the numbering of official court reports to link ids products to
existing standards. Court reports had initiated a system of numbering volumes to associate
them with particular jurisdictions and each other, this gave West a significant leg up on the
developing market for authontative legal information (Berring, 1987:33). Moving further
yet from the disparate narratives of nominative and court reports. West suove for universal
coverage and standardized data objets. After data normalization and integration with
existing jurisdictional indexing systems (i.e. court numbering), comprehensive case
reporting was West's other major innovation, or marketing decision depending on ones
pcispective,^that vaulted West beyond competing systems.-^
Cl
no means was alone in its efforts, and of course it still has competition (e.s,, Lawyers
Edition Reporters, Lexis / Nexis, and a raft of Internet facilitated archives and indices)
3 „In substance our law is excellent, full of justice and good sense, but in form it is chaotic. It
has no systematic arrangement which is generally recognized and used, a fact which greatly increases die
labors of lawyers and causes unnecessary litigation" (Terry ,1920).
Sec a discussion of West's decision on comprehensiveness in : Symposium of Legal Publishers
23 American Law Review 396 (1889).
^ The West Company established a system tor receiving copies of opinions from every
jurisdiction. It prided itself on gatlicring decisions and verilying tlie text with the judge who wrote tliem.
After the initial publ.sh.ng of West's Syllab, in 1876 the company began
production of the regional reporters, sianing with the Northwest Reporter covering courts
.n the Dakota Territory, Iowa. Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. West's
competitive advantages were low cost products, efficient and effective producttve
processes, and ultimately national coverage (Woxland, 1985: 1 19). While West's
commitment to comprehensive coverage meant that many cases were now available for
perusal by lawyers, it also created a mass of cases which were immediately more than an
individual could reasonably manage without some overarching indexing system. Enter the
digest in 1887.6
West outpaced the arrangements of the other edited reports, providing lawyers and
scholars with access to nearly all cases,^ allowing them to structure their informational
needs and then come calling. In a sense what West offered was comprehensiveness and
normalization m place of variable interpretations and comments on a select batch of cases
considered significant. The profession embraced this emancipation much in the same way
full text databases are today, but was immediately faced with a dilemma; how does a user
access the information? How are searches formulated, and by association their basic
inquiries, to ask meaningful questions of the database? Professionals wanted all the cases,
but when presented with them they reached for the security of an editorial stmeture, and a
way of making sense of that mass of material. West was there once again.
Secondly, West established a uniform format tor reporting. All West reporters were designed according to
tlie same formula. West produced a sterile court reporting system that guaranteed reliability tlirough
similarity. Caption, syllabus, and headnotes appeared in tlie same form in all jurisdictions (Berring, 1987:
^ For more Uiorough exploration of diese events see (Marvin, 1969: 67; Woxland. 1985: 15-16).
^ All cases in tlie 1800s tor die original Nortliwest Reporters region were very likely recorded
Uierein, however, in die 1990s it is quite probable dial diere are cases which are noted but not reported due
to die relative importance associated widi die presiding courts place in die judicial hierarchy.
2. Digest and Reporters
The digcsl system of keynumbers, hcadnoles, and subjeel ealegoii/aii.ins was
rneorperaled inl„ the West hne ol produets m 1K87.« West established suh|ect areas with
an expandable base t>r eategorics to organize or index eascs.'> The original calegorizalion, a
universal subjeel thesaurus, was an allempi to distill the essential areas ol law, the
catcgori/ations stuck, shaping conccpluali/alions of law since:
scienL-r r?shai,vi r 7 Mibjeel the,saiirus, while not unusual in inrornialionce, e aped legal research. Por when West Publishing created the KeyNumbei System, it not only enabled lawyers to research cases by subject it^ilso
n lnrcwcitk^
encouraged kiwycrs to lit every legal issue into a certain conceptual
th^
Number sSysl^em provided a paradigm lor thinking about
le think according to the West categories. (Berring
West developed its categorizationsieu) coincide with the Harvard law school and its
prognosticator ol' the case method Dean Langdell.*
' The structuring power ol' subject
categorizations is still manilested in the relationship between legal education and West
Digest.
The seven digest topics arc: Persons, Property, Contracts, Torts, Crimes,
Remedies, and Government. The I'irst-ycar curriculum at Boalt Hall, a typical
course load lor major law schools, consists ol' Property, Contracts, Torts, Criminal
Law, Civil Proccduie, and Constitutional Law. Remedies arc covered in Property,
Contracts, and Torts, and Government is covered in Civil Procedure and
Constitutional Law. (Berring, 1994: 35)
o
West had purcha.scd a .small publishing company, Lillie, Brown wiih United States Digest, and
its exislmg iniellcctual property in then developing indexing techniques, the sUiff included one John
Mallory. Mallory is credited with developing the Digest indexing scheme at West (Hicks, 1942; Surrency
1990: 111-127; Woxland, 198.S: 121).
^ A so-called universal subject tJiesaurus, with a .set ol idenlilied subjects .said to incorporate any
data object in need ol indexing. Ol course tliis system requires some growUi for developing Jireas of law,
but the es.senlial chanicleristic ol lilting cases to categories is determinative and dominant.
See (Wren and Wren, 1986) for listing.
*
* Harviird l:iw .school, and more importantly die Htavard law library, was the site where the data
ol law would be housed, or more accurately, where it would be utilized by law's aspirant practitioners.
n ..s no, ,„c a,n, o, ,hi,, wo,k m
,,y u, unlock Ihose dunces, hn, ralhc,- ,o acknowledge ihci,-
nMnence on ,subsa|nom sy.slem.s In,- managing legal ,nlo„uanon and wha, con.siiiuics
sensible nilaanccs in Ihe d,.scon,-.ses o, suue and ledcal appellate law, and ,e,search on iha,
law.
pmdum-^ P';i-^'oordiiia(cd in lluU llic
hPP
^
scholars forgot that choices had
^ existing categories as inevitable; thus the gestalt ofcase law was created. (Berring, 1994; 55 )
^
Tins power to assess sense is not unique to legal information management. Any system of
inlormation indexing requires decisions about how data is related, accessed, and made
uselul.'2 Users have to tailor their notions of cases, their interrelations, and what they
mean, to the knowledge structures inherent in those systems.'^
Each digest category and subcategory was assigned an identifying number, a
keynumber, which would appear within headnotes for a case opinion. I leadnotes were
condensed, and hopelully distilled, blurbs describing the specific points of law for that case
1
2
'
P>abncy (1986) For a nice discus.sion ot ihe power and implications of indexing lecliniuues
see (Dabney, 1986).
I 3
- This
I
WEST] subject arrangemeni lent its slruclure lo American law. Because it was a
universal subject Itie.saurus, locating every point in every case by subject, then placing the case in a
UK-alion in iJie printed Digests, it imposed a continuing structure on tJie law. Language and concents were
normal i/.ed as the
West editor prepared Uie lieadnoles lor eacli case, (remember West published a print version in
its National Reporter System of every decision published), which helped to make tJie law
comprehensible and lent overall structural coherence. Though West might adjust ifs subject
stnicture, the fact of a
structure remained. Commentators criticized West, but there is no doubt that its family of publications had
;i prolound and continuing impact t)ii the way information about law was organized. West's influence may
have saved Ihe myth of Uie common law from what kxiked like its inevitable demise (Berring, 1987: 25).
w,lhm a particular subject category. Digests are generally ordered by sequential
keynuntbers (t.e. by subject categorizations), and references to cases wtth.n Ute digest
' y the court, location, date, summarizing blurb, and reporter citations. I'l Digests are
also organized by a descnptive word and case name index. The digest structures
relationships between cases and indices, and creates realms or boundanes within which
cases resided and are meaningful in certain ways. It is this power which has atuacled
cnlical altention, and perhaps stimulated the development of new markets for knowing
law's data.
West developed a process for manipulating opinions before inclusion into digest
and reporters. Initially new case opinions are processed by editors who check for citation
and stylistic forms I5 to prepare the data object for the target infomiation system. Editors
then tackle the substance, preparing headnotes and keynumbers for each identified point of
law, which IS then passed through the discerning eyes of senior editors charged with
maintaining structural consistency.
Scholarsi^have identified four essential problems with the digest system; first,
human editors make mistakes, whether in higher level data object normalization, headnote
composition, or key number assignment, if not recognized it can be incorporated into the
system and forever lost to correction. Second, complex layering of indexing creates a maze
of understandings attributed to data objects, to enhance precision editors are forced to
expand the depth of indexing so as to capture and link the object effectively. Third,
despite layering of index and categories, the system is relatively rigid since all subsequent
categories must be fit within the initial domain of categories (more on this in next section).
1 zl
For a nice overview of tlie place of Digests and Reporters in tlie legal infomiation scheme see
tWren and Wren, 1986: 10-19).
1^ See (Berring, 1986: 32) for more complete description.
1^ See (Berring ,1986:34-5) for detailed descriptions of tlie four essential problems.
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' Appropriate to Uie already existing stmcture and understandings of cases witliin Uiat stmcture.
Finally, there is subjectivity and defining
decisions about what matters, and how
ure reflected in case indexing.
power in the actions of editors, they make
It matters, m each case opinion, and those decisions
3. The Power of Indexing and Categorization
Categonzation is a key information management practice, one which has also been
critically examined by scholars of politics and law. Categorization is the explicit
Identification or assignment of attributes to data objects to facilitate meaningful
organization. Attributes provide domains of meaning to those objects and shape how they
may be used and interpreted. Organization schemes are predicated on the assignment of
attributes and correspond to their presence or absence.
Scholars have shed light on the power of attribute assignment and categorization in
a variety ot contexts, several are drawn upon here. Giovanni Sartori presents one of the
more noted efforts with his exploration of conceptual stretching and transformation in
comparative politics. Sartori's work rested on an unproblematic notion of categories and
attribute assignment (Sartori, 1970). To Sartori the lines between categories'^ were clear,
attributes were relatively straightforward data object characteristics, or at least readily
identiliable similarities. Occasionally a category or concept would prove too tight to
1
8
hi comparative politics categorization is a well used metliod for organizing understandings of
individual nation states and tlieir different governments and governing systems. Typologies are a significant
part of die comparative activity.
encompass a new objecc orcoHeCon of „b,ecus, .he categorys infen,sion...igM be abcod
to .ncrease ifs extensu.n-and capture the wayward objects. D.gesus (i.c. West, and
oUicrs) represent a classic categori/,at.on scheme like that with wh.ch Staton worked,
where places are always found for ca,ses, or rather ca,ses are edited and
.nterpreted to fit.
Core cntiusms (e.g. Lakolt, 1987) attack this normalization, destabilizing the
notion of tradtttonal categonzation schemes. Such schemes are con,s.dered con.servativc and
imncated representat.ons of the true complex, ty of data oh,ecus, and that they are practices
and systems which lull u.sers by prov.d.ng stmelure and expectations. The abtlity to delinc
domain boundaries and associalod data object attnbutes is surely conslratned by a class of
"hard cases" which cither fit no existing category, or have multiple interpretations with
respect to appl.cable attributes. While careful not to dismi.ss the uulity or tmponance of
categorization to many information intensive activities, scholars like Lakoffhave suggested
that categorization is an inexact practice, yet one with significant implications for how
objccLs arc known and u.sed, and by association the play of actions which result from drat
knowledge.
In Collier and Mahon's revisilation of Sartori's work (Collier and Mahon, 1993)
they explain that seholars eriiieal of eategorization, ineluding Lakoff, were hardly
discounting categorizations, but rather wanted the political and contingent nature of
categories more explicitly examined. Duncan Kennedy's examination of Blaekstonc's
Commentaries focused on the contingency of categorization. Inherent in efforts to distill
the sense ol the common law were decisions based on ideologies and values which
foreclosed particular results (Kennedy, 1979). Kennedy, as a point man for the critical
legal studies movement, saw the contingency of categorizations and supporting characters
From wSartori (1970), but tilso now general knowledge in information seience: Inten.sion is tlie
ataibute profile, or definitive eharaeteristics, used to delimit daUi objeets.
90
Extension is tlie actual nuige of objects in itie collection idenuf ied according to tlie defined
characteristics of intension. Note that tliey tire inversely related, tlie less defined tlie intension, tlie greater
the extension (no. of cases hit), tlie more defined tlie search profile (i.e. intension) die smaller the
extension.
i.ke docmne as directly connected to the polittcal task of leg.ttntation^ Blackstone's treatise
was an
.nterprettve snapshot of the contnton law. ,t was an abstracted snapshot. The
method of abstraction effectively cod.fied the notions of a parttcular social context, one
heavily tnlluenced by existing law and legal culture. Blackstone's work legitimated the
legal status quo of England writes Kennedy, and the doetnnal categonzations repre,sented
that condition while facilitating legal development in particular directions (Kennedy. 1979-
211 ).
From an early point in the development of legal information sy.stems the machines
(considering Commentaries providing an intellectual model for the common law’s
structure) attached attributes to cases by identifying and focusing on particular
characteristics. Sometimes these are objectively observed, or interpreted legal and factual
patterns upon which many agree. At other times however the attributes are less structured,
and mu.st be cobbled together by a variety of characteristics or interpretive acts.
Richard Delgado picked up this line of attack, tausing upon the contents of the
calegorization scheme, and connecting it to the range of acceptable conceptualizations in
law. Delgado acknowledges the power of categorization, and its comforting, and perhaps
obfuscating, inlluences on users of legal information. U,sers feel good when confronted by
well entrenched information systems of their profe.ssions, they satisfy needs that users do
not recognize as being partially constituted by the systems they query.
Existing classitication systems serve their intended purpose admirably: They enable
researchers to tind helplul cases, articles, and books. Their power is instrumental'
once the researcher knows what he or she is looking lor, the
classitication systems enable him or her to find it. Yet, at the same time, the
very search tor authority, precedent, and hierarchy in cases and statutes can create
the talse impression that law is exact and deterministic. (Delgado and Stcfancic,
But not all users are made comfortable, especially those that are either themselves, or
counsel for, individuals or groups whose potential legal claims are silenced by current
categorization schemes. Information systems resist rapid change, and thus legal work
grounded on them
.s slow ,o move omo new coneeptuai ground, change in bolh ,s
incrcmcnlcil. Dclpcido dccrio'v ihic fV’\r iio >fcauu uttnes inis lor its conscrvalivc influences
novel social and political conditions, not to
on law s ability to address
mention new actors in (hose scenes.
Sei"etd,Th''av1™^^ being
selected by the researcher, thus rendering fhot database
rather like molecular biology's double hebv
useless. The systems function
thoughts, and approaSe^wlbrn^
incremental reform remains quite possible hu
^'^y^'^tems, moderate,
lran,slornialive innovation dilTicnll (beigado and Stefan'Jiriwj
It make,s ,sen,se that categon/,ation will enable paritenlar noltons and interpretations while
disabling others. Delgado probes deeper by examining the listings in legal inlormation
mdiees around the heading of civil rights, his clTorLs dovetail with other
.scholars who
attack standard categorization schemes.21 U.sing concepts or phra.ses wh.ch are mean.ngi nl
in certam disconr.se,s of contempora.7 civil rights Delgado explores how the West Dtcennial
Digest deals incorporates and indexes on them. The results are probably more interesting
lor what they do not contain rather than what they do.
The Decennial Digest contains entries on slums and
ghettos, one must look in the Descriptive Word
inmV m
Searcher to public improvemenus under the
r ric
corporations. Another index contains an entry labeled, simply,
aces. None ol the major indexes contains entries for legitimation false
consciousnesss, or many other themes of the "new" or critical race-remedies
s c olarship. Indeed, a researcher who confined himself or herself to the sourcesisted under standard civil rights headings would be unlikely to come in contact with
1989-^^9^
^^^^Sado and Stefancic,
Delgado s claim seems substantiated, yet it would take more research to fully comprehend
whether, and how, those missed areas are translated and incorporated in existing
inlormation systems. For instance, Delgado queried a hypothetical researcher, "what is the
law around the notion of black women suing for job discrimination on the basis of their
21 See for example work by Derreck Bell juid Kimberle Willumis Cren.sliaw.
.s.a,us as black women, not as a black who
.hen happens ,o be m che class women, bu, as
Ihe smgular enlU,.' Exlshng md.ces lend no. lo inco.pom.e d.e concep, o.' black women ,n
the area ol job d.scrimmation, there
.s a h.sto.,, and ca.egonzanon, lor employmen,
discrimmalion on the basis of gender and race, but not a hybrid for law in the particular
area of employment discrimination for black women.
Because of the structure of the indexing systems attornevs forBlack women have filed suit under one catego^ or£Xr™ ^
dUntly discnmmatory against Black women because the legal classification
Black women like the most advantaged members of each group
To sec further treatment refer lo work by Kimberle Crenshaw challenging anh-
discrimination doctrine manifested in the authoritative sources and practices of American
law.22 In it she claims that there is no space for a more context sensitive dkscussion of
employment, and other discnminalion, under current categorization
.schemes. For such
di,scussions to become authoritative, or at least to have an authoritative element manifested
in ca.se law and commentary, new spaces need to be opened up, new categories and
interpretations developed, new indexing facilitated. Perhaps electronic legal databases and
.search engines will continue to shake the authority of categories and practices of law which
re-altimi an inlormational status quo. In that world law's mandarin materials are reduced
10 documents in a text collection, it remains to be seen whether the knowledge
representations, present and luture, made possible by unstructured data collections changes
what can be conceived of in law.
See (Kimberle Creirshaw, 1995).
~—Acquisition and Ma qipiilntinn
Alter finding Uiat a Lexis / Nexis seareh lor compelling slate
.ntercst wtthin free
exerc.se to be fraught with d.fficulties (i.e. many extraneous, or false positive, cases
returned, and presence of many synonyms for compelling interests), and not likely to
produce a precise enough data set. West's Digest system was used to capture the desired
cicses. Attempting to capture the ca,se collection with Lexis / Nexis showed that doctrine is
not easily quantifiable, that it is part and parcel of a collection of knowledge and practices
around law's hard dala, and that Lexis / Nexis was nol indexed in such a way, nor was Ihe
doctrine manifested with enough textual regularity, to satisfactorily procure a doctrinal data
set. The following explores how West's digest and reporters structure or alter
conceptualizations of compelling interest doctrine through efforts to define, delimit, and
idcnlily case opinions with which to construct that data set.
To conduct that examination an information retrieval task is posed: define a search
profile and identify the relevant cases which exhibit the compelling interests doctnne in free
exercise cases. West or other editors did not categorize on the compelling interest doctrine,
they did however categorize on religious freedom and liberties, representing the domain
from which the collection was drawn. This injects a significant element of legal knowledge
authority, but perhaps doctrine's relation to that authority, and the basis for asking
questions about doctrine, needs to be incorporated.
To collect the doctrinal data set several paradigmatic cases were chosen, defined
authoritatively in commentary and texts23 of constitutional law, for free exercise /
compelling state interests at the Supreme Court (e.g., Wisconsin v, Yoder. 406 U.S. 205
( **^72), Thomas v. Review Board
. Indiana Employment Security Division. 450 U.S. 707
U- S. V. Lee, 435 U.S. 252 (1982)). Each case was looked up each in the relevant
West Supreme Court Reporter, headnotes examined, and the most relevant description and
I acquired these largely from two texts: (Epstein ;uid Walker, 1995; Gaunter, 1985 )
Key Nu^hcr-.,.
.he con,polling scale
.n.ercs. balancing
.s. choscn .^3
Decennial D.gesls, chose ease cilalions and dcscripiions in Key Nun,her 84 Iron, 1 968 i„
pre-sen. were
.demined and calalogued. The dala range slarled in 1968 hecai.se Sherhe,, „
ta. 874 U.S. 898 , 1968), carts Che Supreme Conn's inaiigiiral use o, compelling
.stale interesl in deciding free exercise cases.2s More coniemporarily, cases thal would
otherwise have been valid due lo the presence of diKUinal markers, hue concerned ihe
applicalion of ihe Religious Freedom Restoration Ac. (Public Law No. 108-141, 107 Seal.
14X8) raiher chan a balance be.ween a con.siiiutional right and a stale's inieresi, were
omttted from ihe doctrinal space.28 Each citation for Supreme Court and federal coiiits of
appeal cases was recorded for ihose digest case descriptions which explicitly u,sed, or
implied the u.se of. a balancing test between individual religious exercise and ihc inierc.sLs of
Ihc state.
Using Wesllaw28cach ca.se corresponding to the recorded citations was scanned for
a Imal determination as lo whether compelling inieresus (or synonym) were applied, and
tagged lor whether the policy was upheld or noi. West supplied case synopses and text
passages around key .search terms and phra,ses like "compelling stale interesl" or "free
r sF , . . ,
indexes cases by descriptive characteristics and areas of law, tlie key system assirelcrence numbers to each pnxiuced cateecirv/ dcsr'riminngo y description
igns
25
subsections,7l)
Religious liberty and freedom of eon.science, wiUi a variety of
26
Interestingly, 5Jierbert was under key number 274, subsequent compelling suite interest and free
exercise cases are under key number 84.
1
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993 (Public Law No. 103-141, 107 Suit
1488), 111 tact creates its own doctrinal space, one certainly related to Uie free exercise / Compelling Suite
hitcrest but distinct because it is statutory AND it exists in reaction to tlic jurisprudence of free exercise /
Compelling Suite Interest. Cases from tlie Supreme Court were cut off witli Smitli in 1990, there were
some circuit court ol appeals cases which continued to use tlie balancing test after tliat, hence my
examination of cases up tlirough tlie present. For tlie most part however. Smith and RFRA provides lui
endpoint to tlie daUi set collection.
This was merely automation of a manual task, roughly equiUible to finding tlie opinion in a
luad bound reporter. The only distinction tliat might imply subsUuitive improvement on tlie manual
process would be tlie scanning for search terms, again 1 suggest it is an improvement of style ratlier tluui
lomi, tuid tliat doing so does not foul tlie analysis of traditional hard bound machines.
exeru,se were exam.ned to a,scenatn whether the doctrine wtus utili/ed, and deterntine who
won and lost by the title, opinion, and disposition fields. Pri.soner cases wore al.so tagged
becau,se free exerese Jurisprudence tor pnsoners took an expheit step away from
a.nrpelhng state tnterest. instead adopting a
-legit, mate peneolog.cal
.ntercst" standard
(pxeudo rational basis test) against which to weigh a prisoners religious rights.* Ca.ses
prior to that change in treatment are .simply included w.fh the ba.sic subsets defined on
disposition.
Due to the use of doctrinal synonyms (e.g. "significant government interest
"
"ctimpelling
.social need") and the complex and varied
.structure of Judicial opinions and the
nt.xing of dicta and ratio decidendi often considerable portions of text had to be pr<tees.sed.
g ilh proximity locators and a relatively robust notion of what constituted doctrinal
.stgnilicrs the task was streamlined
.somewhat. This final Iist3'>,s the defined data
.set. next
step was collection. Using Lexis / Nexis Lexsee command and download seiwice ca.scs
were easily located and retrieved, storing them in an tnierim dalaba.se to be prepared for
InQucry analysis.
Like lull text Lexis / Nexis the West hardbound digest and reporter system did not
support a straightforward definition and identification of the relevant cases. West Digests
are indexed by subject areas, with ever decreasing levels of abstraction in each subject area
Compelling interests in free exercise law is not manifested as one of those levels however,
existing instead within another subject area or spread across two or more depending upon
the characteristics ol the cases and how they intersect West's categorization scheme.
By utilizing expert knowledge which defined paradigmatic cases of compelling
interests in tree exercise it was possible to locate an area in the digests where the desired
DLonc V . Estate ot Sliahu/./. .482 U.W. ?>A2 ( 1987), juid Turner v Salluy. 482 U S 78 (1987)
esuiblishcd Uie less stringent reasonableness standard for saue interests, free exercise claims by inmates
could be abridged by less tluui compelling interests, tliose deemed reasonable given die exigencies of prison
administration.
30 See Appendix B for daUi set case list.
cases reside. West's inclusion of headno.es and keynumbers act as tdenttfiers and
pointers, thus the paradigmatic cases pointed back to the digest categories where similar
ca.,es could be Pound. West editors make determinattons abou, what constitutes
similarittes, levels of sameness, and conversely attributes of exclusion and category re-
assignment. At that point however the re,searcher had to manually proce.ss the dtge,si
entries,
.screening for free exerci.se first, then looking for signs of a balancing of interests
which either explic.tly mentioned compelhng interests or implied their tneorporation in the
rat,,, of the case. This mjected significant inlluence from second hand knowledge and the
default bias of expertise tn the
.selecting po,ss.ble ca.ses for the data .set Ca.ses identified siill
had to be examined however to detenninc whether ,n fact the compelling interest doctrine,
or synonym, was pre,sent and pari of the decisional mix.
Doctrine's sense and importance
.seemed undercut hy being excluded from subject
area categorization in West. One could atso argue that .since the compelling interest ca.ses,
and their immediate doctrinal relatives, re.s,ded within one category (i.e. Religious Liberty)
lhal West in fact help rc-alTirm doclrinc's meaning, or at least keep cases to which it has
been attributed hung together. Like Lexis / Nexis however meaning of the doctrine pre-
dated these systems managing case opinions, and the existence ol' that doctrine was not
specihcally part ol their organizational scheme, thus, like Lexis / Nexis, compelling interest
doctrine operates below the level of its primary functions.
What the experience with Lexis / Nexis and West showed more than anything was
that doctrine exists at least as much in the minds of professionals, practitioners, and
scholars ol law, as in the hard data ol law as a quasi-physical component. These actors
aic oltcn tapped (or it is part ol their occupations) to cither apply, or argue against, or
examine a context doctrinally. Both Lexis / Nexis and West digest and reporters were
challenged to capture a data set which reasonably could represent the target doctrine without
heavy editing and tweaking by system users. While attempting to stand as far removed
Irom the process of searching and retrieval, to allow search profiles to take the place of
interactive involvement of knowledge experts, it was obvious that compelling mteresLs
needed knowledge experts to give it life, or rather, that law needs structures like doctrine to
allow space for contests of interpretation and application of law
.
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CHAPTER VII
inquery
A. Introriiirfinn
InQucry'
,s the final information machine employed and examined in Doclrine as
Data and is the culmtnation of a constructed story. That story provided an opportunity to
examine practices of case opinion organisation and access in several infonnation machines
which ultimately help shape conceptualizations of dix-trine and cases.
dc.scribed lull-text and hard bound information systems, Lexis / Nexis
Previous chapters
and West digest and
reporters respectively, and how each was u.sed to collect a data set defined by the
compelling state interest doctrine in free exerci.se law. EfforLs to define, di.scover, and
acquire ca,ses as data showed that doctrine is sustained in knowledge bases around law as
much or more so than in the textual content of case opinions themselves. Or more to the
point, It is sustained by tradittons of making sense of cases, by the authors of case
decisions as well as their interpreters, implementers, subjects, and observers. Stipulating
that much ol dixtrine’s meaning comes from expert knowledge and practices around case
iaw, compelling interest doctrine is still however affixed to ease opinions.
Dixtnne as Data was designed to explore the conceptual domain of compelling
Slate interest docinne in free exercise cases in federal circuit courts of appeal and Supreme
Court. That exploration meant subjecting a collection of case opinions lied together by that
dix-tnne (i.e. as a clump) to InQuery analysis in search of coherency^ beyond that attributed
liiQuery IS a probabilisuc inference search engine designed to index, manage, and provide access
’ collections. InQucry is a producl of die Cenlcr for Imclligcnl Infonnalion Relrieval(UIK) at Uie University of Massachusetts, Amherst
2 Coherency is predetermined to a degree as authoritative notions of doctrine tuid cases were used to
delinc' mid construct die corpus (i.e., supreme court and federal circuit courts of appeal, focused around die
hirst Amendment and its protections of religious free exercise, operatiomU in particular period ( 1963 -
present)). Additionally, die language of a btdmicing test will be present diroughout as it was a key search
prolile characterisde in selecting cases lor die data set
. That is a wide coticeptmd net however, and InQucry
identities all concepts, if diere are patterns or occurrences beyond diosc “rigged” for purposes of set
y egal scholars and pracm.oncr,s.3
.„Que,^
.dencincs concepts and Uteir occun encc and
a,-t,ccurrence
,Vet,uencic,s across a corpus oh docuntcnCs^ It was hoped InOne,, ct.tdd he
used to deterntine whether doctrine's presence, attnhtned to a cluntp of case op.nions
correlated with concept
,.cu.ences and co-occu^nces between those cases where the
Slate s tnteresLs prevailed and those where individual claims triumphed. It was
hypothesized that for compelling interest dtxttrine to be coherent, the tntere,sts or at least
some set of standards where Ihtxse interests were met t,r satisfied, ought to be texmally
present tn cases were tndtvidual claims were
.seconda^ to official pohcy. Conversely, in
Ihe other
.set, there should be .some patterns of text which signifies how individual claims
supersede tho.se interests, and that signiftcatton mtght be pre,sent acro,ss Ute stretch of the
collection. Compelling intere.sfs were identified as determinative- m ihe dispo.sition of
lurget ca.ses using West digests and reporters and Lexis / Nexis, it was p„.sited that if the
doctrine mattered to the structure and content of tho.se case texts, and by a,s,s.K;iation their
rcprcscnted decisions, then there would he some conceptual distinctions (i.e. doctrinal
coherency) between the two suh.sets. This was po,sed in relation to critical, or realist
inspired, approaches to case law and its structures doctrine, rca.soning, and precedent. If
lhe,se critics were right, there would be little coherency to doctrine, InQuery
.seemed to
provide a way to test this empirically.
Such an endeavor however proved too amhitious and relied on an oversimplilied
notion ol the relationship between doctrine and cases. Chapters V and VI described search
and rctiieval experiences which challenged the original or robust objective of this project,
dolinition luid collection, we may find tliem wiUi InQuery,
'.nnii -.(•
deliniiion ol die data set, or collection of cases, relied on expert knowledge, :uid theS *^i«>wledge in tlie determination of what should be in die collection ;uid what should not.
. nowlcdge is part luid parcel ol a community of individuals, situated in and around legal institutions
and tlie re.search diereol
.
4 Notions ol ratio decidendi are inherently tied to interpretive communities around case law,
sometimes they are clearly identified in die case text diemselves, at other insUmces die decisional linchpin
less centrally idendlied and agreed upon. The process of identifying when a compelling interest was
determinative, at least piatially, is lui interpretive act quite often.
and showed instead that doctrine is hard to pinpoint textually and assign to a clump of data
obicc. yet that ts one of the printaty trachtions around doctnne legal stt.dy and poittical
science (see Chapter VIII), to speak of doctrine through cases. Those experiences exposed
doctnne's other s.de, as logic or parameter wh.ch allows lor concep.ualixattons of doctnnal
clumps of cases, but ts also llexible enough so as to prov.de space for
.nterpreuve
.,r
rhetorical politics tn and around case law. Cases are also vety complex data objecLs. Case
texts are some of the most d.fficult to comprehend, wtth true understand.ng held out by
knowledge experts and them traditions of reading and making sense of them. Knowledge
experts are the gatekeepers to cases, or at least until very recently have been, and part of
their function has been to show the rest of us how to understand cases. No text's meaning
.s merely the product of word defm.tions and the rules of grammar, contexts of learning,
pre,sentat,on. and interpretation all matter significantly, but when it comes to case law, the
latter lake on far greater importance. With so much riding on contextual specific
interpretation, and given the relative complexity of data objects like cases, InQtiety’s use on
them becomes problematic. While InQueiy analysis of the cases labeled as doctrinal (i.e.,
as a clump) is still pursued, this project focuses on the manner information tools and
practices inOuence notions of doctrine and cases as data.
In the early days of the computer era it was suggested that electronic data
processing could be appropriated to study law and judicial decisions (Lovenger, 1963 ).
Computers make it possible to explore the terms and phrases which appear in texts, to map
them, to probe their relationships within substantive groups of case texts. InQuery
presents indexing and access practices which treat documents as textual streams of parts of
speech (i.e. nounphrases, terms, verbs, etc.), with little distinguishing between
contextually significant sections of text (e.g. ratio, dicta, dissent). InQuery indexes
documents on concepts (i.e. nounphrases) and association relationships between them,
relying on practices which identity concepts in a corpus, their occurrence frequencies,^ and
5 See below for a discussion of occurrence frequency and tlie proffered significance of highly
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co-occurrcncc associations between them. A picture or profile of the document collection
can be produced from them, showing the most important concepts (i.e., nodes with high
occurrence frequency) and their most significant neighbors (i.e., co-occurrence
associations). The following exposes these practices which make that profile possible.
B
, Use / Practice Approach to Conreptiial rnntpnr
Doctrine as Data was designed to augment the study of judicial product by heating
doctrine, and the case opinions through which it operates, as a central part of legal
discourse (White, 1990; Smith, 1994; Davies, 1996; Smith, 1995) where conceptual
contosLs (Connolly, 1974) and affirmations of law's coherency take place. Scholars
(Gordon, 1984; Kennedy, 1979; Kerruesh, 1991; Fit/.patrick, 1992; Smith, 1995; Barkan,
1987) lollowmg the realist tradition see doctrine as indeterminate, window dressing placed
on case opinions by judges and commentators seeking to rationalize decisions and situate
them in established traditions of interpretation. Coherency said conferring from doctrine in
legal discourse, especially that which constitutes the production and interpretation of ca,se
opinions and decisions, is contrived, or worse, obfuscating the real reasons decisions arc
made (c.g. behavioral, political, or otherwise sociological). That said however, doctrine
still structures meaning for case opinions, doctrine is still part of legal education and
scholarship, and ultimately doctrine is part ol practices for making sense of case opinions.
Compelling state interest doctrine in free exercise of religion may be said to
structure expectations and relations framing disputes, as a parameter or logic enabling
domains lor winners and losers in contests of individual faith and police power.^ At the
very least doctrine partially structures discussion and commentaiy swirling around those
contests. As testimony to compelling interest doctrine and its enduring role in politics,
occurring concepts to the information content of a document collection.
constitutive assertion tliat law generally, and legal knowledge structures like doctrine
specilically, take shape in a wide range of social iuid politiciil contexts. For more di.scussion See Brigham
(19%)
Cong.e,s,s
,,s dcbaung ano.hcr a„cn>p, reinvigonue
,hc cn.pelHng nuces,
.slandard. k.llccl
hy ,hc Suprcn,c C„u,-,
Religious labmy l>,,nec,,on Ac, ,1 1.K,
) ol njj. Compelling iiueiosls in the domain ol' religious I'recdom is still being
consuiuled, cxcmplilying ihe rellcxive nainre ol' Ihc relalionship belwcon law’s aulhoriiy
and law’s social reality.
Karl Llywcllcn and the realists established a critique of lormalism and doctrine (See
Chapter 2 ), and opened up an analytical door into the examination of cases and the
meaninglul use of words therein. Karl Llywellen’s oft cited Bramble Rn.h lakes a
skeptical view of doctrine in a discussion of judicial Hcxibility within a Iramework ol
Icgahsm and disputes. It is within disputes, subject to legalism’s structuring power, where
doctrine is most pronounced. Uewellyn and other realists (e.g., Frank 1935; 1949) used
doctrine” to reler to practices like “precedent” and “stare decisis,” overarching concepts
which describe, and are said to shape, judicial behavior in Ibrmalist or traditional models.
Rules were used by Llewellyn and others to describe more specilic knowledge structures,
such as those this project calls doctrinal, narrower abstractions applied to the processing
and sense-making around cases in particular areas of law. This distinction can be llattened
somewhat by suggesting that doctrine exists as a subset of a general class ol' legal rules.
I hese lules may include signilicant abstractions or practices like precedent or specific
constiucLs like the strict scrutiny balancing test or iLs compelling interest component, d’hese
scholais, lather than discounting the signilicance ol all such rules, suggested these
absti actions provided screens, that lormal constructs and practices were structures through
which politics and ideology were made legitimate and active. The case system is the data in
which that legitimation occurs, Llewellyn turned his energies to making sense of those
objects.
1 For a more delailed history of compelling inieresls in Free Exercise, and iJie subsequeni elTorts of
Congress to contravene die tSmidi decision, see Chapter 3.
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Llewellyn’s discussion of the case system (Llewellyn. 1930:25-69, focuses on Ute
pracuces of maktng sense of the language of appellate optnions. and how to make
assessment of the tesulhug law. m order to grasp the meaning of a case you must read
knowledgeably (Llewellyn. 1930: 41). and to do that the reader must contextually know
the words, not s.mply adhere to an emp.rically pos.tive knowledge of their mean.ng
Contextual knowledge for Llewellyn, is an understand.ug based on word use and
interrelationships,
“the life of words is in the using of them, in the wide network of their
long a.ssoc,ations” (Llewellyn. 1930: 41). Certainly some associations are positivist,
.sign -
Signifier relationsh.ps, established through traditions of use. It is some of these.
assocattons, across a body of free exercise case law. that are explored with InQuery, to
probe their actual use, and perhaps tease out some meaningful relationships for that body
beyond those already attributed to it.9
Socio-legal study of law and language (Conley and O'Barr, 1990; White, 1990;
Fish, 1980; Constable, 1998) has largely focused on the manner in which legal language
structures particular understandings and contexts, how law is interpreted, and ultimately
how It is applied and made meaningful through social action. The role of words.
grammars, and concepts is important in that work, with concepts being central to InQuery’s
use here. Concepts are generally described as ideas and notions meaningfully associated
with particular authoritative acts and proclamations of actors like judges, referred to with
words or strings thereof (White, 1990: Ch. 2; Brigham, 1978: 9; Pitkin, 1972: 60-65).
JB White's work (White, 1990: 25-31) critically examines the traditional use of the
term concepts and puts forth a more use or practice oriented view. White takes on the
notion that concepts are fixed packages of meaning for universal, or even domain specific.
8 The use of Uie term “contextual knowledge” is variable, Uiat is, it has several proffered meanings
depending uprm one’s definition and scope of context. For the particular discussion of Llewellyn’s tiie
context was not only a textual one, but also a larger socio-institutional one.
^Such attribution would largely be tlie product of knowledge experts in specific areas of
constitutional law and appellate court behavior / pnxluct.
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arc no. words;
.cy are ,he inccrna, or
.„.oncc.ua, phcnonrcna
,ha, words arc ,hough, ,o
labC. as markers, or rewards wh.ch words arc .hough.
.0 poin,’’ (WhUc. ,9d0; 29) This
returns us .0 old pos.tivis. „o.,„ns of language he argues, suggesting ,hat wtnds arc signs
ttr Platonte
.deals which ex.s, only
.0 he articulated through the lall.hle eomexfs of .eali.y
and human expression. White posi.s instead that words are all we have, and that the
mcantng for tho,sc words ts the product of interprettve acfs by tndivtduals situated ,n social
contexts. No. that meantng ,s utterly open ,0 pol.ttcal argument, or force of rhetonc. hut
rather that eontexf, and trad.tlon shape doma.ns of sen,se and non.sen.se tn language, and
concepts arc meanings associated with those words and phricses in context.
John Brigham’s Constitutional I .mg iKi ge (Brigham, 1978) was an early clTori at
rclocusing scholarly attention on the institutional language practices which make law
meaningful. Bngham studied concepts which were the product of a specific language for
constitutional discourse in the Supreme Court. That language is defined by the grammars
and subsequent word use practices which shape notions of reasonable and unreasonable in
constitutional utterances. Perhaps relationships between concepts, or words in context or
practice, within a doctrinal space or legal discourse could be explored for their role in
providing domains of the sensible for the texts of appellate decisions.
Hanah Pitkin, in her writing on Wittgenstein and Justice (Pitkin, 1972),
appropriated the work of Paul Ziff (Ziff, I960) to explore the way language, and more
importantly, words become meaningful in law, and ultimately how law itself then takes
shape. Like White, Zitl argued that words become meaningful by their use, rather than
some positivist or empiricist notion that words arc fixed signifiers for static meanings.
Use is a broad notion, it could be the use of words in dialog, in commentary, in
Vcuiable social contexts, in the petitions and claims ot interest groups existing in those
contexts, or lor this project, in the production and presentation of case opinions of the
highest federal appellate courts.
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i n,ean,„g o, w„,Us or phrases is hepenhc, r,po„ ,heir posi.ion in a pai.ern
wou, nse r.ncicr ihc consiiiniive unrhrcila o, language and granrn.ars, iha, ,s,
-nreaning
..s .Icicrnnnec, hy ihe word’s disinhniion
,n language,
.he hngu.shc environ,neni n,
Winch u
.x,cn,s” ,i>,,hin on ZilT, ,972: I i Pi,hn, a,gnes ihai Ihe meaning o, a wo.d
depends on
-,he se, o, oiher words lha, can also no,rnany occur ,n ,,s posnion in du-sr-
exp,essions.” and
-ihe se, o, exp,essions ,n winch
,, nonnaliy occurs" (l>,,hn, iOVZ-
H ). InQucry presen,s ,ools and pracices w,,h winch ,o explore wo,d use. and ,he
P,.Herns and associahons wi,h „,her expicssions. While allrihuiions ol meaning a,e no,
,c,,lly sough, wi,li InQueiy, lecognizing
,lia, word use relahonsliips aie only a small
P..H ol Ihe derivahon and suslaining oh meaning lor cases, ,son,e ol ihe pahems and
associahons uncovered w„h i, may he u.selul lo underslanding ea.ses and docl,ine's
assigned meaning.
L^OcCHrrciKT l^•r.<n^cncv ji nri r»
-Ocf„rreno..
Mos, compu,er inlormahon
.elrieval syslems a,e designed lo manage Ihe slomge
ami .elrieval ol documems, Ihe dala ohjeCs consis.ing of all Idr-ms of alpha numeric lex,
and liguies. P,'edominanlly d.ese syslems Irea, ilocumen, colleclions as sheams ol
dchnnied lex, dociimcnis, wilh each documeni concalenaled wiih iis immediaie ncighhors in
no special oider, only dislingiiished by a lew conirol characlers lo idenliry dial docnmcnl
(e.g, #IX)C. HOI ) lor indexing and .scparalion (o.g. #IX)CI!HGIN, #IX)CKND). Slorage
ol Ihe ,-aw documems can he ralher simple, a lisi of ohiecls, a slack, a pile even, so long as
Ihc sysicm has a I'obusl mechanism lor localing relcvanl documems when useriiueries aie
perloi-med. The key is Ihc indexing
.scheme which provides acec.ss lo documems.
hiloimalion rehieval
.syslems like liili Icxi Lexis / Ncxis or prohahilislic inrcrcnce InOnery
heal Ihc dociimcnis as iclalivcly iinslmcliircd colleclions ol lexi objccls. |hcsc ohiecls may
simply be .seen as alphanumeric shings lo he indexed univcrsaliy, as in Ixjxis / Nexis, or
they may be parsed for parts of speech (e.g„ noun, verb, nounphrase, term, etc.) which
wtil help structure the tndexing and search / retrieval proce,sses in systems like InQuery.
InQuery employs a sophi.sucated tndexing
.scheme wh.ch distills information
rcpre,senu,t.ons from documenus based on the conceptual content of each document. The,se
sysutms tdenttfy parks of speech in a document to make asse.ssmenus about the tnlormatton
cmtent of that document. Tlrere are some parts of speech tn textual di.scour.se wh.ch are
less important to the tnformation content of the documenus in a eolleciton, depending of
eour.se on the domain of that duscourse (e.g.. law. business, medicine). Scholarship in
inlormalion retrieval suggests however that in domain specific collections that parts of
speech known as nounphra,ses are most significant to conveying the information content of
a document collection, and as a precondition, of each document in that collection.i.
Nounphra,ses are con.sidorcd coneepUsH in this
.scholarship, and are constituted by either
single nouns or a string of nouns, often connected by other parts of speech. InQueiy
identifies and utilizes nounphra,ses to index dtxument collections, and support enhanced
document retrieval.
Collections of related documents inevitably will have phrases which occur more
Ircqucntly than others, in fact most phrases appear only once. While those appearing once
are certainly meaningful to the information content of the document collection, they arc less
significant than tho,se most frequently occurring. Highly occurring phrases emphasize
concepts repeatedly, their use signifies importance, weighted for readers and future writers
alike. The conceptual content ol the collection is a function of both the use and patterns of
h) See (Croft tuid Turtle, 1991).
II Nounphrases are considered Uic key concepts in a dtxunient collection, indieaUng or conveying
the informauon content of tiiat collection Uirougli tiie most highly occurring nounphrases. This rests on an
empiricist notion ol meaning to a degree, but is also linked to a use oriented derivation of metuiing. Yes,
nounphrases, or concepts, have meaning unto tliemselves, for widiout such meaningful ataibutes ifiey
would be unintelligible out ol some interpretive context. Simply, words have to have some base elemeiiLs
ol meaning on tlieir own, tfiey may chtmge radically depending uixm tlie context of use and interpreuuion,
but there must be some positive or empirical clement of meaning to each word. That said, Uie relationships
between words is tlic key context for line tuning and shaping meaning.
these phrases, as well as an empirically posh.ve elemem of meaning which ,s derived Iron,
trad,..ons of char phrase’s use ,n a vaneiy of contexts. Some of these phrases however are
so common as to essentially undercut thetr contrihuuon to collection meaning. For instance
the nounphrases “court,” and “law” in this project’s collection would so t.-e,uently iKctir as
to render them somewhat meaningless. Comparisons of concept ix-currence frequences
between the subdivisions of die document collection (i.e., compelling interest cases where
state’s interest prevailed, and those where individual claims triumphed) may .shed light on
the correlation of doctrine to distinctions between them.
Occurrence frequencies pre.sent one picture of the conceptual content of document
collections, that picture can be expanded with the production of co-occurrence statistics.
Co-occurrences, or collocation,s.ir are relationships amongst terms and phrases in a
document collection. The relationships are defined by the occurrence of two or more lemis
and/or phrases in close proximity (i.e. within same paragraph typically), the more often it
happens the greater the co-occurrence frequency value. Socio-linguists began paying
attention to co-occurrences or pragmatic associations (Bowers, 1989: 50; Firth, 1957: 194-
5) because they suspected that meaning of words and phrases was partially a function of
their associations through use. Associational meaning of terms and phrases is derived from
the, “habitual, and therefore expected, contiguity with other objects” (Bowers, 1989: 50).
This is distinct from meaning which situates the object in a socio-cultural domain of
contextual and interpretive variables, as well as empiricist or positive meanings.
Associational meaning represents a narrow slice, it is “a measure of expectation in the
actual combination of words over quite short stretches
- phrases, sentences, and contiguous
sentences” (Bowers, 1989: 75). Co-occurrences show the lexical environment of a text,
the patterns in which terms and phrases occur in proximity to each other. Co-occurrence
12 See (FirtJi, 1957: chapter 15) discussion about "modes of meaning" for texts.
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stat.sl.cs represent syntactical relations, the intermingling
“chains" of significalion (Lacan
1977; de Saussure.1966), deployed and recas, for assigning and proffering meaning.
Information Retrieval and InOnpry
Information retneval systems take on a simple task, store data obiecfs meaningfully
supply a query language and interface for users to make requests of Uie system, and satisfy
those queries as effectively as possible. That task may be straightforward, but due to
variability in data objects, different means of access, and distinct knowledge
repre,sentations for data objects and quenes alike, implementing an effective infonnation
retrieval system can be challenging.
InQuery is an information retrieval system based on the probabilistic inference
network (Turtle, 1995). That is, InQuery satisfies queries by returning documents which
arc inferred to be probably relevant to a user's query. InQuery implements a probability
ranking system in order to weight documents relative to queries.
estimates the probability of relevance of a text to the query, on the basis0 the smtistical distnbution of terms in relevant and non-relevant text given anuncertainty associated with the representation of both the source text tmd the
and Hunter,SrIsT"
“ relationship between them. (Zelezn.kow
Relationships are inferred between documents in a database and user quenes by comparing
the inlomiation representations of documents and queries. The stronger the inference, i.e.
the more similar the information representations, the higher the relevancy ranking for a
document, and the more likely it is to be on point for that particular query.
Relevancy is based on textual characteristics of the query and document. The terms
and phrases of the query, and their most highly associated phrases, are used to create a
“profile” or knowledge representation of a user’s information request. That representation
IS compared with those of documents in the collection. A query can only be satisfied by
documents possessing evidence or data which produce an information representation
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similar u> the query’s inlormalion rcprescmalion. Evidence is typically based on the
slalislical represenlations of occurrences and associations tif phrases within documents.
ntrease the relevancy ol dtK'umenUs retrieved I'roni a query on a text collection
(i.c. to achieve greater consonance between query information representation and document
information representation) InQtieiy u.ses the InFinder a,ssociational thesaurus utility to
expand the information representation of the user’s query. Phrases and terms front the
user’s query are directly utilized to find documents having high occurrences of them, hut
documenLs that also have high occurrences of phrases which have been found to co-occur
signilicantly with those in the query are often relevant to the user’s informaUon need.
Since It IS the product of the thesaurus building which provides access to the occurrence
and co-occurrence frequency statistics the following will focus on InFinder, rather than
InQucry’s retrieval ol' documents.
InFinder constructs a thesaurus by going through every document sentence by
sentence, recognizing phrases (i.c., concepts) and terms using parts of speech recognition
taggcrs.i3 InFinder then inserts the phrases and terms in a dictionary, storing phrase and
term idcntilicrs in a table with their occurrence frequencies until a certain number of
sentences is processed, or generally when a paragraph limit is encountered. At this limit,
InFindei produces pairwise associations between all phrases and terms within that text
window, determining co-occurrence frequencies by multiplying frequencies for each
combination ol phrase and term. The co-occurrence frequencies for each combination is
then summed over the entire collection (Jing and Croft, 1994). The highest association
Ircquencics arc icprcscntcd in the thesaurus as the relationships between given terms and
phrases and phrases which have high co-occurrences with them.
The thesaurus is a list ol all terms and phrases occurring in the document collection,
each entry has a list ol associated phrases, in order of decreasing co-occuiTcncc frequency.
1 3 Taggers are applications which use templates which model tlie structure of sentences and the
patterns ol word use. PtirLs of speech (i.e. nounphrases, verbs, etc.) are effectively identif ied using tliese
tools.
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InQuery utilizes the thesaurus to expaud a querys tnlomtation profile by look.ng up, and
including in that profile, phrases which are highly associated with terms and phrases in lliat
query. Documents returned will match to greater or lesser degree an infonnation profile
devised from terms and phrases from the original queiy and their as,sociaied phrases Iron,
ihe thesaurus.
E. The Prorpcc
1. Designs for InQuery Analysis
While InQuery poses great potential as a database and search engine for law’s texts,
this project was not so much interested in the document management and retrieval
properties InQuery presented. Rather, the process used to build InQuery's thesaurus and
the statistics which represent the actual term / phrase occurrences and as.sociations in the
text IS 01 immediate interest. Occurrence frequency data shows those concepts which arc
arguably most significant to a collection’s information content Some of these highly
occurring concepts can be treated as nodes for co-occurrence examination, as conceptual
centers around which other concepts orbit, thus producing a picture of the lexical
environment with the greatest informational weight (Hockey, 1980: 89-91). Co-
occurrence statistics for doctrinal terms and phrases (e.g., compelling, state interests,
overriding state interests, overriding government interests) provide a representation of the
environment around key phrases, exposing the doctrinal markers most significant
conceptual neighbors, and the text which may have the greatest doctrinal impact on readers
and future writers alike.
By dividing the collection into cases where compelling interests were sustained, and
those where state interests were found lacking in the face of individual claims, and then
developing occurrence and co-occurrence frequency statistics for each group, it was
hypothesized that those statistics could help expose doctrine’s coherency, i.e., its
correlation to those two groups. If doctrine really matters to the structure of cases in each
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collection there should he some disunctions ,n the occun-ences and associattonul
relationshtps of key concepts across the two groups ol cases where the doctnne of
compelltng interests was said to exh.hit determ,nafve inlluence. Coherency was onginally
suggested as an
.ndicator lor the presence of textual consistences, and distinctions, wh.ch
m.ght lend weight to the notion that compelling
.nterests were
.denUliahle, or that there was
a domain of referents which indicated the presence or ahsenee of such interests.
The Center for Intelligent Information Retrieval at the University of Mas,sachusetis
made InQuery available for this project, and supplied technical suppon staff to help tailor
moueoi and InFinder to satisfy the projeefs needs. CllR was supplied with the original
data Hies, the ca.ses collected via Lexis / Ncxis and West. The tagging of each case was
ttsed lor the creation of several data files (see below). CllR then built association the,saun
lor each and provide acce.ss to occurrence frequency and co-occurrence asscKiation
-statistics. CllR provided occurrence frequency tables for each data file, they were acccs.scd
via an Internet interface, and could be imported into a database or spreadsheet or word
processing environment on a local platform. To explore co-occurrence frequencies one had
to interactively a-sk InQuety to provide a list, in order of decreasing frequency, of
a-ssociated phrases for a given term or phra.se. For instance, InQuery could be asked to
provide the most highly associated phra-ses to “compelling,” or “state interest” or any
combinalion thereof.
The complete data set was comprised of 186 case opinions, 108 of which constitute
the two primary sets investigated here.!-* Data set size presented an immediate question to
CIIR stall: was it large enough to produce meaningful results? would the frequencies and
associations be telling in a sample this size? CIIR staff raised concerns that there simply
would be too few documents for statistical significance, for the idiosyncrasies of individual
documents to wash out over the expanse of a collection. The larger the collection, the less
14 The dilfercnce of 78 is Uie total of tlie prison cases after tlic doctrinal shift, from compelling
interests to legitimate peneological rationale (see Chapter 3 di.scussion).
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.mpaa any ,s.„g,e d„cun,e„, would have, chus ,l you had a docun.m lha,
.coaled a phnuso
.nord.nately u would have rclalivcly less weight in a large collection, and would not
neces,sarily skew the results. This hurdle seemed cro,s,sed however when CIIR realised
how large case opinions can be. tt is not ,so much the number of docuntents that ntatters as
Ihe number of words, and Judges are typically r,uite wordy. This is not to say that only a
lew large documents would work, but over one hundred large documenus
.scented OK.
Each case text tor the collection consisted ol' the majttrtty opinion and the di.sscnttng
opinion il- any extsted. Di.s.senLs raised
.some further data object i.ssues, ntost signtficantly
would the pre.sence ol di.s.senting opinions pollute the analysis since di.s.sents arc not
u aditionally considered part of the “law" produced by case.s? Would dissents ,n opinions
that were placed in one grttup of ca.ses. e.g. those where the state’s tnterest prevailed, inject
concepLs and concept a.s.sociattons that ought not be tncluded with that of the majortty
opinion? InQuery does not distinguish between pans of the data object, only where data
objccLs begin and end, and the textual contents therein. Thus, di.s,seniing opinion text is
treated the same as majority opinion language in the production of occurrence and co-
occurrence frequency statistics. A decision had to be made whether to edit out all di.s.seiiLs,
which was not simple given that the intermediaiy daiaba.se (i.e. Folio Views) did not make
11 ca.sy to cut this portion ol each ca.se, and there were nearly 2tX) cases. While each ca.se
was selected on the basis of compelling interests being pan of the decisional mix, they did
not purport to show cases where those interests were the ratio exclusively. Therefore it
was likely that dissents would address a range ofissues in the majority opinion, sometimes
tackling issues not explicitly presented in the majority opinion, arguing instead for a
diamatically dillerent path ol reasoning and opinion. In other instances, dissenting judges
will only choose one piece ol the majority opinion to address, perhaps not even the ratio.
Certainly, dissents were not always going to take on application of the compelling interest
doctrine, thus it was decided that dissents could be lelt alone, they would effectively wash
themselves out with their variability.
2. InQuery Analysis
To construct subsets for further processing, and allow for examination of
conceptual patterns and relationships within logically distinct groups of opinions, some
meta distinctions were applied to the opinions via tagging wiUt some two
.state condition
fields. During scanning and verification cases were tagged as either a "win" or "lose."
corresponding to cases where state interests prevailed or were tmmped by individual claims
respectively. Cases were also tagged if they were a prison case, and those cases were
further divided by a distinction between those occurring before and alter 1987 and the
doctrinal
.sea change in free exercise jurisprudence in prison ca.ses (see Chapter 111 for
discussion of this change in free exercise jurisprudence). The tagging produced six suKsels
of interest, several were combined to create 10 data files (see Appendix C) to be provided
lo CIIR for InFinder association thesaurus building.
In the onginal formulation of Doctrine as Data the objective was to see if there was
doctnnal coherency in and between several of these subsets. The following analysis is
based on InQuery's processing of file 8, representing all cases where compelling interests
were present prevailing, and file 9, all those where free exercise claims were successful
over otlicial interests. That analysis is based on observation of patterns, similarities, and
distinctions in concept occurrence frequencies and associations in each corpus. If there
was something to the doctrine’s influence on the cases in each file, beyond expert
knowledge and interpretive traditions, it might show up at the level of words and phrases
and their patterns and relationships.
a. Occurrence Frequencies
Appendix E displays a comparison ol the relative occurrence frequencies of some of
the most highly occurring concepts in files 8 and 9. InQuery produced occurrence
Irequency reports lor each file, they have been sorted in order of decreasing occurrence
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irccuency. and a reladve frequency nreasure for each concept was computed hy d.viding
the concept occurrence frequency for each hy the occurrence frequency of the ntos,
common nounphrase. See Appendix D for a representation of the two baste occurrence
irequency reporfs, note that the reports are cut off well before the end, there are far too
many concepts that occur infrequently (i.e. predominantly only once) and are less
significiint in this torm of cincilysis.
After tdenltlytng stop words, n„unphra,,es that are standard identifiers hke “u.s.,”
•s.ct„” or “fed,” highly occurring concepts were identified from each report and compared
lor relative occurrence frequency distinctions. Those concepf, whose relative occurrence
frequency values differed by more than a few percentage points across the two files are
Identified in Appendix E. Roughly the first I (X) concepts^ in the report for file 8 were
identified in the report for file 9, differences in relative occurrence frequency were noted,
some of whtch were interesting and are commented upon here. That comparative process
was repeated in the reverse, findings are also de,scribed in Appendix E.
Htghly occumng concepts in ca.ses where individual claims trumped
.state or
government interests (i.e. file 9) seem to generally have a greater relative weight than in
cases where compelling interests exist (i.e. file 8). This ts partially due to the fact that file 8
was much larger, and there were nearly 2(I(X) more concepts encountered, therefore a
rclahvtty measure is going to be watered down more significantly. Conversely, since there
arc so many more cases there should be more occurrences per concept on average, thus
mitigating somewhat the increased number of overall concepts. As a result, relative
occurrence Irequency distinctions of a few percentage points should be treated as
interesting, but with less import that distinctions of 5% or more.
There is remarkable overlap between the two files, especially the highly occurring
concepts, there arc exceptions to be sure (e.g. the concept “life” is far more common in
15 Choosing hie first 100 concepts is probably overkill, alter Uie first 50 or so tlie significance
drops of considerably because tlie relative occurrence frequency distinctions become negligible.
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cusc,s where smie intereste were Irunrped), bur generally Urere i,s some cohereney ,o Ihe
collcclion's mast sign.ficanl coneepis. Some of that ts rigged, ihal is. .some highly
occuntng concepts are
-search terms” used to scan and detent, ine whether the ca.se ought
mcluded. Phra,sas lihe
-free exerci.se” or “religton” or
-.merest” are expected to h.ghly
occur, though distincttons m their tKCunence frequences and co-occumence patte. ns across
the tiles may still be ot interest.
In the set of ca.ses where compelling inleresLs did not exi.st there are .some
tnterestmg results, the data
.set s.xe and relat.v.ty issue d.,scus.sed above notw.thstandmg.
The phra.ses, ”city,” “children - child,” “education.” and “ordinances” indicate that hKal,
municipal, and stale policy are less likely to represent a compelling intere.st, especially
when the tree exerci.se “rights” of parents to educate children are concerned. Since many of
the successlul tree exercise challenges were in the unemployment benefits area, Ihe notion
ol “bencfiLs”
.seemed interesting. Might it be expected that "benelifs" occur differently
across the files? However, "benefits" had essentially the same occurrence frequency in
each hie. There were certainly cases in the area of unemployment benefits where the states’
imeresLs prevailed, thus it is likely that the two sets essentially canceled each other out
di.scursively. The other interesting distinction is perhaps more representative of an
ideological quality to the writings of judges in those cases where individual rights
triumphed over state interests. The phrases “beliefs,” “rights,” “freedom,” and “life” were
more prominent in those cases, indicating that opinion writers were employing a rhetorical
arsenal designed to influence interpretation by readers. Judges relied on ideologically
powerlul concepts, providing strong rationales for defeating state interests, and likely
sending signals to future challengers about how to constitute their own fights. Finally, the
occurrence ot “god” was quite humorous, again arguably serving a rhetorical purpose, that
god is more present in the cases where individuals are victorious over the secular state.
Since the data set where state or government interests were compelling and thus
prevailed was considerably larger than its counterpart, and since compelling interest have
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been lound to exist in all aaeas of relevant pol.cy, save of eourse for expl.c.t d.scnntination,
there seemed to be less of note in file 8. Subjeet area distinctions which seemed evident in
file 9 were not so in its counterpart, save for one noticeable pattern. The language of
authority, ot federal authority espeeially, seemed dominant. The phra.ses “government,”
“united states,” “congress,” “statute,” and “purposes” all seem to indicate that where
authoritative policy prevailed there was a predisposition to federal law, that interests were
more likely to be found compelling when emanating from the.se sources. In addition, the
relatively high occutrence frequency of “exemption” may indicate that judges are being
rhetortcally active, attempting to paint claims for free exerci.se as exceptions, as contrary to
the default, as seeking special treatment from the norm, as deviant.
b. Co-Occurrence Associafinnv;
The production of co-occurrence associations to explore the influence of doctnne on
two sets of related cases is experimental, representing a new way to view texts of federal
appellate case opinions. It is clear that interpretive traditions of knowledge experts are still
preeminent in assigning and ascertaining the meaning of case opinions, however the texts
themselves, the words of decisions, the patterns of phrase use and associations have
significance to those traditions. Without the texts, their is nothing upon which those
communities can toil. Case readers are faced with text made meaningful in a variety of
ways. As they encounter highly occurring phrases and their neighbors, patterns are
associated, or incorporated, with expert supplied knowledge about those cases, and
perhaps structure the production of future opinions.
i. Co-Occurrence Nodes - Highly Occurring Concepts
The highly occurring concepts identified by InFinder for the two primary files can
be treated as nodes, as conceptual points around which other nounphrases orbit to varying
degrees. From the top twenty most frequently occurring concepts returned for each file
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several phrases were selected for eontpanson:
-reltgion,
.nterest,"
..xerctse," and
behef. Each was h.ghly occumng ,n both files and ts significant to the doctnnal profile,
or intoiraation representation, originally protTered. These phrases are significant
components of contpelltng interest discussions, they are tnd.cators. thus it seemed useltd to
evaluate the lex.cal environments tor each tn the two files. Distinct,ons and similant.es ,n
co-occurrences between the two srouns of easps Ua^lu p t c e tested here are noted and examined for
thctr possible roles is sustaining, or undercultmg, dtKtrinal coherency.
Co-,x;currence statistics are produced for the given concepts from each file.
Phra,ses which commonly co-tKcur with a given phrase across the two files are identified as
they may show doctnnal or discursive coherency in a general sense. As expected however
there are more co-(«currence distinctions than s.m.lanties between the files, and these arc
more interesting. Co-occurrence distinctions between the two tiles, relaUve to a single
-search phrase, may signify a correlation to doctrine and thus potential coherency, or a form
ol It nevertheless. This is speculative however, at best trends may be identified which
approximate rough correlations between phrase co-occurrence distinctions and doctrine’s
argued presence. In addition, there are bound to be distinct phrase associations for each set
which are idiosyncratic, that is, the product of wordy judges in panicular cases, who repeat
a phrase which is only really relevant to that particular case, but that weighs heavily when
counting and associating is performed. Some of those idiosyncrasies will likely also be
indicators of the substantive areas dealt with in each set of cases, the line between those
which are really only central to one or a couple cases and those which are more general is
dillicult to ascertain without referring back to the original cases. Other phrases which are
highly co-occurring are simply fortuitous stowaways, and are obviously not meaningful to
the contextual meaning of the textual environment (i.e. like the word “while” co-occurring
with “exercise”).
Each subject phrase is treated as a conceptual node with a number of related (co-
occurring) phrases, they are listed below sorted by decreasing co-occurrence frequency.
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Co-occumng phrases, wh.ch are unique to that particular file lue underlined. Commcnls
will appear to the nght ol each associated phrase as appropriate. The tollowing presents
the top phrase co-occurrences for "religion,"
"interest,"
"exercise," and "beliel" IVom those
cases where state interest was compelling and prevailed, and Utose where individual claims
trumped those interests:
ii. Co-Occurrence Nodes - User Defined
In addition to those concepts supplied by InFinder as highly occuning, and Ihus
significant to the content of ihe collection, the key textual components of the doctnne were
posed as co-occurrence nodes. InFinder was queried to provide highly co-occurring
phrases tor compelling,” and “state interest” from files 8 and 9.
The important finding here is that for each supplied query there is remarkable
overlap, that is, there seems to be little distinction in co-occurrences across the two files.
The textual environment for doctrinal phrases is nearly identical in cases where compelling
interests existed and those where they did not. Does this then imply an inherent
mcoherency if there are no real distinctions across the files subject to compelling interest
doctrine? Or rather, is the doctrine coherent, and the determinative element of the cases
occurs elsewhere (i.e. away from compelling interest talk) in the decision? The answer lies
between, the findings cannot sustain either conclusion, especially since the whole notion of
coherency, and doctrine's essential identity, has been problematized at each step of this
project. Nevertheless, there is some coherency to be sure, readers of compelling interest
and tree exercise cases will encounter certain highly occurring, and otherwise important,
phrases and their most common neighbors repeatedly, this is likely to produce a sense of
orderliness in the data being interpreted and consumed. Some of that orderliness will likely
then accrue to the relationship between doctrine and those cases. The goal however is
largely to expose the co-occurrences for further discussion and research. Appendix G
contains a list ol the most highly co-occurring phrases with the core doctrinal terms and
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phrases (i.e. compelling and sia.e
.merest). Note that co-oecurring phrases unic,t,e to each
lile are underlined m Appendix G, there are not many of them howevei
.
F. Concliisinn
The attempt at automated Lexis / Nexis searches, and then ,he painstaking ease by
case examination using West’s products, showed that the unstructured nature of case
opinion texts and the complexity of legal language and reasoning, make it d, ITict.lt to
categonze some cases as repre,sentative of a particular doctrine. The meaning of cases and
their language are contextually constituted by individual readers, there are of counse
domains, or communities, of interpretation structured by things like constitutional
grammars (Brigham, 1978) and other expert or authoritative driven traditions of
understanding and discourse (White, 1990; S. Fish, 1980).
Case opinions arc complex data objects, thus knowledge structures which arc
partially constitutive of the meaning of those objects are likely tied to both the symbolic
elements ol those objects as well as interpretive communities around them, sustaining
them. A document collection of doctor’s notes on asthma (See Chapter 1) is not so
mtcrprctively wedded, the data objects are far simpler, thus knowledge derived from textual
relationships across them is likely less tenuous. Recalling the asthma study and the use of
InQuery described m Chapter 1, doctors were asked to provide key search terms which
they felt would correlate to asthma attacks and exacerbations. Given the simplicity of
doctor’s notes, as compared to case opinions, it is relatively straightforward to capture the
documenks containing those search terms and the documents which are related to those
terms through high co-occurrence frequencies. Case opinions are far different, the
occurrence ol key terms which may signily a doctrinal discussion can be easily mixed with
occurrences which arc in dicta, or in a dissent. We tried to look beyond this by suggesting
that InQuery provided the chance to examine the text of a discourse, a doctrinal discourse,
but that is a knowledgeable attribution by a researcher, and is not necessarily represented in
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.he documents e.fecuvely. Simply, doctors’ notes are one thing, case op.n.ons are tiu.te
clearly another.
Is there coherency to compell.ng tnterest doctrine? If so. can ,t be ascertained iron,
the text of an opinton, or collection of them wtth tools like InQucry? The experiences of
Ihis project, in conjunction with existing views on doctrine and appellate cases, seem to
undercut the latter, while the prior is shown to be as much a eonditton of tntcrpretive
communities as with cases themselves. While the data set of cases for this project was
collected in such a way as to front load a certain amount of coherency (i.e„ the presence of
certain phrases), was there anything beyond that, or which correlated to their presence?
Aside from search terms and stop words there is a remarkable amount of overlap in
occurrence frequencies of the most significant phrases between the primary two sets of
cases examined. Some of this is undoubtedly related to compelling interests doctrine, hut
there are likely other common features which cause certain concepLs to appear readily.
Repeated fact paliems, especially with respect to the types of issues being coniestcd, or the
policies being challenged may also be concept magnets, causing the overlap witnessed.
Separating these parts of cases, or attributes represented therein, is probably not useful,
since case meaning is a lunction of all of those things and the interpretive community
giving them ultimate social (and specialized) meaning. The relationship between
compelling interests in free exercise law is going to be connected to certain kinds of cases,
dealing with most likely a relatively fixed, or incrementally changing, domain of subject
areas.
There were also distinctions in occurrence frequencies, and some co-occurrence
frequencies, for particular significant doctrinal phrases in each of the examined files.
Distinctions also correlate to doctrine’s presence. Doctrine's causality cannot be sustained
on this alone, but it represents yet more correlation and thus arguments about causation and
coherency can be furthered. InQuery unfortunately did not really uncover much beyond
what was already known about compelling interests, there were some interesting
occuTence frequency distrncons that seemed to soltdify understandings, bu, unlike the
doctors and the asthma study there seems to be only mcrcmenuti knowledge derivation,
conlined for instance to occurrence frequency distinctions for phrases ‘•freedom” or
“exemptions” which may give insight into the rhetorical directions of opinion writers.
What then can be gleaned from the InQuery examination of these case texts? What
do InQuery’s practices for organization and accessing data objects lend to understandings
of cases and doctnne and the ways they become meaningful? If the u,se of InQueo^ hud no,
been preceded by Uie experiences and findings from utilizing West’s digest and reporters
and Lexis / Nexis to define and collect a doctrinal case collection, then InQuery would have
uncovered similar concerns via its treatment and organization of the data objects. Case
opinions are complicated data objects, with contested meanings produced through complex
inlerpretive functions performed by legal knowledge experts, as well as a raft of other
interested parties. Since InQuery does not incorporate the more interpretive aspecus of that
I unction, and only really deals with the text as it appears, it shows just how significant
knowledge expens are to understandings of cases. InQuery shows that cases are made up
01 a lot of text that could be dicta or ratio, but the only way to know is through knowledge
experts. Doctrinal search terms might just have likely occurred in dicta as not. InQuery
cannot distinguish between. What of doctrine as pan of those understandings? InQuery
shows that phrases which believed to be central to a particular doctrine are associated with a
range of other concepts, some of which may help shape understandings of the basic
domain in which that doctrine works, but just as many, if not more of them, show the
idiosyncratic nature of case opinion writers.
And what of access to cases? Essentially InQuery was cut off before it could be
used tor document retrieval, as this investigation was largely interested in the tools InQuery
uses to help retrieve documents most effectively. Indexing is predicated on the creation of
occurrence and co-occurrence frequency data, those practices only reaffirmed notions that
doctrine, while textually present to varying degrees, is as yet indeterminate in its influence
153
those ohjcus. In short, if coherency lor such a knowledge structure as dwtrine is
sought, Ure lens applied must he wider Uran case.s, i, must include cases for sure, bu, i,
must fiK-us on the manner they are incorporated and proffered in particular knowledge
ba,ses, how their meanings are arranged, and whether those meanings become real in (he
realm ot judges and other social actors.
CHAPTER VIII
doctrine, data, discourse
A. IntrodllPfinn
Docmne has been treated throughout this project as both a clump, or a coliccuon of
data objects, as well as a logic, where parameters of practice and intetprcmtion arc
estahhshed. This chapter concludes that treatment by situating the use of doctrine as data,
both as clump and logic, wiihm traditions of scholarship around courts and law, and then
in an examination of several of law’s information machines.
Realist and formalist public law and
.socio-legal scholarship have divergent notions
of doctrine, this project attempted to strike a middle ground. A formalist framework posits
that doctrine structures basic case management and commentary techniques, and that it is
important to how judges reason, decide, and write case opinions (Carter, 1994;
Levi, 1949). Doctnne as Data shied from such determinism, acknowledging that the
reahstsi were convincing when they suggested doctrine could be fitted to a variety of
outcomes, and that other factors in case disposition and rationalization which arc not readily
identiliable within lormal constructs like precedent and doctrine are likely significant.
The lollowmg explores scholars' use of doctrine as a knowledge structure which
helps provide sense to Judicial decision making and opinion crafting,2as well as one
subject to the constitutive influences of practices of legal information management and
manipulation.3 Doctrine is traditionally expressed relative to judicial opinions, thus opening
^ See K.N. Llewellyn (Llewellyn, 1960) for prototypical realist statement
9
Doctrine, viewed discursively, helps shape a range of institutional actions, standards, legitimate
motions and phrases which constitute a domain of possible outcomes. This is basically Smitli’s discursive
tlieory of doctrine, see Smitli (1994).
Conceptualizations of legal forms have socially constitutive inlluences, shaping beliefs,
relation.ships, expectations, and ultimately behavior pursuant to all tliose tilings (Brigham, 1996). Brigham
also suggests tliat texts, e.g. opinions sustaining tilings like constitutional doctrine?, can be examined
constitutively by studying tlie practices which make tliose texts meaningful to scholars, judges, otliers.
a space for irealing federal appellate case texts as data manifesting doctnne.4 Legttl
scholarship, as well as dcKlrinal and behavioral public law pohtical science, use ihat data,
and doctrine, tn dtst.net ways. This project lakes from all of them, and ulttmately relies on
work of sociolegal scholars who are renewing attention to law's inslt.uitonal product (i.c.
opinions) and practices making them meaningful in a variety of social contexts.
Professional and intellectual traditions as well as information machines and practices
represent several such contexts and have been the subject of this project's analytical
attention.
^Doctrine in the Primary Tradition, of AnaiycSc
1. Understandings of Doctrine and Texts
Scholars with formal and skepticaP understandings of doctrine exalt and dismiss it
respectively. Doctrinal political science and legal scholarship attribute a logical consistency
to doctrinal tormulations, as part of the regular practices of applying rule to fact, and as
determinative of case outcome, as well as shaping the way scholars understand and
organize cases. Realist inspired criticisms of the fluid reasoning used to fit cases to pre-
existing categories, as well as the lack of attention to contradictions or weaknesses in
doctrinal readings of case opinions, cuts against such detemiinism. To the critics doctrine
is considered largely indeterminate, viewed as rhetorical, legitimating, or at worst,
obfuscating of the real influences in case disposition.
The realists and more recent discourse theorists share a skepticism about the textual
determinism urged by formalists, but the realists' reductionist tendency to discount
almost entirely the role of ideas, logic, and language in shaping law blunted the
cntical edge of their work. The realist attempt to simply replace textual determinism
^ For an elaboration see (Berring, 1987: 36), "tlie doctrines of tlie law arc built from findable
pieces of hard data that traditionally have been expressed in tlie form of published judicial decisions. The
point of tlie search is to locate tlie nugget of autliority tliat is out tliere and use it in constructing one's
argument" Berring ( 1994; 45).
^ This formulation of different views of doctrine in scholar.ship is tliat of Smitli (Smitli, 1994).
Jc.crm,nisn, allced ,l,e
,„
From formalism comes this sense lhat docirinc structures very basic case
ntanagemen, and commenta^ techniejues, and that ,t is imporlan, to how judges reason,
deede, and write opinions. Reali.sis sugge.sted doctrine could he fitled to a variety of
outcomes (Llewellyn, 1931) as a construct which, while clearly employed post hoc for
organizational and pedagogical purpo.scs, is also in part a delimiting force on what judges
do in the first place. Doctrine unfolds through the articulation of opinion writers, as well as
iLs application, or attribution, to tho.se opinions by practitioners, information managers and
scholars.
2. Doctrinal Scholarship - A Shared Tradition
Doctrinal study in political science follows the model of formalist legal scholarship
and Its attention to precedent, reasoning, and structures like dicta, ratio decidendi, and
docirinc:
,n,lalin.“i'
understanding doctrine involves extracting a cimccl
Urinal slalcmcnt or lormula Irom the cases and then working out the logical
consequences ol that lormula lor concrete controversies. II' docirinc is understood
in icims ol Its logical consequences, moreover, it presumably should be evaluated in
similai terms This approach to docirinc roughly describes the bulk ol' conventional
constitutional scholarship. (Smith, 1994: 527)
In this view docirinc lacililalcs resolution ol particular controversies in a logical, if
abstracted, way. Clearly this tradition considers judicial opinions rcricclivc of the act ol'
judicial decision making and representing legal authority, opinions arc data for
investigations ol both. Political science has been interested in reasoning expressed in
opinions because that is where judicial politics lay exposed (Carter, 1994: 3). Doctrinal
scholarship focuses on particular phrases which signify a decision making formula, or at
least shape opinion cralting or categorization practices. Doctrinal scholarship adopts an
analytical framework relying on dividing dre corpus of appellate cases into meaningful
categories. The most likely candidates for analysis in public law polihcal science are those
areas m the domain of constitutional law. For works that exam.ne a particular case, or
sequence of cases, which demonstrate doctrinal development or devolution see: Shapiro,
1985; Levinson, 1985; Schuck and Smith. 1985; Alfange, 1983; Bmion, 1983; Downs,
1985. This scholarship strives to unlock those processes, examining how reasoning and
precedent are managed and presented, and often what the appropnate doctrinal path ought
to have been.^
Doclnnal analysis treats constitutional doctrine as an abstraction for a collection of
inieirelaled judicial practices which provide structure to the meaning of cases. Sometimes
doctrinal phrases are explicitly used by judges in opinions, especially when a claim is
raised articulating a particular doctrine. In this style of analysis however doctrine has its
greatest inlluence in the aulhoriialive indexing of cases and the commentary propagating
notions like doctrinal traditions, depanures, and coherence. "Clear and Present Danger,"
"Separate but Equal," "Intra Military Immunity," "Sovereign Immunity," "Plain View,"
Collateral Consequences" are all doctrines created by judges and commentators, caught in
an interpretive relationship that defines both how cases are treated judicially and
analytically. While still practiced, doctrinal analysis and scholarship has waned steadily
since its nadir in the 1950s, this sort of examination originates from strong doctrinal
fomiulations and notions of reasoning and argument.
Philip Bobbit, in his work on different forms of Supreme Court argument
expressed in opinions, posits that "doctrinal argument
. . . asserts principles derived from
precedent or from judicial or academic commentary on precedent" (Bobbit, 1982; 7).
Bobbit divides Supreme Court argument into five essential types corresponding to formal
activities under the umbrella ot the so-called legal model. ^ First, historical arguments (e.g.
6 See Martin Shapiro's assessment of doeuinal publie law (Finifter ,1993).
n
The legal model is a label referring to an explanatory scheme used to describe law by such
ongmal
.ntent" ) are expressed Urrough mterpreUrUons of daur from the Founding period
and aenvtties. Second, textual arguments, or plain meaning of dte words, star, from the
trrelutable power of words in the Constitution and the.r posit, vis, meantngs. Thi,d.
structural argument is based on the expressed or agreed upon state structures and
’
relattonshtps derived from the Const.tution, Fourth, prudential argument, appears as a
catch-all category, where decisions, or portions thereof, are made on grounds other than
the previous three, and are likely interpreted as tnstitutionally self preservationist or
expansionisfS Doctrinal argument is the final categoty, describing rhetoric or
rationalisation utilizing a precedenttal trail, replete with constitutive abstractions, knowledge
structures, and practices like standards of review and balancing tests.
Case opinions are obviously data in doctrinal analysis, but it is opinions as Otcy are
mapped onto the categorized terrain of constitutional law. That categonzation is a formalist
activity, and it shapes how scholars and practitioners understand and utilize ca,scs.
Mapping IS done by acts of interpretation and commentary relative to established categories,
It IS just that some of those acts, like that of leading legal scholars. West publishing editors,
and judges themselves weigh more heavily on assigning a cases doctrinal place, thus
Structuring the meaning of both doctrine and cases.
For Bobbit’s tormulation to work doctrine needs to be understood as a fairly
narrow abstraction, as a word or phrase which represents some set of practices and
standards to police case domains and affect their expressed outcomes. However, practices
ot interpreting and applying plain meanings and original intentions might also be described
doctrinally. It doctrine is simply considered an abstracted element of judicial practice and
expression, then whether inspired by words in the constitution or a long history of
practices as reasoning from precedent, stare decisis, and doctrinal argument. The attitudinal scholars of
public law political science deride tlie legal model and die formalisms undergirding it as non-explanatory of
judicial behavior, it provides tliem tlieir foil.
O
Bobbit speaks of tiie decisions manifesting die so-called "sift in dme" of die Roosevelt era court
as being prudent arguments.
. .diat is, die argument of the decision supports die stability of die institution,
mid maybe die polity generally.
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mlcrpreting those words should not matter. Bobhit suggests as much, saying tha, doctrinal
iirgument wss susUiincd in, "nrcccdent in'^iitiitir-moi ^ •1
,
pi tuem, institutional doctnne, and doctrines of
construction" (Bobbit, 1982: 47).
Bobhit shows that there is a set of knowledge structures and practices that
correspond to doctrine. An accepted history exi.sts tying together or defining a body of
ca,ses under the tree exercise banner, and doctrine is important therein. This despite the
existence of many types of argumenLs and fact patterns in that collection, and skepticism as
to whether opinions really matter in understanding why judges do what they do.
3. Attitudes, Behaviors, and Databases
Doctrinal analysis and perspectives reign supreme in legal education and
scholarship generally. Political science though has developed different lenses through
which to view judges and courts. Behavioral studies of judicial decisions suggest that
attitudinal charactenstics and ideological orientations of Judges are largely determinative of
their case votes, and that opinions are nothing more than a rationalization of those votes.^
Behaviorist work has at its root a realist view of judges as ideological actors, driven by
policy preterences rather than archaic notions^^Mike fidelity to practices such as legal
reasoning, lormal rule application, and doctrines such as stare decisis.^ Realism and its
See Harold SpaeUi's piece in die Spring 1996 Law and Courts Newsletter of die American
Political Science Association responding to Mardn Shapiro's survey of Public Law and Judicial Politics in
(Finilter, 1993). Spaedi vehemendy oppo.ses Shapiro’s suggestion diat public law pay more attention to die
words of judges, to die language of courts. Spaedi poses:
And why, we are indignantly asked, have we not returned to uakiiig constitudonal language seriously? The
answer seems patendy obvious to anyone even remotely connected to reality: because die justices
diemselves do not, anymore diari dieir brediren on lower courts, (pp. 12)
This may be called legal formalism or die legal model (Segal and Spaedi, 1993).
^
^ See work (Brenner and Spaedi, 1995), which attempts to probe die innuence of die legjil
model's stalwart, precedent in die ultimate decisions by justices of die Court. The tide of dieir work, Suire
Indecisis is a very good indicator of dieir contended findings, diat precedent matters litde to decisions, its
atdtudes and values diat matter.
progeny is atlnbuteU wim a skeptical view of docnine, one which largely sees diKhrinc as a
component ,n the post hoc rationalization of dec.sions l.kely made on aiutudinal grounds.
Based in realist theories, behavioralists claim to study judges and couas
scientifically. Rather than studying judictal poliUcs d,rough a traditional legal formalist or
other more interpretivist lenses, polittcal scientists began coding cases and counting votes.
Doctrine as a knowledge structure was not jettisoned completely however with the
repudiation of legal formalism. Instead doctrine was reduced to some basic fomis,
behavioral political science continued to use it occasionally to code cases according to "legal
provision," "authority for decision." and "issue area."i2 The other formulation is the more
common, and represenLs long standing judicial practices like ".stare decisis," However,
behavioral work did not have a place in their models for stare decisis or its cousins, in fact
stare decisis is incorporated only through coded variables for "precedent altered" or the
like. Neither formulation though typically includes nounphrases'^such as “compelling
state interests” which represent narrow practices within domains like free exercise law.
The exploration, or incorporation as codable data, of these specific nounphrases would
require a deeper level ol textual analysis than the behavioral effort attempts.
Common aceounts ot the history ol behavioral studies of judges and their deeisions
begin with C.H. Pritchett's The Roosevelt Conn (Pritchett, 1948). This work is credited
with devising an essential perspective of behavioralism, one which tracks and interprets
votes of justices, albeit in blocs, against a scale of liberal and conservative positions in
particular areas ot law. While Pritchett declined to move beyond mapping votes and
ideology to a theory of decisions, he provided impetus to a generation of scholars who took
1
^
See Spaeth's Supreme Court Database Documentation, Fourtli ICPSR Release, May 1993, pp.
41-58. Specifically Uiese represent fields in records of tlie database which can be searched on
1 O
- Nounphrases are just tliat, a collection of terms which are comprised largely of nouns iuid
adjectives, subsequent chapters will discuss how such plirases have been suggested as being most significant
in tlie determination of meaning in a text collection.
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lhal step. In a sense behav.oral.sm suggests that the map, and a plethora of new more
detailed ones, is the territory ofexplanaUon for judicitU actions,
Suhsequently many facets of legal phenomena and practices slip through then
collective fingers, relegating detailed study of opinions to those too slow or stubborn to
accept the sense of the attitudinal model.ia Doctrine as a specific knowledge structure
which signifies a legal practice or test in the disposition of cases, was largely left out of
Pritchett's work, however the categorizations of liberal and conservative, not to mention
the dtvision of areas of law would continue to depend on abstractions that arguably have
doctrinal dimensions.
Incorporating scholarship by psychologist Clyde Coombs (Coombs, 1964) political
scientist Glendon Schubert articulated a model where Pritchett stopped (Schubert, 1965).
Using a scaled continuum of ideologies (i.e. from liberal to conservative) Schubert
contended that cases could be placed on this continuum based on a codingis of their
Ideological content. Judges are then placed on it depending on their perceived or accepted
Ideology; the catch was that these attitudes were being derived from judicial behavior while
at the same time being suggested as an explanation for that behavior. 16 ideally though,
once you constructed your continuum, and mapped the judges' so called i-points onto it.
new cases could also be mapped onto it by assigning their "J-points," analysis could move
forward. No longer would this work provide just a highly coded picture of events but it
could have predictive potential. Doctrine has a less than central place in this work.
14 Altitudinal model is die pre-eminent conceptualization of behavioral work in public law /judicial politics. Interestingly, Segal and Spaeth m the Attitudinal Model were very adamant about die
lack of utility of die so called legal model for making sense of judicial decisions, claiming die auUioriuiUve
high ground for dieir model to die exclusion of die legal model. In a sub.sequent work, ( i.e.
Brenner./Spaedi, (1995)) Spaedi appears to have backed off diat dichotomous view, suggesting diat die
attitudinal model, while good at representing die decision making process is not, and cannot be, completely
explanatory. This caveat however neglects to speculate on die proportion of explanation die atdtudinal
model possess, and conversely how much die legal model might contain.
' Coding refers to die interpretations ol case profiles against Uiis ideological scale, ca.ses are
scaled reladve to odier cases which are coded into a defined subject space or legal issue domain.
16 Schubert recognizes diis in a later work (Schubert, 1974: xii).
occasionally providing coders with knowledge
subject areas and keys to assigning liberal and
structures lor the categori/alion ol' legal
conservative positions vis-a-vis those areas.
Specilic judicial practices like balancing ol interests (e.g. strict scrutiny analysis and
compelling Interest standards) arc conspicuously ab.sent from these codtng schemes,
slipping through an analytical niter unconcerned with things like doctrine.
Behavioral scholarship moved heyond the straight ideological mapping ol' judges
and ca.scs to a more nuanced approach at modeling judicial decision making. The work ol
Rohde and Spaeth (Rohde and Spaeth. 1976) is predicated on the theoiy that political
decisions, namely of the Supreme Court, are largely a function of the policy preferences of
decision makers, institutional rule structures, and the situations in which tho.se decisions
are made. The rule structures can he both formal and informal, though Rohde and SpacUi
.seem to locus on the formal rules of Court constitution and procedure which support the
theory that policy preferences arc most determinative in the discretion laden cnvironmcni of
the Court. 1 7 It is also plausible to suggest that informal rule structures in Rohde and
Spaeth's conceptualization facilitate dcKtrincs like compelling state intcresLs, and they too
have a dclcrminalivc ellcct on altitudinal factors being opcrationali/cd.
Ol central concern however arc the Justices' preferences manifested through the
constructs bcliel, altitude," "and value." Rohde and Spaeth suggest that these
construcLs arc independent variables in the determination of the dependent variable
decision. They consider attitudes the key unit of operationalization in their model, and
contend attitudes arc relatively enduring collections ol beliefs about an object and
situation. 18 Values in turn arc an "interrelated set of attitudes" (Rohde and Spaeth, 1976:
77). These construcLs arc determinative of behavior when combined with particular social
1 7
For example Uie Coirslitulion's provisions which provide for life tenure, no electoral
accountability, and a relatively narrow jurisdiction which has been essentitilly reduced to wholly
discretiomuy writs of certiorju-i (for a discussion of tliis see Perry (1991).
in
An object in tliis model is genertdly a person, institution, place, or thing; a situation is the
context witliin which tlie decision nuikcr eonfronts tlie object.
and inslitudonal objecLs and siluations. Altitudinal objecLs arc described as tndtviduals,
groups, or corporations before the Court, tdenttfied by their social roles and those assigned
cm in judicial proceedings. Clearly there arc lormal and informal institutional rules which
provide for determining the domains of objects which can come before the court. Some of
those rules or practices might be considered doctrinal, but for purptxscs of this study it is
the .so-called atiiiudinal
.situation that seems mo.sl likely to be doctrinally
.significant.
Rohde and Spaeth identify altitudinal situations as the "dominant legal issue in the
ca.se" (Rohde and Spaeth, 1976: 77). Siluations include, but are not exclusive to: abortion
legislauon, search and seizure and electronic eavesdropping, voluntariness of confession,
comity, harmlul beliefs or ideas, privacy, mootness, religious freedom, sit-in
demonstrations, and the right to vote. They range from situations defined by clauses in the
Constitution to very context specific situations (e.g. sit in demonstrations as an indicator of
events when this book was written in the 1960's). Attitudmal situations represent a high
level of abstraction, that is they are attributed to cases wholesale, allegedly capturing the
essence ol the case belore them. In some cases then attitudinal situations could be derived
Irom things like doctrines and tests, but they become subsumed, finding little overt
expression in the proffered situations.
Contemporary behavioral work continues the basic Rohde and Spaeth project, with
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Segal and Spaeth, 1993) and Brenner and Stare
Mecisis (Brenner and Spaeth, 1995) the most notable efforts. However, incorporating
concerns lor the circularity critique ol early ellorLs (discussed above with respect to
Schubert) these works attempt to be predictive, with Stare Indecisis attempting to find
attitudinal indicators from sources other than the judicial votes to be explained. This work
holds "that justices make decisions by considering the facts of the case in light of their
ideological attitudes and values" (Segal and Spaeth, 1993; 73). Thus their project becomes
an exercise in representing cases by their constituent facts, determining ideological
19 Facts can be inlcrpreted (e.g. legal provision) or can be claimed more objective (i.e. names).
positions vis-a-vis the decision space for those cases, and analyzing judges decisions
against those positions and relative to different fact patterns. Like legal formalism this
model views facts as independent variables to the decision, hut unlike formalism which
then goes on to suggest that things like precedent, plain meaning, intent, and balancing of
interests are also determinative, the attitudinal perspective turns to the Justices' values for
decision explanation.
To facilitate this Harold Spaeth constructed the Supreme Court Database, a
searchable collection of computer records containing the coded representations of cases
Irom the 1950s to the near present. The database is composed of records, each of which
corresponds to a Supreme Court case opinion. Records in turn are constructed of a series
ol variables (fields) which are coded to represent so-called case facts, these correspond to
six essential characteristics of a case: 1) identification variables - e.g. citations and docket
numbers; 2) background variables - e.g. how the Court took jurisdiction, origin and
source ot case, the reason the Court granted cert; 3) chronological variables - e.g. date of
decision, term of Court, natural court; 4) substantive variables - e.g. legal provisions,
issues, direction of decision; 5) outcome variables
-e.g. disposition of case, winning
party, formal alteration of precedent, declaration of unconstitutionality; 6) voting and
opinion variables - e.g. how individual justices votes, their opinions and interagreements,
the direction of their votes.
These variables are constructed by coders, that is, variables are filled in by
individuals evaluating the case before them. Some of that evaluation is objective in that
most researchers would agree to that variables existence and value (e.g. docket number).
However, some of them are less objective, and require interpretation by the coder. For
example, coding a case for substantive variables such as "legal provision," "issues," or
"decision direction" require a coder to definitively establish a discrete value for something
that may have several contenders for leading role.
The database allows for the examination of votes by querying on specific
tndependent vanable patterns. For tnstance. one can analyze decisions (e.g. percentage
overturned or upheld) coded for a variety of characteristics in search and
.seizure ca.ses (e.g.
where the search was tncident to a valid arrest and lacking a warrant or pursuant to a valid
watrant). Scholars are then able to dev.se nuanced queries of the databa.se to tty and tea.se
out decision and vote patterns based on a variety of coded independent variables.
However, never are scholars able to move beyond the coding
.schema that has been
consu-ucted as a representat.on of a large collecuon of opinions, the text of Ute opinions
remain beyond the reach of the database and its analytical power, and .scholars must have
tailh that the distance is ct^vered effectively by that schema.
Doctrine is relatively ignored in the database and the work that goes on around it,
however the construction of several variables in the database imply the existence of
structures and/or practices which have doctrinal connections. Specifically, the "substantive
variables" of "legal provisions considered by the Court," "authonty for decision," "issue,"
and issue area" arc all potential sites for the influence of that thing called doctrine. Again it
should be noted that never does the attitudinal work come down to a lower level of
abstraction and deal with specific judicial practices which are manifested in opinions, such
as balancing tests or doctrines, but this work does maintain a level of operation dependent
on ordering knowledge structures, some of those may be considered doctrinal.
To identify the legal provision at issue the coders sought authority, determining the
provision by consulting the summary of cases in the U.S. Reports. At this level coding
was basically a duplication of the Reports summary, and for the most part the values coded
were known as constitutional clauses, statutory provisions. Court rules, or practices and
constructs, all of which conceivably could be considered doctrinal. Doctrines explicitly
included in the 1993 version of the database were the "Abstention doctrine," "retroactive
application of a constitutional right," the "exclusionary rule," "harmless error,"
"res judicata," and "estoppel." Largely however doctrine,
expressly incorporated in the database.
as in compelling interests, is not
Behavioral Public law political science makes docinne a largely underulili/cd
independent variable. This scholarship pays attention to judges written words lor
categorization, but this may be accomplished without a complete accounting ot an opinion,
behavioral coding also uses the most abstract notions of doclrine. Due to criticisms of
doctrine's indeterminacy and fluidity, behavioralism is generally
.skeptical ofdocuine's
signilicance to judicial decisions. Given this one would expect doctrine to be relegated to a
few naive d.scu,ssions of doctnnal legal scholars. The paradox however is that .scholars
and pracmtoners, who are privy to scholarship which denies doctrine's importance, still
leach and wnte ,n its terms. As skeptics decry doctrine's use for understanding judicial
decision making, and the formalists neglect to always critically examine the words of
opinions to make sure a doctrinal label can stick, there is a sense that doctrine
.still matters.
C. The Sense and Shape of Doctrine
1. Discursive Constituting
A constitutive analysis ot doctrine and case opinions examines ways those objects
become meaningful, some of those ways are manifested in information machines and their
practices of organization, categorization, access, and ultimately information retrieval.
Constitutive socio-legal study (Brigham, 1996; Brigham, 1987; White, 1990) examines
how law and its forms become meaningful through social practices which give them
palpable substance. Resulting social contexts, and individuals' beliefs, attitudes, and
actions thus constitute law's forms and structures. Brigham suggests that constitutional
concepts and provisions are constituted, made meaningful, through social and political
interests as they organize and act relative to authoritative understandings of those concepts
and provisions. Law's meaning is manifested in action and belief, in discourses where
individuals or groups are attempting to contest or reaffirm authoritative understandings for
social, institutional, or political ends. A significant part oflcgal discourse, data for
understanding, are knowledge structures like doctrine helping make sense of objects like
cases.
Treating law as a discourse, as "a system of linguistic and nonlinguistic modes of
categorization, evaluation, and transmission of meanings, implies a significant role for case
opinions and doctnne" (Davies, 1996: 43). These modes span contexts, operating within
appellate couns and the legal profession, and finding expression in socieiy and poliiics
more generally.20 Law signifies practices such as the application of codes, statutes, and
rules in case disposition and opinion crafting. It also mlluences interests, community
groups, perceptions and behaviors which socially mediate institutionalized law.
It is important to note that legal discourse is not just the formal rules of the eame of!^Syr ursSrs
Discourses are constrained, or enabled?, by practices for manipulating knowledge
structures around particular events or contexts (e.g. cases) (Brigham, 1978). Margaret
Davies suggests that discourse norms (e.g. principles, doctrines, or rules) are the law's
currency, that norms categorize and construct "facts" and "actions," making them
meaningful, creating official stories (Davies, 1996: 52). Doctrine as norm enables
descriptions of legal events through categorizing and ordering. Norms are also prescnptive
as those categorizations shape how actions are socially and legally interpreted and reacted
to.
In this work compelling state interests is an analytical subject for probing the
practices which make knowledge structures like doctrine meaningful. A discursive
approach to doctrine posits that it is a structure which can be argued over, pushed and
See for example how Uie compelling interest doctrine, or standard, or test, found its way to die
political arena of Congress after Smitli
.
and tlien how various .social interests lined up for and against die
re-articulation of compelling interests as proposed by Congress.
pulled, and re-arUcula.ed u, man.l'est judicial change or discrecion. Doclrinc may take
several form,s within op.nions, each fom,
.stmctunng understandings and expectations
about what practtces and standards are sensible tn reaching, or at least rat.onaliWng
decisions.
2. Doctrinal Opinions as Part of Law’s Forms
Judges arc the most significant individuals in the practices around knowing and
using the compelling state interest doctrine. Scholarship (Brisbin, 1993; Kessler, 1993;
O’Niell, 1981:631) which explores the relationship between the social phenomena of nghts
and Supreme Court opinions suggests that doctrine not only inllucnccs Judges m their
decisions and opinions, but also inlluences how individuals and groups know and
approach law ouUsidc of specific cases or courts (Brigham, 1987). Doctrine gives rise to
particular understandings of legal situations and creates opportunities for actions.2l li is
mtcrsubjcctivc, yet imbued with a sense of objectivity through the mediation of written
words22and legal institutions. The authoritative texts of appellate courts contain the
primary sources of law used to delineate social and political contcxts.23
nnu .re.
OB.uT, 1990; Gcerty., 1983) which argues Uial law and legal
u idcrstandings / practices can, and do, contribute to particular social realities, AND that laws doing tlie
consutuling and regulating are mulufaceted, wiUi a variety of sources luid histories, luid different normative
Junctures applications, actors, prescriptions (See Law and Society scholarship on LegiU Pluralism ( e gMerry
,
1990; de Sousa Santos, 1987)).
• & ' K-
22 See Walter Ong's discussion of how writing transformed cognitive luid epistemic faculties luid
ulumately altered the tiling being written about (Ong, 1986)
23 These contexts may be viewed as social texts, A text is constituted by any meaningful action,
which writing is only one example.
.
. interpretive social scientists have long believed tliat imy bounded
activity tliat raises questions of meaning can be considered a text. What is tlieoretically interesting about
texts is tliat tlicy raise tlie question of multiple meanings, and it is in how one chooses among these
multiple meanings tliat hermeneutic tlieories of different sorts reveal tlieir tlieoretical edge. (Scheppele
1988:87)
’
Also, In essence, tlie social construction model places emphasis on tlie primacy of language and
all of Uie social processes by which Uuiguage develops luid is used. Those tilings we call knowledge,
reality, or facts, are viewed as community-generated linguistic entities tliat lae constitutive of the
communities tliat generate tliem (Barrett 1989: xiv).
Op.n.ons are employed by state and private actors, omc.alty and intormally, to
shape the spaces of American political and social acuon (Sche.ngold, 1974: xi; McCann.
1994: 6). Atienrion to docinne, a sign.fieanl stmcture in the "mandarin" materials of law
udy, IS an assertion that judicial politics is conceptually expressed there (Gordon, 1984)
Gordon argues that legal forms and practices are the results of political processes, and as
arise from the struggles ot conflicting social groups" (Gordon, 1984: 101),
Stopping short of claiming law's forms as purely instrumental results of those conflicts,
Gordon suggests that forms often provide for brakes or resistance to the instrumental
changes of politics.24 Theories of law's relative autonomy pick up this line of thought,
moving beyond both Marxist and behavioral claims of laws instrumentality, positing that
law's forms have an institutional quality that at least partially transcend the politics out of
which they emerge. (Brigham, 1990: introduction; Thompson, 1975; Hay, 1975).
Law furnishes American politics with important symbols of legitimacy like cases
and doctrine, these m turn reflect values which may be the building blocks of political
Ideology (Scheingold, 1974: 13). Symbols and the practices of access and understanding
which connect them are "the products of long evolving historical struggles in which some
interests, groups, norms have tended to prevail" (McCann, 1994: 9). By examining
practices of organizing, indexing, and accessing case opinions around doctrine in a narrow
domain we can also perhaps explore how those symbols evolve and shape legal
conceptualizations.
D. Concltisinn
Ellorts to define a doctrinal profile, execute searches in computer and hard bound
digest / reporter environments, and collect target case opinion texts showed that compelling
See discussion of die tensions between formal rationality of law (and its attendant legitimacy)
and tlie desire of political elites to maintain order and tlie status quo (Balbus, 1937). His work was an early
socio-legal assertion of laws relative autonomy (see also (Hay, 1975) ) in tlie movement away from
structuralist Marxism (at its most radical) and social scientific beliavioralism (at a more mcxlerate level).
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.meres, doctrine was no. fixed or eas.ly quantifiable in Utosc n.ach.nes, Doc.nne became
less sure wrU. each step of definition and discovery, and ultimalely forced a re-exam,nation
of what was being asked ol each machine, and the manner in which data objects arc
indexed and accessed. Asking information systems to produce the desired docurnal data
made it necessary to examine doctrine itself, and how tho.se systems structure
.storage of.
and access to, the cases which arguably manifest doctrine. With each step (i.e. definition,
discovery, acquisition, and ultimately InQuery analysis) the Uting doctrine and the case
opinions themselves acquired, and lost, meaningful attributes from that manipulation.
Compelling interest doctfine is a relatively low level rule or principle for judges and
lawyers in the contests of constitutional law, despite that relative "low level" it is an
abstraction which is extremely difficult to sustain in an information machine. That to ask
either a lull text or hard bound digest and reporter system to present a collection of
doctrinally related cases is difficult. Compelling interest doctrine slips through the editorial
and indexing filters, while proffered as significant to case outcome in the area of free
exercise law, as the ratio decidendi, it was not sustained in those systems as a categorizing
attribute of the data objects, but rather was subsumed under some other indexing
characteristics. The structure of the data object, and the different textual representations of
the target doctrine, made it ditticult to create a sufficiently robust search profile so as to
capture as many of the relevant cases as possible.
1. Lexis / Nexis
False positives, those data objects hit appropriately when executing a search, but
not on point concerning compelling interests in tree exercise, highlighted the importance
of dicta and authoritative understandings of free exercise case law. Full text searches of
documents like case opinions are going to treat all terms and phrases similarly. Full text
machines cannot distinguish between dicta and the determinative text of the decision.
Doctrinal terms and phrases are just as likely to occur in dicta as not. The textual presence
171
Ot compelling interests is easily ascertainable (taking into account synonyms), but
determining which doctrine is most signifieant because of its presence in the ratio decidendi
depends on more interpretation than a full text machine can provide.
Standing back and reflecting on this shows that the notion of compelling interest
doctrine was well established prior to defining a search profile, that a doctrinal profile was
already established by exposure to second hand knowledge proffered by knowledge
experts in law and education. From that it was known what sorts of cases ought to be
outside the set of cases manifesting the compelling state interests doctrine in free exercise
law even before executing searches based on textual characteristics. And even in some
cases where the search profile was satisfied, the "hit" document was not “on point” because
it did not indicate that the compelling interests doctrine was determinative. Notions of what
constitute determinative text, whether a doctrine is active in that determination, and the
concept ot on point are sustained in the knowledge bases and interpretive practices of
knowledge experts. Full text systems do not, cannot, index on such notions if they are not
correlated in textual occurrences or patterns. Scholars and practitioners can relatively easily
ascertain when a case meets that sort of criteria, a machine is challenged.
Doctrinal synonyms for a complex expression (i.e. compelling state interests) posed
a significant dilemma as well. By randomly sampling free exercise cases returned with a
wide open Lexis / Nexis search (e.g. all cases with the phrase free exercise and between
1 963 and the present) it became clear that there were other ways to express the balancing of
interests implied by compelling interest doctrine (e.g. compelling government interests,
overriding government interests, overriding state interests, interests of highest order,
compelling justification for imposing this burden). Full text is devoid of the fuzzy logic
with which human readers and editors make sense of data collections, people can relatively
easily determine when a data object is related to a expressed information need when trained
in a case-based fashion.
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While dissaiisfied with Lexis / Nexis as a tool to identify a doctrinal collection of
cases 11 proves excellent for acquiring cases already identified as useful, as well as for
searching for a specific case or a group of cases tied together by things like opinion writer,
date range, participants, or even the presence of certain terms and phrases (c.g. religion).
2
. West
Like lull-text Lexis / Nexis the West hardbound digest and reporter system did not
support a straightlorward detinition and identification of the relevant cases. West Digests
are indexed by subject areas, with ever decreasing levels of abstraction in each subject area.
Compelling interests in Free Exercise law is not manifested in one of those levels, it
thcretore must either exist within one subject area / keynumber or is spread across two or
more ol them depending upon the characteristics of the cases and how they intersect West’s
categorization scheme.
By utilizing expert knowledge which defined paradigmatic cases of compelling
interests in tree exercise^^ it was possible to locate one basic area in the digests where the
desired cases reside. West's inclusion of headnotes and keynumbers act as identifiers and
pointers, theretore the paradigmatic cases pointed back to the digest categories where
similar cases could be found. Following those pointers a region in the West Digest was
located in which to search for the target cases. At that point however the researcher had to
manually process the digest entries, screening for Free Exercise first, then looking for
signs of a balancing ol interests which would either explicitly mention compelling interests
or imply their incorporation in the ratio of the case. This act injected significant inlluences
Irom second hand knowledge, i.e. expert knowledge derived bias in the selecting of
possible cases for the data set. Cases identified still had to be examined however to
determine whether the compelling interests doctrine was actually present and was part of
the decisional mix.
25 See discussion in Chapter 6 which discusses tliese.
Notions of compelling interest doctrine were largely unalTecled by West. It is
possible that the doctrine was undercut by not being included in the subject area categories,
and thus being subsumed in another category. However, one could also po.sit that
.since the
compelling interest cases resided within one category (i.e. Religious Liberty) that West did
m fact help re-affimi that doctrine's meaning. Also, the language of compelling interests
did show up considerably in the digest case blurbs, thus further affirming the dwtrine's
importance. Like Lexis / Nexis however doctrine's meaning pre-dated the systems to
manage case opinions, and the existence of that doctrine was not specifically part of the
organizational scheme of them. Neither West or Lexis / Nexis were able to capture the
cases manifesting the doctrine without significant expert knowledge, thus doctrine's
meaning as a significant delimiter of judicial decision making in a particular area of law may
be shaken.
As a basic finding, it became clear that doctrine such as compelling interests reside,
or are largely constructed, through inteipretive communities in and around federal appellate
courts, working with judicial opinions. Doctrine exists more in the minds of practitioners
and scholars of law; the full text machines performed poorly at capturing data that could
reasonably be said to represent the target doctrinal space. West performed better but
required significant human investment. Without heavy editing and tweaking by system
users it is difficult for full-text or hard bound systems to provide a satisfactory set.
3. InQuery
Experience with Lexis / Nexis and West showed doctrine to be a fluid knowledge
structure, and that use ol those machines to define, discover, and acquire cases manifesting
it was challenged without significant input from expert knowledge. Nevertheless, InQuery
represented a new set of practices with which to manipulate case opinions, the data objects
most tied to doctrine.
InQucry was slill used t„ expose die concepiual eontcnl ol a colicclion ol cases
delimited by compelling interest docuine. That delimiting is based in textual content as well
as editorial structuring of West and the knowledgeable searching of a researcher. Textual
markers of the cases tuc limited to the phrase "compelling stale interests" and "rrec
exercise" and synonyms thereoT InOtieiy was Itirned loose on the collection, which had
been divided into two groups, corresponding to ca.ses where the compelling interests were
prc,sent and superior and tho.se where the claims of free exerci.se violation triumphed.
.Some basic di.stinctions in the conceptual patterns
.seemed to appear, with the ba.sic
dillcrcncc being that ca.ses where compelling interests prevailed tended to locus aiotind the
supremacy of concepts representing Icdcral law and policy. Opinion writers also phra.scd
thc.se ca.scs in terms ol' "exemptions" I'roiii iho.se policies, making a rhetorical play lor
pai lictilar meaning, i.c. that the policy is the norm or dcl'ault, and the claims vis-a-vis that
policy are .seeking exceptional ireatnicni Irom that norm. Ca.ses where the interests ol' .state
were less than compelling tended to I'octis on "children" and "education", and where liKal
law was at issues. Rhetorically, opinion writers u.sed the language ol' "beliel's" and
liccdom more readily than the other .set, establi.shing another range ol' cxpcctalions and
understandings.
These sorts ol lindings lend to re-atlirni existing knowledge about eompelling
interest doctrine, and likely could have been determined with a less robust machine lor
analysis. Since the corpus is relatively small it would have been possible to make similar
observations by reading each and keeping track. But InQucry shows other concepts and
distinctions between them that might not be so obvious, and more importantly it opens up
new possibilities lor case text analysis and manipulation lor larger databases. This is all the
more significant in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in the Spring of '99 to let
stand (i.c. declined to hear the case) a lower court decision which established that West did
not own the content of case opinions, aside from their editorial value added of course.
New markets arc opening, systems like InQuciy arc likely candidates for organizing and
making sense of the growing mass of case opinions.
With the real prospects for a dramatically changing legal information market
InQuery, or similar products, may offer practitioners and scholars new tools to categorize
and structure access to law’s data. It is very likely that these tools will sustain new
understandings ot that data, as well as undercut existing knowledge bases. Existing
knowledge bases and their human facilitators though will also influence the way new
systems are brought on line, and ultimately will structure the influence these new tools
have. It IS impossible tor new tools to simply exist, in a context free manner with no
relation to the world they enter, they come into being as part of a tradition of information
manipulation and knowledge traditions. Whether new tools supplant the old remains to be
seen, the primary players are still extremely well positioned and powerful, yet there is
dissent and dissatisfaction, and those forces often move markets and their entrants in new
directions.
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APPENDIX A
LEXIS / NEXIS QUERIES
Query 1: (compell! w/2 interest) w/3 (state or government)
many thousands of hits, and rightly so, as it is going to null all
renSsl^Iifi
doctrine. Many false positives ( i.e. returned cases that did notpresent a case where a free exercise balancing tests was applied, that were "on point").
subsequent action: Narrowed this query by adding "and (free exercise) and (first
amendment) and (religion)," but still had over 600 hits, again the query will pull cases
which just mention free exercise. First Amendment, Religion, and a combination of
compelling state or government interests in close proximity.
Query 2 : free exercise and date > 1962 -> over 4000 hits
and (compelling w/2 interest) -> 936 hits
results: These pulled too many, considerable false positives. These attempted to
use date as a floor, since the Supreme Court did not start using compelling state interest
in religious free exercise until then, but again it will hit on cases where compelling state
interest is mentioned but not acted on, or in merely a discussion context (i.e. dicta), not
working with it (i.e. ratio decidendi). For example, it will pull Establishment cases that
merely talk about tree exercise as another area of First Amendment doctrine.
subsequent action: Narrow further by requiring state or government interesLs to
be present.
Query 3: (free exercise and date > 1962) and ((compelling w/2 interest) w/3 (state or
government)) -> 708 hits
results: Many false positives result.
subsequent action: Took new path, forget date for now, just try to narrow around
the doctrinal phrase.
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raSe anSgfdn)"® compelling governmenc interest) and (free
discussinns“Irf
*is makes sense because so many
mSTot the I sHmen®! ‘ «’">*‘ilcli™al areas, and the mereention ot 1 t Amendment application of it will trigger a hit.
action: Try to peel off specific groups of false positives trv to
rdmte'daL1ac“ ofZgfr''''*™*
Query 5: (compelling government interest or compelling state interest w/40 free
(compelling government interest or compelling slate interest
w/lO establishment) -> 307 hits, note: 14 of these were Supreme Court cases while 97
were federal circuit cases
results: Added the "and not" to skim off hits which CSI or CGI occurred, but that
was concerned with Establishment rather than free exercise. The use of not is
problematic because now some false positives are eliminated, but also very likely those
true positives which as a matter of dicta discuss Establishment and compelling state
M
missed "overriding government interest" in U.S. v. Lee 455 U.S. 252
0982), and case opinions with "compelling state interest or compelling government
(e.g. Lyng V. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Assn .
1 U8 o. Ct 1319 (1988)).
subsequent action: Turn to West editors and the agents of legal information
authority.
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appendix b
DATA SET
Cases where individual claims supercede state interests (LOSE)
of Education, Escambia CouiiE' Ala.. 880 F 2d SOS (1989^Callahan v. Woods. 658 F. 2d 679 ( 1981)
(
Callahan v. Woods. 736 F. 2d 1269 (1984)
Ch^choftheLukiimiBalmluAyev.Cit^ud^ H3S Cl 2217 M 99 S^Edwards v. Maryland State Fairs. 628 F. 2d 282 ( 1980).
' • Lt. 1 7 ( 1 993).
airfax Covenant Church v. Fairfaz City School. 17 F. 3d 703 (1994)Ferguson v. IRS. 921 F. 2d 588 (1991).
^ozee V. Illinois Dept ofEmployernent & Securin’. 101 S. Ct 1514 (1989)Hohhie v. Unemployement Appeals Commission. 107 S. 01 ! 1046 1987)
nternational Socien for Krishna Consciousness v. Barger. 650 F. 2d 430 (1981)
Islnmi ^ Consciousness v. Bowen. 600 F. 2d 667 (1979)'/i/rtw/6 Center ofMississippi v. Starkville, Mississippi. 840 F 2d 293 (1988)McCurry v. Tesch. 738 F. 2d 271(1984) ^
McDaniel y. Pan. 98 S. Ct. 1322 (1978).
Mozert y. Hawkins County Public Schools. 765 F. 2d 75 (1985).
^ozert V. Hawkins Coimn Board of Education. 827 F 2d (1987)
Northwest Indian Cemetary Protection Associatioin v. Peterson. 795 F. 2d 688 (1985)Peyote Way Church of God y. Smith. 742 F 2d 193 (1984)
^ ’
Quaring V. Peterson
. 728 F. 2d 1 121(1984).
Salvation Army v. Department of Communin Affairs, N.J 919 F 2d 183 (1990)Society of Separationists y. Herman. 939 F. '2d 1207 (1991)
Spence v. Bailey. 465 F. 2d 797 (1972).
Thomas V. Review Board of Indiana Employment Division. 101 S Ct 1425 (1981)
Wisconsin y. Yoder. 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
^ '
Yonkers Raceway y. Cin of Yonkers. 858 F. 2d 855 (1988)
Yott y. Rockwell. 501 F. 2d398 (1974).
Prison 1 (PIL)
Barnett v. Rodgers
Brown v. Peyton.
Jihaadv. O’brien.
Neal V. Georgia.
Walker v. Mintzes.
Yevgen y. Scully.
410 F. 2d 995 (1969).
437 F. 2d 1228 (1971)
645 F. 2d 556 (1981).
469 F. 2d 446 (1972).
771 F. 2d 227 (1985).
817 F. 2d 227 (1987).
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635 F. 2d 971 (1980).
Cases where state interests prevailed over individual claims (WIN)
Alexander V. Boston University. 766 F. 2d 630 (1985)American Friends Service Commission v. Thornburgh 941 F 2d 80R f iQonAmerican Fnend.^ Serv,ce Commission v. Thornb rfh: % F 2d M05 1W2)Austin V. Berryman. 878 F. 2d 786 (1989). ^ ^ r. zu u^i).
Badoni v. Higginson. 638 F. 2d 172 (1980)
Ballinger v. IRS
. 728 F. 2d 1287 (1984).
Baz V. Walters. 782 F. 2d 701(1986).
Bethel Baptist Church v. U.S
. 822 F. 2d 1334 (1987)Bob Jones University v. U.S. 103 S. Ct 2017 (1983)
Borgeson v. U.S. 757 F. 2d 1071 (1985).
Bowen v. Roy. 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
Brandon v Bd. ofEducation, Guilderland Central School DistrictDrown V. Hot, Sexy, Safe Productions. 68 F. 3d 525 (1995)Brown v. Polk County, Iowa. 37 F. 3d 404 (1994).
Christian Echoes National Ministry v. U.S. 470 F. 2d 849 (1972)
Christian Gospel Church v. City ofSan Fransisco. 896 F. 2d 1221 (1990)
Cra//7 V. Board of Police Commissioners, St. Louis. 920 F. 2d 1402 (1990).
V. Shenandoah Baptist Church. 899 F 2d 1389 (1990)EEOC V. Freemont Christian School. 781 F. 2d 1362 (1986)EEOC V. Pacific Press Publishing
. 676 F. 2d 1272 (1982).EEOC V. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary
. 651 F. 2d 277 (1981)Enipl Division, Dept, ofHuman Resources, Oregon v. Smith. 108 S. Ct. 1444 (1988).
Division, Dept, ofHuman Resources, Oregon v. Smith. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)'
Eellowship Baptist Church v. Iowa Department Public Instruction. 815 F. 2d 485 (1987)
Fleischfresser v. Directors of School District 200. 15 F. 3d 680 (1994).
First Assembly of God, Naples Fla. v. Collier County. 20 F. 3d 419 (1994)
Forest Hills Early Learning Center v. Lukhard. 728 F. 2d 230 (1984).
Golden Eagle v. Johnson. 493 F. 2d 1179 (1974).
Goldman v. Weinberger. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986)'
Graham v. IRS. 822 F. 2d 844 (1987).
Gray v. Gulf Mobile, and Ohio Railroad Co. 429 F. 2d 1064 (1970)
Grosz V. City ofMiami Beach, 721 F. 2d 729 (1983).
Grove v. Mead School District. 753 F. 2d 1528 (1985).
Hernandez v. IRS. 819 F. 2d 1212 (1987).
Hernandez v. IRS. 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989).
Hynes v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville. 667 F. 2d 549 (1982).
Intercommunity Centerfor Justice and Peace v. INS . 910 F. 2d 42 (1990).
International Societyfor Krishna Consciousness v. Houston 689 F. 2d541(1982).
Lakewood Congregation ofJehovas Witnesses v. Lakewood. 699 F. 2d 303 (1983).
Linscott V. Millers Falls Co. 440 F. 2d 14 (1971).
Lyng V. Northwest Indian Cemetary Association. 108 S. Ct 1319 (1988).
Menora v. Illinois High School Association. 683 F. 2d 1030 (1982).
Messiah Baptist hurch v. County of Jefferson, Colorado. 859 F. 2d 820 (1988).
Miller v. IRS. 829 F. 2d 500 (1987).
Murray v. City ofAustin. 947 F. 2d 147 (1991).
Murphy v. ARkansas. 852 F. 2d 1039 (1988).
Nelson v. U.S. 796 F. 2d 164 (1986).
New Life Baptist Church v. East Longmeadow . 885 F. 2d 940 (1989).
Ogden V. U.S. 758 F. 2d 1168 (1985).
Olsen V. DEA. 878 F. 2d 1458 (1989).
Olsen V. IRS. 109 F. 2d 278 (1983).
Palmer V Chicago Board ofEducation. 603 F 2d 1 27 U
1
91^)\Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh. 922 F 2d 12 10 Ago nPortv. Heard
. 764 F. 2d 423 (1985).
' (IFJl).
Potter V. Murray City. 760 F. 2d 1065 (1985)
Rushton V. Nebraska Public Power District 844 F 2d 562 (
\
Ryan V. U.S. 950 F. 2d 458 (I991)
Scott V. Rosenberg. 702 F. 2d 1263 (1983).
Sherwood v. Brown
. 619 F. 2d 47 (1980)
Smith K Board of Education North Bahvon Union Free School Disi 844 F 2d 4()( 1488^
sTboI T CommL^sion of Oh o 9 > 24 1202 990)
'
St. Bariholomew s Church v. NYC. 914 F. 2d 348 (199(1)
'
'
V. bdizahelh Community Hospital v. NLRB
. 708 F. 2d 1436 1983)
«4() F. 2d 1087 (1988).
^C.sTmh“" California. 1 10 S. Ct. 688 (199(1).
U.S. V. Bertram. All F. 2d 1329 (1973)
U.S. V. Bigman. 470 F. 2d 13 (1970).
U.S. V. Campbell. 439 F. 2d 1087 (1971).
U.S. V. Del Socorro. 883 F. 2d 662 (1989).
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Dickens.
Gering.
Greene.
Grayson.
Holmes.
Lee.
Middleton.
Mowat.
V. Merkt
.
Rush.
Schrnucker.
Scopo.
Slabaugh.
Turnbull.
695 F. 2d 765 (1982)
716 F. 2d 615 (1983).
892 F. 2d 453 (1989).
656 F. 2d 1070 (1981).
614 F. 2d 985 (1980).
102 S. Ct. 1051 (1982).
690 F. 2d 820 (1982).
582 F. 2d 1194 (1978).
794 F. 2d 950(1986).
738 F. 2d 497 (1984).
815 F. 2d 413 (1987).
861 F. 2d 339 (1988).
852 F. 2d 1081 (1988).
888 F. 2d 636 (1989).
Vandiver y. Hardin County Board ofEducation 925 F. 2d 927 ( 1 99 1
)
Vernon v. Los Angeles. 27 F. 3d 1385 (1994).
Walsh V. Louisiana High School Athletic Association. 616 F. 2d 152 (1980)
Wilson V. Block. 708 F. 2d 735 (1983).
Wilson V. NLRB. 920 F. 2d 1282 (1990).
Windsor Park Baptist Church v. Arkansas Activity Association. 658 F. 2d 618 (1981).
Prison 1 (PIW)
Abdullah v. Kinnison.
Brooks V. Wainwright.
Brown v. Wainwright.
Childs V. Duckworth
.
Cole V. Fulcomer.
Dreibelbis v. Marks.
Hill V. Blackwell.
Jaworski v. Schmidt
.
Kahane v. Carlson.
769 F. 2d 345 (1985).
428 F. 2d 652 (1970).
419 F. 2d 1376 (1970).
705 F. 2d 915 (1983).
758 F. 2d 124 (1985).
742 F. 2d 792 (1984).
774 F. 2d 338 (1985).
684 F. 2d 498 (1982).
527 F. 2d 492 (1975).
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LaReau v. MacDougall.
Little V. Norris.
Madyim v. Franzen.
O’Malley v’. Brierly.
Smith V. Coughlin.
St. Clair v. Cuyler.
Teterud v. Burns.
Walker v. Blackwell
.
473 F. 2d 974 (1972).
787 F. 2d 1241 (1986).
704 F. 2d 954 (1983)
477 F. 2d785 (1973)
748 F. 2d 783 (1984).
634 F. 2d 109 (1980).
522 F. 2d 357 (1975).
411 F. 2d 23 (1969).
Note: The following were colleeted but not
luture reference
part ot analysis at this phase of project - for
Prison 2 (P2L) - Prisoner’s claims victorious
Ali V. Cousins.
Higgins V. Burroughs.
LaFevers v. Saffle.
Malik V. Brown.
McCabe v. Arave.
McKinney v. Maynard.
Mosier v. Maynard.
Phelps V. Dunn.
Reed v. Faulkner.
Salaam v. Lockhart
Ward V. Walsh.
Young V. Coughlin.
Young V. Lane.
912 F. 2d 86 (1990).
816 F. 2d 119 (1987).
936 F. 2d 1117 (1991).
16 F. 3d 330 (1994).
827 F. 2d 634 (1987).
952 F. 2d 350 (1991).
937 F. 2d 1521 (1991).
965 F. 2d 93 (1992).
842 F. 2d 960 (1988).
856 F. 2d 1120 (1988).
1 F. 3d 873 (1993).
866 F. 2d 567 (1989).
922 F. 2d 370 (1991).
Prison 2 (P2W) - State interests prevailed
Ahdur-Rahman v. Michigan. 65 F. 3d 489 (1995).
Allen V. Toombs.
Aziz. V. Moore.
Bear v. Nix.
Bettis V. Delo
.
Blair-Bey v. Nix.
Brown v. Harris.
Campbell v. Purkett
.
Cooper, et. al. v. Yard.
Dunavant v. Moore.
Eason v. Thaler.
Farid v. Smith.
Felix V. Rolan.
Friedman Arizona.
Friend v. Kolodziencz.ak.
Hadi V. Horn.
Hall V. Bellnion.
Iron Eyes v. Henry.
Jordan v. Gardner.
Mark v. Nix.
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APPENDIX C
DATA FILES
File name Description
.ho
to all non-prison cases between 1963 and present' wherethe proffered claim of a policy’s violation of an individual’s right to religious free
exercise was superseded by the state’s interests or needs.
2) Lose - All those non-prison cases between 1963 and present where the
prevailed
^ ^ policy’s violation of an individual’s right to religious free exercise
3) PIW - All those prison cases prior to the 1987 doctrinal shift where the prison
administration or state policy prevailed over an inmate’s claim of violation of their free
exercise rights
4) PIL - All those prison cases prior to 1987 where the prison administration or
s ate policy was superseded by an inmate’s claim of violation of their free exercise rights
5) P2W - All those prison cases subsequent to 1987’s doctrinal sea change
regarding standards ol evaluation of free exercise claims by prisoners, and where the
prison administration or state policy prevailed
6) P2L - All those prison cases subsequent to 1987’s doctrinal sea change
regarding standards of evaluation ol free exercise claims by prisoners, and where the
prison administration or state policy was superseded by a prisoner’s rights.
7) Win -t- Lose - All non prison cases
8) Win -I- PIW - All cases where state policy or action upheld and compelling
interest applied.
9) Lose -I- PIL - All cases where individual rights upheld and compelling interest
applied.
10) (Win -I- PIW) -t- (Lose + PIL) - All cases compelling interest applied.
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APPENDIX D
OCCURRENCE FREQUENCY
Occurrence Frequencies for the most highly occuring phrases
1. Cases where state interests prevailed (file 8)
Qcc., Phrase, Relative Occurrence freouencv (% highesis (M'c ^
3009 u.s.
1875 court
1867 f.2d
1846 1. ed
1833 s. ct
1187 religion
1180 government
1106 district court
1061 united states
1059 state
1057 case
941 church
931 cir
769 interest(s) *
686 exercise
644 section
629 law
628 belief(s) 939 *
617 id.
581 plaintiffs
558 use
532 burden
522 evidence
5 1 1 exemption
499 right(s) 868 *
496 congress
479 defendant
46 1 appellants
459 part
440 order
434 u.s.c.
433 issue
417 defendants
412 purpose(s) 717 *
412 conduct
410 statute
385 action
378 cert.
377 first amendment
370 fact
370 claim(s)614*
100
.00%
62.31%
62.05%
61.35%
60.92%
39.45%
39.22%
36.76%
35.26%
35.19%
35.13%
31.27%
30.94%
25.56%* combined 33%
22.80%
21.40%
20.90%
20.87% * combined 31%
20.51%
19.31%
18.54%
17.68%
17.35%
16.98%
16.58% * combined 28%
16.48%
15.92%
15.32%
15.25%
14.62%
14.42%
14.39%
13.86%
13.69% * combined 24%
13.69%
13.63%
12.79%
12.56%
12.53%
12.30%
12.30% * combined 20%
369
369
363
362
350
339
335
334
333
327
325
325
324
314
314
313
311
311
310
310
309
309
309
305
302
298
294
292
285
282
279
275
274
272
268
267
263
260
259
250
244
244
241
239
237
234
233
230
228
228
225
224
221
221
rights
act
supreme court
cases
members
practice(s) 6 1 4 *
opinion
decision
regulation(s) 631 *
amendment
time
question
s. ct.
city
appeal
counsel
elTect
beliel'
record
application
person
education
activities
purposes
violation
regulations
basis
plaintilT
courts
b
school (s) 539 *
practices
I'reedom
board
services
trial
judgment
schools
history
children (child) 359 *
sherbert
claims
information
argument
matter
persons
irs
peyote
rule
authority
establishment clause
interests
secretary
employees
12.26%
12.26%
12.06%
12.03%
1 1 .63%
1 1.27% * combined 20%
11.1 3%
1 1.10%
1 1.07% * combined 21%
10.87%
10.80%
10.80%
10.77%
10.44%
10.44%
10.40%
10.34%
10.34%
10.30%
10.30%
10.27%
10.27%
10.27%
10.14%
10.04%
9.90%
9.77%
9.70%
9.47%
9.37%
9.27% * combined 18%
9.14%
9.1 1%
9.04%
8.91%
8.87%
8.74%
8.64%
8.61%
8.31% * combined 12%
8.1 1%
8.1 1%
8.01%
7.94%
7.88%
7.78%
7.74%
7.64%
7.58%
7.58%
7.48%
7.44%
7.34%
7.34%
1 86
221
221
220
220
220
220
217
216
214
212
21
1
208
205
204
201
200
198
197
195
194
194
193
191
189
186
183
183
182
182
179
178
177
174
173
172
172
172
170
168
168
167
167
167
166
163
163
162
161
161
160
160
160
159
157
benefits 7.34%
appeals 7.34%
yoder 7.31%
means 7.31%
faith 7.31%
f.supp 7.31%
free exercise clause 7.21%
organization 7.18%
facts 7.11%
individual 7.05%
laws 7.01%
protection 6.91%
summary judgment 6.81%
inc. 6.78%
respect 6.68%
motion 6.65%
inmates 6.58%
denial 6.55%
smith 6.48%
n 6.45%
benefit 6.45%
reason 6.41%
nature 6.35%
relief 6.28%
way 6.18%
policy 6.08%
payments 6.08%
testimony 6.05%
property 6.05%
j- 5.95%
status 5.92%
aliens 5.88%
parents 5.78%
activity 5.75%
reasons 5.72%
organizations 5.72%
commissioner 5.72%
process 5.65%
review 5.58%
employee 5.58%
view 5.55%
tax 5.55%
students 5.55%
defense 5.52%
investigation 5.42%
constitution 5.42%
thomas 5.38%
years 5.35%
circumstances 5.35%
test 5.32%
Jury 5.32%
course 5.32%
power 5.28%
institution 5.22%
1 87
156
156
156
155
155
154
154
153
152
152
152
152
151
151
150
148
147
147
147
146
146
146
146
144
144
143
143
142
142
141
141
138
138
137
136
136
136
135
135
134
134
133
132
131
130
130
129
129
129
128
128
128
127
127
lee
example
district
grounds
emphasis
requirement
holding
discrimination
parties
ordinance(s) 195 *
institutions
brief
standard
area
payment
marijuana
society
light
discretion
support
id
exception
analysis
people
number
instruction
churches
requirements
determination
context
actions
result
place
terms
statement
judges
issues
extent
complaint
doctrine
conclusion
funds
exercise clause
hearing
intent
individuals
new york
need
employer
vemer
request
religions
questions
others
5.18%
5.18%
5.18%
5.15%
5.15%
5.12%
5.12%
5.08%
5.05%
5.05% * combined 6%
5.05%
5.05%
5.02%
5.02%
4.99%
4.92%
4.89%
4.89%
4.89%
4.85%
4.85%
4.85%
4.85%
4.79%
4.79%
4.75%
4.75%
4.72%
4.72%
4.69%
4.69%
4.59%
4.59%
4.55%
4.52%
4.52%
4.52%
4.49%
4.49%
4.45%
4.45%
4.42%
4.39%
4.35%
4.32%
4.32%
4.29%
4.29%
4.29%
4.25%
4.25%
4.25%
4.22%
4.22%
188
126
126
126
126
125
125
125
125
124
124
124
124
123
123
122
122
121
120
1 19
118
118
1 17
1 16
1 16
1 16
116
116
1 15
1 15
1 15
1 14
114
1 13
112
1 12
112
112
111
111
1 1
1
1 10
109
109
109
109
108
108
108
107
107
107
107
106
106
states 4 . 19%
speech 4
. 19%
public 4
. 19%
provision 4
. 19%
service 4 . 15%
possession 4
. 15%
manner 4
. 15%
enforcement 4
. 15%
system 4
. 12%
state interest 4 . 1
2
%
form 4 . 12%
county 4 . 12%
provisions 4 .09%
cause 4
.09%
worship 4 .05%
inquiry 4 .05%
impact 4 .02%
Wisconsin 3 .99%
addition 3 . 95%
god 3 .92%
association 3 .92%
circuit judge 3 . 89%
title vii 3 . 86%
indictment 3 . 86%
failure 3 . 86%
exercise rights 3 . 86%
accommodation 3 . 86%
group 3 . 82%
decisions 3 . 82%
areas 3 . 82%
respondents 3 .79%
legislation 3 .79%
inteiprotation 3 .76%
refusal 3 . 72%
prohibition 3 .72%
land 3 .72%
conviction 3 .72%
prosecution 3 . 69%
principle 3 . 69%
opinionby 3 . 69%
employment 3 . 66%
states court 3 .62%
showing 3 . 62%
petitioners 3 . 62%
child 3 . 62%
hair 3 . 59%
finding 3 . 59%
entry 3 . 59%
d.c. 3 . 56%
California 3 . 56%
ante 3 . 56%
amount 3 . 56%
treatment 3 . 52%
response 3 . 52%
1 89
106 prison
^
106 language
^ S2%
106 february 3 : 52%
106 appellees
^
105 work 349%
105 program 3*49%
105 opportunity 3^49%
105 hemandez 349%
104 trial court 3.46%
2. Cases where individual claims prevailed over proffered state interests
Phrase, Rclaavc Ocnirrcncc In- I'/, hivhi'si.; o,-,- '
1 ()().()()%
/J 1 court 68.52%
684 s. ct 62.41%
674 1. cd 61.50%
572 religion 52.19%
556 state 50.73%
489 district court 44.62%
408 f.2d 37.23%
389 case 35.49%
323 exercise 29.47%
316 beliefs(s) 593 * 28.83% * combined 54%
111 belief 25.27%
275 city 25.09%
271 right(s) 457 * 24.73% * combined 42%
261 law 23.81%
248 intcrest(s) 369 * 22.63% * combined 33%
240 cir 21.90%
231 id. 21.08%
228 government 20.80%
207 children or child 31 1 * 18.89% * combined 28%
204 opinion 18.61%
202 plaintiffs 18.43%
194 order 17.70%
192 church 17.52%
191 plaintiff 17.43%
188 education 17.15%
186 rights 16.97%
180 defendants 16.42%
178 practice(s) 273 * 16.24% combined 23%
174 burden 15.88%
172 free exercise clause 15.69%
164 cases 14.96%
162 claim 14.78%
161 use 14.69%
161 conduct 14.69%
158 tsa 14.42%
158 action 14.42%
153 decision 13.96%
150 part 13.69%
149 united states 13.59%
147 freedom 13.41%
143 issue 13.05%
142 sherbert 12.96%
140 supreme court 12.77%
139 judgment 12.68%
138 s . ct. 12.59%
135 first amendment 12.32%
134 record 12.23%
131 smith 11.95%
130 question 11.86%
130 evidence 11.86%
191
128
125
121
121
120
119
119
1 16
1 14
111
105
104
104
101
101
100
99
99
99
97
95
95
95
95
94
94
94
94
93
92
91
91
91
91
90
89
89
89
88
87
87
87
87
86
86
86
86
84
84
84
84
82
82
81
rcgulation(s) 212 *
members
purpose(s) 192*
interests
violation
ordinance(s) 210 *
basis
rule
thomas
appeal
courts
fact
child
school (s) 185 *
protection
complaint
inmates
faith
act
work
way
u.s.c.
practices
affirmation
statute
society
reasons
parents
effect
provisions
ordinances
life
exemption
claims
n
requirement
benefits
appellants
nature
laws
j-
course
amendment
yoder
verner
section
board
schools
regulations
immunity
establishment clause
students
hearing
holding
1 1.68% * combined 19%
1 1.41%
1 1.04% * combined 17%
1 1 .04%
10.95%
10.86% * combined 19%
10.86%
10.58%
10.40%
10.13%
9.58%
9.49%
9.49%
9.22% * combined 17%
9.22%
9. 1 2%
9.03%
9.03%
9.03%
8.85%
8.67%
8.67%
8.67%
8.67%
8.58%
8.58%
8.58%
8.58%
8.49%
8.39%
8.30%
8.30%
8.30%
8.30%
8.21%
8.12%
8.12%
8.12%
8.03%
7.94%
7.94%
7.94%
7.94%
7.85%
7.85%
7.85%
7.85%
7.66%
7.66%
7.66%
7.66%
7.48%
7.48%
7.39%
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81 animals 7.39%
80 view 7.30%
80 time 7.30%
80 actions 7.30%
79 proceedings 7.21%
78 Wisconsin 7.12%
78 state interest 7.12%
78 application 7.12%
77 school board 7.03%
77 person 7.03%
77 history 7.03%
77 cert. 7.03%
76 persons 6.93%
75 relief 6.84%
75 activity 6.84%
74 means 6.75%
74 matter 6.75%
72 respect 6.57%
72 number 6.57%
71 purposes 6.48%
71 injunction 6.48%
71 Callahan 6.48%
70 oath 6.39%
70 god 6.39%
70 f. supp 6.39%
69 years 6.30%
68 test 6.20%
68 refusal 6.20%
68 florida 6.20%
68 emphasis 6.20%
67 program 6.11%
67 counsel 6.11%
67 amish 6.11%
66 summary Judgment 6.02%
66 people 6.02%
66 hialeah 6.02%
66 circumstances 6.02%
66 cause 6.02%
66 army 6.02%
65 neutrality 5.93%
65 facts 5.93%
65 article 5.93%
65 argument 5.93%
64 sankirtan 5.84%
63 states 5.75%
63 others 5.75%
63 office 5.75%
63 individual 5.75%
63 constitution 5.75%
63 b 5.75%
62 prisoners 5.66%
62 activities 5.66%
61 day 5.57%
60 result 5.47%
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60
60
60
59
59
59
59
59
58
57
57
57
57
56
56
56
55
55
55
55
55
quaring
provision
property
terms
state court
seminary
district
concern
support
tennessee
issues
country
appeals
power
department
appellee
reason
peyote
parties
new york
judge
5 .47%
5 . 47%
5 . 47%
5 . 38%
5 . 38%
5 . 38%
5 . 38%
5 . 38%
5 . 29%
5 . 20%
5 . 20%
5 . 20%
5 . 20%
5 . 11%
5 . 11%
5 . 11%
5 .02%
5 .02%
5 .02%
5 .02%
5 .02%
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APPENDIX E
RELATIVE OCCURRENCE FREQUENCIES
superseS'Se oah”sta7(i.t file 9)!'’°''^
nounphrase (rei occ.freq. in file 9 to rel occ.freq. in file 8)
religion (52% to 39%)
state (51% to 35%)
district court (45% to 37%)
exercise (29% to 23%)
belief(s) (54% to 31%)
city (25% to 10%)
right(s) (42% to 28%)
children-child (28% to 12%)
education (17% to 10%)
practice(s) (25% to 20%)
freedom (13% to 9%)
sherbert (13% to 8%)
smith (12% to 6%)
ordinance(s) (19% to 6%)
society (9% to 5%)
free exercise clause (16% to 7%)
life (8% to .5%)
god (6% to 3%)
195
and preSiM ^-‘’mpelling
model: nounphrase (rel. occ. freq. in file 8 to rel occ. freq. in file 9)
government (39% to 21%)
church (31% to 17%)
united states (35% to 13%)
congress (16% to 4%)
statute (14% to 9%)
exemption (17% to 8%)
purpose(s) (24% to 17%)
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APPENDIX F
CO-OCCURRENCE ASSOCIATIONS
File 8 - Cases where slate interests prevailed
InFinder found 928 terms related to: religion
‘ religion posed problems for state policy?
p.lamtiffs’ religion - not significant
— - interesting but not clear on its meaning
respondents' religion
-not significant
religion
religion rcqnirpmpnf
Devote places
Icmale soldiers
b. free exercise
nationalism
nonreligion
state cntanglemem
faith mandates
calculus
burden results
advances
government entanglement
property protection statute
religion clauses
- reference to Smith .?
- idiosyncratic likely,
- as rationale for compelling interests?
- Establishment language? patterns in Dicta?
- Balancing test language
File 9 - Cases where state interests superseded
InFinder tound 536 terms related to: religion
nonreligion
Irec exercise clause.
-Interestingly, the clause is discussed more here
precepts
conception - Procreative? not likely, a religious “conception” perhaps
discrimination because - Sensible association,
disputes - Language of disputes rather than “exemptions”
^te governments - Slate - local laws more likely to be superseded
imposition - See “disputes” above
religion clauses
religion
photograph requirement burdens - Idiosyncratic, several cases dealt with photo id’s
heritage
government entanglement
ience - Interesting, but not sure how it fits, likely idiosyncratic
slate religion
adherents
toward
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science
process clansp Due Process? Interesting that it would crop up here
File 8 - Cases where state interests prevailed
InFinder found 710 terms related to: interest
tax benefits places - Exemptions from tax policy sought
petitioners' exercise
burden denial
- Claims of free exercise burden fail
interest claiming protection
~ Peculiar, referent to statute, wordy iudge'^
interest
government interest
state interest
tax collection
- See “tax benefits places” above
say
n6 because
stake
welfare traud - Another area where state interests are
compelling
unemployment compensation statutes - See “welfare fraud” above
id. thus
workplace
solvency * Doctrinal coherency? economic issues heavy?
amendment interest
overriding - Doctrinal synonyms used more heavily
interest test
File 9 - Cases where state interests superseded
InFinder found 337 terms related to: interest
student groups - Idiosyncratic - though several cases were of education variety
state university - Idiosyncratic
liberty interest *Doctrinal coherency? ideological element to judicial rhetoric
interest
state interest
motorists - Idiosyncratic - photographic requirement / license cases
state interest test
proximity
licensees - Idiosyncratic
transactions
government interest
applications
identification
photograph requirement - See licensees, motorists, identification above
exclusion
magnitude - Balancing test language?
interest test
crowd control - Idiosyncratic
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conccssionairps:
- Ditto
animal carcasses - Likely idiosyncratic
File 8 - Cases where slate interests prevailed
InFinder tound 1001 terms related to! exercise
exercise litigation
school attendance statute - Idiosyncratic? or a reference to Yoder
exercise protections
religion problem * Doctrinal coherency‘s
process right
state accommodation * Exemptions policy as the default
value judgment * Doctrinal coherency's
exercise clause
exercise riphis
free exercise
exercise claim
exercise challenge
sfate compulsion - State is compelled, balancing test language
ridicule ^
restraint argument
religion Shenandoah - Idiosyncratic
peyote places
- Smith references?
interest claiming protection
a-e
exercise
File 9 - Cases where state interests superseded
InFinder found 607 terms related to: exercise
animal-sacrifice laws
smith rule
Smith
protections
regulates
issue discriminates
designs
rule smith
quotation marks
free exercise clause
exercise claim
historical understanding
case law
exercise
neutrality
- Heavy use, esp. since most cases in this set come before
* Doctrinal coherency? Discrimination by state policy
* Doctrinal coherency? Judges referring to traditions of
interpretation and knowledge of religious beliefs / actions
* Doctrinal coherency?
state actions
199
score
inleresi
claiming proieciic^n
free exercise claim
exercise clause
while
Doctrinal coherency? Rather than seeking exemption or
exceptions as in the other set of cavSes, judges articulate
claims in terms of protection
- Bizarre
File 8 - Cases where state interests prevailed
InFinder found 558 terms related to: beliefs
mishler -
-Delinitely idiosyncratic'
beliefs
david smith - Another idiosyncrasy
plaintiffs' beliefs
graduation exercises - Ditto
diploma
government benefii*;
prison officials' beliefs
burdens incident
state conditions
receipt controls
government program.^;
plaintiffs' claims
centrality
prospect
perjury clause
sincerity
tendency
beings
security considerations
File 9 - Cases where state interests superseded
InFinder found 291 terms related to: beliefs
plaintiffs' beliefs
beliefs
diploma
amish beliefs
unemployment
predicament
pressure
plaintiff parents
holt readers
juror
* Doctrinal coherency? either a reference to Yoder or an
inordinate amount of repeats in the case itself
* Doctrinal coherency? Expert knowledge tells us this already
reaffirmation though.
- Idiosyncratic
200
second commandment
observances
objector
holt books
themes
grant
employers
centuries
revelation
evolution
- Idiosyncratic? Odd for sure.
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APPENDIX G
CO-OCCURRENCE NODES - USER DEFINED
File 8 - Cases where stale interests prevailed
InFinder found 314 terms related to: compelling
interest test
welfare fraud
state interest
exercise inquiry
pienta
fields
2()0()bb-l
projects
2()()()bb
workers' compensation program
government interests
precedents
interest
border control laws
government interest
slabaugh
state interests
centrality
stake
bowen
magnitude
overriding
drug laws
fulfillment
approach
means
drugs
claimant
exercise rights
fourth circuit
- Same significance as in File 9
- Ditto
- Ditto
- In both files, consistency of discourse
- In both files, consistency of discourse
- Remarkably in both, would seem idiosyncratic
* Doctrinal coherency?
- Idiosyncratic - case name
- Doctrinal synonym
- Not surprisingly correlated to compelling interests
File 9 - Cases where state interests superseded
InFinder found 452 terms related to: compelling
interest lest - Almost same significance as in file 8
welfare fraud - Ditto
state interest test
state interest - Ditto
student groups * Originally suspected of idiosyncrasy, but perhaps it is a
doctrinal coherency indicator. . .education and children may beat
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riel (is
state interests
state university
licensees
pienta
exercise inquiry
ssn requiremoni
motorisi.s
ensuring
anomaly
2()()()bb-l
2()()()bb
interest
workers' compensation program
state interests
precedents
nebraska oiTici;(l.s
border control laws
photograph re()uircmenl
projects
slabaugh
government interests
iustirication
exercise right
magnitude
means
File 8 - Cases where state interests prevailed
InFinder found 1340 terms related to: state interest
* Note: remarkable overlap of highly co-occurring concepts
interest claiming protection
state interest
solvency
unemployment compensation statutes
respondents smith
pienta
drug laws
users
Imra
plaintiff principals
overriding
interest
liberty interest
stake
magnitude
drugs
principals
women guards - Idiosyncratic likely, but interesting
state court
sex education policy - Idiosyncratic as well, again interesting that sex ed. would
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»rpX.:aWr"I " ‘-'“y P'--ns -ppon
state
part ii
state interests
claimant
union shop
exercise protection
Oregon
interest test
relationship standard
exercise rights
Smith! Idiosyncratic.
File 9 - Cases where state interests superseded
InFinder found 1563 terms related to; state interest
interest claiming protection
church group
motorists
student groups
state interest
- The next three phrases are all indicators of subject areas
where compelling interests of the state are trumped
state university
solvency
. This is odd, would be expected to correlate more highly
with other set of cases, used as a rationale lor state interest
in certain policies (i.e. tax or unemployment)
being compelling.
unemployment compensation statutes - See above
respondents smith
pienta
drug laws
Imra
photograph requirement
licensees
liberty interest
interest
state interest test
plaintiff principals
ensuring
magnitude
respondents' claim
nebraska otticials - Trouble with Nebraska! Prison case idiosyncrasy
overriding
users
licensee
state interests
ssn requirement
stake
principals
drugs
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